## Online Appendix

## The School to Prison Pipeline:

## Long-Run Impacts of School Suspensions on Adult Crime

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Appendix Table A1. Tests of Covariate Balance by Race and Gender

|  | Students of Color |  | White |  | Male |  | Female |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Suspensions | $\begin{gathered} \text { Test } \\ \text { Scores } \end{gathered}$ | Suspensions | $\begin{gathered} \hline \text { Test } \\ \text { Scores } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Suspensions | $\begin{gathered} \text { Test } \\ \text { Scores } \end{gathered}$ | Suspensions | $\begin{gathered} \text { Test } \\ \text { Scores } \end{gathered}$ |
| Prior-Year Days Suspended | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.001 \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.000 \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.002 \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ |
| Prior-Year Test Scores | $\begin{gathered} -0.003 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.000 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.000 \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ |
| Black |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ |
| Hispanic |  |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.029 * * \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.010 \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ |
| Male | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.003 \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ |  |  |  |  |
| Special Education | $\begin{gathered} -0.007 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.001 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.011 \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ |
| Limited English Proficiency | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.011 \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.001 \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ |
| Elementary School Susp. Indicator | $\begin{aligned} & -0.002 \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.004) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.008 \\ (0.006) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.008 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.008^{*} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.002 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.001 \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.000 \\ & (0.010) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| P-value for joint hypothesis F-test | 0.651 | 0.778 | 0.710 | 0.514 | 0.430 | 0.896 | 0.934 | 0.883 |
| N | 14493 | 14493 | 11753 | 11753 | 13345 | 13345 | 12901 | 12901 |

Notes: In this table, we present the results of regressions of school effects on a set of baseline variables. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects and grade fixed effects. We present the results for school effects on suspensions in column (1) and school effects on test scores in column (2). In the second to last row, we present the p -value on an F -test for the joint hypothesis that all the coefficients in each column are equal to zero. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01,{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05,{ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.10$

|  | Students of Color Male |  | Students of Color Female |  | White Male |  | White <br> Female |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Suspensions | Test Scores | Suspensions | Test Scores | Suspensions | Test Scores | Suspensions | Test Scores |
| Prior-Year Days Suspended | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.000 \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.003 * \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.000 \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.004 \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ |
| Prior-Year Test Scores | $\begin{gathered} -0.004 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.002 \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.001 \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.003 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.004 \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.012^{*} \\ & (0.007) \end{aligned}$ |

Black

Hispanic

Male

| Special Education | -0.003 | 0.000 | -0.012 | 0.006 | 0.010 | 0.006 | 0.012 | 0.020 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $(0.006)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.019)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.012)$ | $(0.014)$ | $(0.020)$ |
| Limited English Proficiency | -0.007 | -0.015 | 0.014 | -0.010 | 0.002 | 0.003 | -0.022 | 0.016 |
|  | $(0.009)$ | $(0.012)$ | $(0.018)$ | $(0.016)$ | $(0.023)$ | $(0.013)$ | $(0.026)$ | $(0.039)$ |
| Elementary School Susp. Indicator | -0.001 | 0.007 | -0.002 | 0.000 | -0.016 | -0.013 | 0.017 | -0.010 |
|  | $(0.006)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.008)$ | $(0.011)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.010)$ | $(0.016)$ | $(0.036)$ |
| P-value for joint hypothesis F-test | 0.497 | 0.764 | 0.663 | 0.269 | 0.610 | 0.662 | 0.533 | 0.512 |
| N | 7320 | 7320 | 7173 | 7173 | 6025 | 6025 | 5728 | 5728 |

