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  3. American Economic Review: Insights
  4. March 2024
  5. Steady-State Social Distancing and Vaccination

Steady-State Social Distancing and Vaccination

  • Christopher Avery
  • Frederick Chen
  • David McAdams
American Economic Review: Insights
vol. 6, no. 1, March 2024
(pp. 1-19)
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Abstract

This paper analyzes an economic-epidemiological model of infectious disease where it is possible to become infected more than once and individual agents make endogenous choices of social distancing and vaccine adoption. Protective actions adopted by any one person reduce future risks to other people. The positive externalities associated with these behaviors provide motivation for vaccine and social-distancing subsidies, but subsidizing one protective action reduces incentives for other protective actions. A vaccine subsidy increases vaccine adoption and reduces steady-state infection prevalence; a social distancing subsidy can either increase or reduce steady-state infection prevalence.

Citation

Avery, Christopher, Frederick Chen, and David McAdams. 2024. "Steady-State Social Distancing and Vaccination." American Economic Review: Insights, 6 (1): 1-19. DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20220699

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D62 Externalities
  • D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
  • I12 Health Behavior
  • I18 Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health