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  4. April 2012
  5. Carrot or Stick? The Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences in a Haystack Model

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Carrot or Stick? The Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences in a Haystack Model

  • Florian Herold
American Economic Review
vol. 102, no. 2, April 2012
(pp. 914–40)
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Abstract

We study the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity: the willingness to reward and the willingness to punish. First, both preferences for rewarding and preferences for punishing can survive provided that individuals interact within separate groups. Second, rewarders survive only in coexistence with self-interested preferences, but punishers either vanish or dominate the population entirely. Third, the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively. Rewarders can invade a population of self-interested players. The existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers, who then crowd out all other preferences. (JEL C71, C72, C73, D64, K42)

Citation

Herold, Florian. 2012. "Carrot or Stick? The Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences in a Haystack Model." American Economic Review, 102 (2): 914–40. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.2.914

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C71 Cooperative Games
  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
  • D64 Altruism
  • K42 Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law