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  3. American Economic Review
  4. March 2004
  5. Costly Voting

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Costly Voting

  • Tilman Borgers
American Economic Review
vol. 94, no. 1, March 2004
(pp. 57–66)
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Abstract

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Paretodominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.

Citation

Borgers, Tilman. 2004. "Costly Voting." American Economic Review, 94 (1): 57–66. DOI: 10.1257/000282804322970706

JEL Classification

  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior