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American Economic Journal: Applied Economics: Vol. 3 No. 2 (April 2011)
AEJ: Applied Volume. 3, Issue 2 | 
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AEJ: Applied Forthcoming Articles
The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta
Article Citation
Hsieh, Chang-Tai,
Edward Miguel,
Daniel Ortega, and
Francisco Rodriguez. 2011. "The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's Maisanta."
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
3(2): 196-214.
DOI: 10.1257/app.3.2.196
DOI: 10.1257/app.3.2.196
Abstract
In 2004, the Hugo Chávez regime in Venezuela distributed the list of
several million voters who had attempted to remove him from office
throughout the government bureaucracy, allegedly to identify and punish these voters. We match the list of petition signers distributed by the government to household survey respondents to measure the economic effects of being identified as a Chávez political opponent. We find that voters who were identified as Chávez opponents experienced a 5 percent drop in earnings and a 1.3 percentage point drop in employment rates after the voter list was released. (JEL D72, O17)
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Authors
Hsieh, Chang-Tai (U Chicago)
Miguel, Edward (U CA, Berkeley)
Ortega, Daniel (IESA, Caracas)
Rodriguez, Francisco (UN Development Program)
Miguel, Edward (U CA, Berkeley)
Ortega, Daniel (IESA, Caracas)
Rodriguez, Francisco (UN Development Program)
JEL Classifications
D72: Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
O17: Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
O17: Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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