Notes: In this table, we present the results of regressions of school effects on a set of baseline variables. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects and grade fixed effects. We present the results for school effects on suspensions in column (1) and school effects on test scores in column (2). In the second to last row, we present the $p$-value on an $F$-test for the joint hypothesis that all the coefficients in each column are equal to zero. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. ${ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01, * * \mathrm{p}<0.05, * p<0.10$

|  | Remained <br> Enrolled in CMS <br> in 2002-03 | Has Test Score <br> in 2002-03 | Remained <br> Enrolled in CMS <br> in High School |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sch. Effect on Suspensions | -0.010 | -0.004 | 0.005 |
|  | $(0.008)$ | $(0.009)$ | $(0.010)$ |
| N | 25848 | 25848 | 25848 |

Notes: In this table we present the relationship between assigned school suspension effects and indicators of student attrition. The sample includes all students in grades 5 through 7 in 200102 (i.e., the students who should have moved to a middle school in 2002-03). The outcome variable in column (1) is in indicator of enrollment in CMS in 2002-03. The outcome variable in column (2) is an indicator of having a non-missing test score in 2002-03. The outcome variable in column (3) is an indicator on enrollment in CMS in any high school grade. The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 1 SD increase in estimated school effect on days suspended. Each regression includes neighborhood by 2002 school zone fixed effects. In addition to these fixed effects, all regressions control for lagged achievement on state tests, LEP status, SPED status, gender, race, and grade level. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<$ 0.01

|  | Days Susp. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { ISS } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { OSS } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Susp. <br> Indicator | Test Scores | Dropout | 4-Year College | Arrested $(16-21)$ | Incarc. $(16-21)$ | Number Arrests (16-21) | Number Incarc. (16-21) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sch. Effect Tercile 2 | 0.724** | 0.131 | 0.593** | 0.005 | -0.026 | 0.023 | -0.040 | 0.056*** | 0.044*** | 0.269** | 0.243*** |
|  | (0.289) | (0.108) | (0.233) | (0.023) | (0.047) | (0.023) | (0.034) | (0.022) | (0.015) | (0.116) | (0.089) |
| Sch. Effect Tercile 3 | 0.892*** | 0.182* | 0.710*** | 0.021 | 0.019 | 0.035 | 0.013 | 0.070*** | 0.052*** | 0.302*** | 0.259*** |
|  | (0.315) | (0.093) | (0.271) | (0.023) | (0.050) | (0.025) | (0.035) | (0.021) | (0.013) | (0.107) | (0.082) |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 21153 | 26246 | 17275 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |

Notes: In each column we present the coefficients, standard errors, and sample size from a separate estimate of Equation 3, including indicators for school effect terciles. The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a second (or third) tercile a school, relative to a school with suspension effects in the lowest tercile (i.e., the least strict schools). Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects. In this sense, we are comparing students who attended the same school in 2001-02 and lived in the same neighborhood but were assigned different schools in 2002-03. In addition to these fixed effects, all regressions control for lagged achievement on state tests, LEP status, SPED status, gender, race, and grade level. Test scores are the average of students' scores on the math and reading state tests and are standardized across the full sample by year and grade. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. $* \mathrm{p}<0.1 * * \mathrm{p}<0.05 * * * \mathrm{p}<0.01$

|  | Arrested (16-18) | Arrested $(19-21)$ | Incarc. $(16-18)$ | Incarc. $(19-21)$ | Number Arrests (16-18) | Number Arrests (19-21) | Number Incarc. (16-18) | Number Incarc. $(19-21)$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sch. Effect on Suspensions | 0.013 | 0.035*** | 0.014** | 0.017*** | 0.041** | 0.099*** | 0.045*** | 0.067*** |
|  | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.006) | (0.006) | (0.018) | (0.025) | (0.015) | (0.021) |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |

Notes: In this table we present the relationship between school suspension effects and crime outcomes, by age. We separately examining outcomes that occurred between the ages of 16 and 18 (even columns) and outcomes that occurred between the ages of 19 and 21 (odd columns). The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 1 SD increase in estimated school effect on days suspended. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects. In addition to these fixed effects, all regressions control for lagged achievement on state tests, LEP status, SPED status, gender, race, and grade level. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. * $\mathrm{p}<0.1{ }^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05 * * * \mathrm{p}<0.01$

Appendix Table A5. Impacts of Days Suspended on Type of Arrest

|  | Serious Violent Crime Arrest (16-21) | Serious <br> Property Crime <br> Arrest <br> $(16-21)$ | Other Arrest $(16-21)$ | Number of Serious Violent Crime Arrests (16-21) | Number of Serious Property Crime Arrests (16-21) | Number of Other (NonSerious) Arrests (16-21) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sch. Effect on Suspensions | 0.001 | 0.018*** | 0.013** | 0.001 | 0.041** | 0.099*** |
|  | (0.004) | (0.006) | (0.005) | (0.005) | (0.016) | (0.024) |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |

Notes: In this table we present the relationship between school suspension effects and subsequent type of arrest. Serious violent crimes are murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Serious property crimes are arson, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft. The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 1 SD increase in estimated school effect on days suspended. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects. In addition to these fixed effects, all regressions control for lagged achievement on state tests, LEP status, SPED status, gender, race, and grade level. Test scores are the average of students' scores on the math and reading state tests and are standardized across the full sample by year and grade. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. * $\mathrm{p}<0.1 * * \mathrm{p}<0.05 * * * \mathrm{p}<0.01$

Appendix Table A6. Impacts of Suspension Likelihood on Suspensions, Achievement, Attainment and Crime

|  | Days Susp. | $\begin{gathered} \text { Days } \\ \text { ISS } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { OSS } \end{aligned}$ | Susp. Indicator | Test Scores | Dropout | 4-Year <br> College | Arrested $(16-21)$ | Incarc. $(16-21)$ | Number Arrests (16-21) | Number Incarc. (16-21) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sch. Effect on $\operatorname{Pr}($ Suspend) | 0.331** | 0.062** | 0.269** | 0.017** | 0.004 | 0.014 | -0.021** | 0.026*** | 0.021*** | 0.122*** | 0.092*** |
|  | (0.133) | (0.024) | (0.122) | (0.008) | (0.017) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.006) | $(0.036)$ | $(0.031)$ |
|  | [0.01] | [0.04] | [0.03] | [0.10] | [0.87] | [0.10] | [0.04] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] | [0.00] |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 21153 | 26246 | 17275 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |

Notes: Within each column and panel, we present the coefficient, standard error, and sample size from a separate estimate of Equation 3. The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 1 SD increase in estimated school effect on suspension likelihood. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects. In this sense, we are comparing students who attended the same school in 2001-02 and lived in the same neighborhood but were assigned different schools in 2002-03. In addition to these fixed effects, all regressions control for lagged achievement on state tests, LEP status, SPED status, gender, race, and grade level. Test scores are the average of students' scores on the math and reading state tests and are standardized across the full sample by year and grade. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. Adjusted p-values are reported in square brackets. Specifically, we report False Discovery Rate (FDR) adjusted Q-values computed using the method proposed by Anderson (2008). These are interpreted similarly to $p$-values from a two-tailed test, and explicitly adjust for the increased likelihood of estimating extreme coefficients when making multiple comparisons.* $\mathrm{p}<0.1^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$

|  | Days Susp. | $\begin{gathered} \text { Days } \\ \text { ISS } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { OSS } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Susp. <br> Indicator | ISS <br> Indicator | OSS <br> Indicator | Test Scores | Dropout | 4-Year College | Arrested (16-21) | Incarc. $(16-21)$ | Number Arrests (16-21) | Number <br> Incarc. <br> (16-21) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Days ISS | $\begin{gathered} 0.381^{* * *} \\ (0.117) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.085^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.296^{* * *} \\ (0.109) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.017 * \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.022^{* *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.004 \\ & (0.019) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.012 \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.016 \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.029 * * * \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.022^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.145^{* * *} \\ (0.036) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.118^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 21153 | 26246 | 17275 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |
| Days OSS | $\begin{gathered} 0.119 \\ (0.126) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.116 \\ (0.123) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.010 \\ & (0.008) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.023 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.029^{*} \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.020 \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.016^{*} \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.029 \\ (0.041) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.020 \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 21153 | 26246 | 17275 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |
| Ever ISS | $\begin{gathered} 0.341^{* *} \\ (0.113) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.060 * * * \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.281^{* * *} \\ (0.107) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015^{* *} \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016^{* *} \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.007 \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.018) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.011 \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.013 \\ & (0.010) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.023 * * * \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.128 * * * \\ (0.037) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.098^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 21153 | 26246 | 17275 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |
| Ever OSS | $\begin{gathered} 0.170 \\ (0.133) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.004 \\ & (0.034) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.174 \\ (0.126) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.010 \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.017 * * \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.017 \\ (0.019) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.021 \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.025^{*} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.019 \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.017 * \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.044 \\ (0.046) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.019 \\ (0.042) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 21153 | 26246 | 17275 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |

Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient, standard error, and sample size from a separate estimate of Equation 3. The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 1 SD increase in estimated school effect on days suspended. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects. In this sense, we are comparing students who attended the same school in 2001-02 and lived in the same neighborhood but were assigned different schools in 2002-03. In addition to these fixed effects, all regressions control for lagged achievement on state tests, LEP status, SPED status, gender, race, and grade level. Test scores are the average of students' scores on the math and reading state tests and are standardized across the full sample by year and grade. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. * $\mathrm{p}<0.1$ ** $\mathrm{p}<0.05{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$

Appendix Table A8. Mean Outcomes by Race and Gender

|  | Days Susp. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { ISS } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { OSS } \end{aligned}$ | Susp. <br> Indicator | Test Scores | Dropout | 4-Year <br> College | Arrested (16-21) | Incarc. (1621) | Number Arrests (16-21) | Number Incarc. (16-21) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Students of Color ( $\mathrm{N}=14,493$ ) | 3.76 | 0.61 | 3.14 | 0.33 | -0.50 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 0.87 | 0.61 |
| White ( $\mathrm{N}=11,753$ ) | 0.83 | 0.19 | 0.65 | 0.11 | 0.52 | 0.07 | 0.30 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0.12 |
| Male ( $\mathrm{N}=13,345$ ) | 3.20 | 0.53 | 2.67 | 0.29 | -0.13 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0.19 | 0.90 | 0.65 |
| Female ( $\mathrm{N}=12,901$ ) | 1.66 | 0.30 | 1.36 | 0.17 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.26 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0.13 |
| Male Students of Color ( $\mathrm{N}=7,320$ ) | 4.82 | 0.75 | 4.07 | 0.40 | -0.62 | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0.27 | 1.37 | 1.02 |
| White Male ( $\mathrm{N}=6,025$ ) | 1.24 | 0.27 | 0.97 | 0.15 | 0.46 | 0.08 | 0.27 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.32 | 0.19 |
| Female Students of Color ( $\mathrm{N}=7,173$ ) | 2.67 | 0.47 | 2.20 | 0.26 | -0.39 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.35 | 0.20 |
| White Female ( $\mathrm{N}=5,728$ ) | 0.41 | 0.10 | 0.31 | 0.06 | 0.58 | 0.05 | 0.32 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.09 | 0.05 |

Notes: Each cell indicates the mean value of the column heading for the subgroup of our sample indicated in the row headings.

|  | Days Susp. | Days ISS | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { OSS } \end{aligned}$ | Susp. Indicator | Test Scores | Dropout | 4-Year College | Arrested $(16-21)$ | Incarc. $(16-21)$ | Number Arrests (16-21) | Number Incarc. (16-21) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Risk Quartile 1 | $\begin{gathered} 0.068 \\ (0.112) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.038 \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030 \\ (0.110) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.002 \\ & (0.018) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.017 \\ & (0.016) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.090 \\ & (0.057) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.006 \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.013 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.003 \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.029 \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ |
| Risk Quartile 2 | $\begin{aligned} & -0.049 \\ & (0.097) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.026 \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.075 \\ & (0.094) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.057 * * \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.014 \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.022 \\ & (0.028) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.043 \\ (0.042) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ |
| Risk Quartile 3 | $\begin{gathered} 0.401 \\ (0.281) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.106^{* * *} \\ (0.040) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.296 \\ (0.272) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.042 * * * \\ (0.014) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.030 \\ & (0.043) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.031^{*} \\ & (0.016) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.004 \\ & (0.019) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.050^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.030^{* *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.125^{* * *} \\ (0.047) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.071^{* *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ |
| Risk Quartile 4 | $\begin{aligned} & 0.802^{*} \\ & (0.458) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.145 \\ (0.114) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.657^{*} \\ & (0.381) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.014 \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.017 \\ & (0.020) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.027 \\ (0.017) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.013 \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.036^{*} \\ & (0.021) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.032^{* *} \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.263^{*} * \\ (0.128) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.242 * * \\ (0.104) \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 21153 | 26246 | 17275 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |

Notes: Within each column and for each subsample, we estimate a separate regression of Equation 3. We present the coefficient, and standard error in parentheses. Risk quartiles are defined by generating four equal sized groups of students, based on the predicted number of days suspended. We predict days suspended using student demographics, prior achievement and elementary school suspensions. Quartile 1 indicates students least at risk of suspension; quartile 4 indicates those most at risk. The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 1 SD increase in estimated school effect on suspension likelihood. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects. In addition to these fixed effects, all regressions control for lagged achievement on state tests, LEP status, SPED status, gender, race, and grade level. Test scores are the average of students' scores on the math and reading state tests and are standardized across the full sample by year and grade. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. * $\mathrm{p}<0.1^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$

Appendix Table A10. Relationship Between School Effects and Peer Characteristics

|  | Mean <br> Baseline Test Scores | Proportion Missing Baseline Test Scores | Proportion Black | Proportion Hispanic | Proportion White | Proportion Male | Proportion <br> SPED In <br> Prior Year | Proportion <br> LEP In <br> Prior Year | Proportion Missing SPED or LEP |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Preferred Sch. Effect | -0.009 | -0.002 | -0.006 | 0.006 | 0.005 | 0.003* | -0.002 | 0.008 | 0.001 |
|  | (0.032) | (0.005) | (0.032) | (0.007) | (0.032) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.009) | (0.004) |
| Naïve Sch. Effect | $-0.128 * * *$ | 0.011 | 0.095*** | 0.025*** | $-0.121^{* * *}$ | 0.002 | -0.000 | 0.030*** | -0.003 |
|  | (0.018) | (0.007) | (0.025) | (0.007) | (0.024) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.007) | (0.005) |
| N | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 | 26246 |

Notes: Within each column, we present the coefficient, standard error, and sample size from a separate estimate of Equation 3 . The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 1 SD increase in estimated school effect. Each column contains a different outcome, identified by all other students in the school and year. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects and grade level indicators. Test scores are the average of students' scores on the math and reading state tests and are standardized across the full sample by year and grade. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$
Appendix Table A11. Decomposition of Variance at School-, Teacher-, Year- and
Student-Level Student-Level

|  | Days <br> Suspended | Test <br> Scores |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| School-level standard deviation | 0.160 | 0.090 |
| Within-school teacher-level standard deviation | 0.059 | 0.227 |
| Within-teacher year-level standard deviation | 0.312 | 0.179 |
| Idiosyncratic (student-level) standard deviation | 0.815 | 0.445 |
| Total SD | 0.889 | 0.538 |
| N (student-year-course) | 115967 | 115967 |

Notes: This table uses student-year-course level data from grades 6 through 8 math and reading classrooms in 2000 and 2001 to estimate the variance at the school, teacher, year, and student-level idiosyncratic error. Each column presents a separate regression. The outcome in the first column is the number of days suspended $z$-score. The outcome in the second column is the average math and reading $z$-score. In each column, we report the raw standard deviation of suspension and test score residuals and decompose this variation into components driven by idiosyncratic within-year student-level variation, within-teacher year shocks, and withinschool teacher variation, and persistent school-level variation across years. The corresponding variances to the standard deviations in rows $1-4$ sum to total variance in row 5 .

## Appendix Table A12. North Carolina (Statewide) Summary Statistics

|  | Mean | Std. dev. |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Test Score | 0.000 | 0.977 |
| Baseline Test Scores | 0.004 | 0.917 |
| Days Suspended | 1.372 | 5.664 |
| Male | 0.513 | 0.500 |
| White | 0.523 | 0.499 |
| Black | 0.269 | 0.443 |
| Hispanic/Latinx | 0.131 | 0.337 |
| Asian | 0.027 | 0.163 |
| American Indian | 0.014 | 0.117 |
| Multiple Races | 0.036 | 0.187 |
| Economically Disadvantaged | 0.443 | 0.497 |
| Limited English Proficiency | 0.049 | 0.217 |
| Grades | 6 through 8 |  |
| N (student-year) | 4810510 |  |

Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for our sample from NCERDC, which provides students in grades 6 through 8 in North Carolina Public Schools from 2005-06 through 2018-19.

## Appendix Table A13. Balance Checks for Principal Value-Added

|  | Intensive Margin (Value-Added on Days Suspended) |  | Extensive Margin(Value-Added onSuspended Indicator) |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Individual Regressions | Joint Model | Individual Regressions | Joint <br> Model |
| White | $\begin{gathered} -0.071 \\ (0.482) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.034 \\ & (1.169) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.028 \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ |
| Black | $\begin{gathered} -0.021 \\ (0.451) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.132 \\ & (1.144) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.027 \\ & (0.029) \end{aligned}$ |
| Hispanic | $\begin{gathered} -0.304 \\ (0.432) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -1.241 \\ & (0.982) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.003 \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.029 \\ & (0.027) \end{aligned}$ |
| Asian | $\begin{gathered} 0.048 \\ (0.795) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.793 \\ & (1.437) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.016 \\ & (0.028) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.035 \\ & (0.039) \end{aligned}$ |
| Baseline Test Score | $\begin{gathered} -0.022 \\ (0.150) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.006 \\ (0.151) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ |
| Limited English Proficiency | $\begin{gathered} -0.677 \\ (0.831) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.602 \\ (0.846) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.010 \\ & (0.020) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.010 \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ |
| Economically Disadvantaged | $\begin{gathered} 0.453 * * \\ (0.186) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.452 * * \\ & (0.203) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.004 \\ (0.007) \end{gathered}$ |
| Male | $\begin{aligned} & -0.340 \\ & (0.451) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.320 \\ & (0.473) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.001 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.001 \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ |
| Joint hypothesis test p-value N (school-year) | 5454 | $\begin{gathered} 0.296 \\ 5454 \end{gathered}$ | 5454 | $\begin{gathered} 0.697 \\ 5454 \end{gathered}$ |

Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school. * $\mathrm{p}<0.10$ ** $\mathrm{p}<0.05^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$

|  | Black \| Hispanic | White \| Asian | Male | Female |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Panel A: Intensive Margin (Days Suspended) |  |  |  |  |
| PVA | $\begin{gathered} 0.011^{* *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.010 * * * \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.013 * * * \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ |
| Panel B: Extensive Margin Pr(Suspended) |  |  |  |  |
| PVA | $\begin{gathered} 0.008^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.006^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.005 * * * \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| Y Mean | 0.058 | 0.041 | 0.056 | 0.04 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| N (Student-Year) | 431486 | 603030 | 526684 | 507620 |

Notes: This table presents results of student-year level regressions of dropout indicators on the principal effect of their assigned principal I each of their three years of middle school. We estimate leave-out principal effects using the full panel of North Carolina data from 2005-06 through 2018-19. Student outcomes are restricted to students in North Carolina middle-school cohorts who would have graduated on-time (i.e., 2005-06 through 2011-12). Standard errors are clustered at the school level. * p $<0.1^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$

|  | Days Susp. | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { ISS } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Days } \\ & \text { OSS } \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | Susp. Indicator | Test Scores | Dropout | 4-Year College | Arrested $(16-21)$ | Incarc. $(16-21)$ | Number Arrests (16-21) | Number Incarc. (16-21) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sch. Effect on Suspensions | $\begin{gathered} 0.391 * * \\ (0.188) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.077^{*} \\ & (0.040) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.315^{*} \\ & (0.173) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.015 \\ (0.014) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.005 \\ & (0.023) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.015 \\ & (0.011) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.023^{*} \\ & (0.013) \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.021^{* * *} \\ (0.007) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.131^{* * *} \\ (0.047) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.111 * * * \\ (0.036) \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ |
| N | 18833 | 18833 | 18833 | 18833 | 15180 | 18833 | 12397 | 18833 | 18833 | 18833 | 18833 |

Notes: Sample includes students in grades 6 through 8 in 2003 who were assigned schools that did not have a new principal. Within each column, we present the coefficient, standard error, and sample size from a separate estimate of Equation 3. The results are interpreted as the effect of being assigned to a school with a 1 SD increase in estimated school effect on days suspended. Each regression includes neighborhood by old school zone fixed effects. In addition to these fixed effects, all regressions control for lagged achievement on state tests, LEP status, SPED status, gender, race, and grade level. Test scores are the average of students' scores on the math and reading state tests and are standardized across the full sample by year and grade. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood by old school zone level. * p $<0.1^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$

## Appendix Table A16. Correlations of Teacher Workforce Survey Items with School-Level Conditional Suspensions

| Domain | Item Description | Corr |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Community | Parents/guardians are influential decision makers in this school. | -0.73*** |
| Community | This school maintains clear, two-way communication with the community. | $-0.58 * * *$ |
| Community | This school does a good job of encouraging parent/guardian involvement. | -0.47*** |
| Community | Teachers provide parents/guardians with useful information about student learning. | -0.56*** |
| Community | Parents/guardians know what is going on in this school. | -0.64*** |
| Community | Parents/guardians support teachers, contributing to their success with students. | -0.69*** |
| Community | Community members support teachers, contributing to their success with students. | $-0.59 * * *$ |
| Community | The community we serve is supportive of this school. | -0.70 *** |
| Student Conduct | Students at this school understand expectations for their conduct. | -0.44*** |
| Student Conduct | Students at this school follow rules of conduct. | -0.69*** |
| Student Conduct | Policies and procedures about student conduct are clearly understood by the faculty. | -0.25*** |
| Student Conduct | School administrators consistently enforce rules for student conduct. | $-0.28 * * *$ |
| Student Conduct | School administrators support teachers' efforts to maintain discipline in the classroom. | -0.35*** |
| Student Conduct | Teachers consistently enforce rules for student conduct. | $-0.27 * * *$ |
| Student Conduct | The faculty works in a school environment that is safe. | -0.61 *** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Role of teachers: Selecting instructional materials and resources. | -0.32*** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Role of teachers: Devising teaching techniques. | -0.40*** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Role of teachers: Setting grading and student assessment practices. | -0.24*** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Role of teachers: Determining the content of in-service professional development programs. | -0.15*** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Role of teachers: The selection of teachers new to this school | -0.24*** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Role of teachers: Establishing student discipline procedures. | -0.22*** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Role of teachers: Providing input on how the school budget will be spent. | -0.25*** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Role of teachers: School improvement planning. | -0.17*** |
| Tchr. Empowerment | Teachers have an appropriate level of influence on decision making in this school. | $-0.27 * * *$ |
| Resources/Facilities | Teachers have sufficient access to appropriate instructional materials. | -0.25*** |
| Resources/Facilities | Teachers have sufficient access to instructional technology, including computers, printers, software and internet access. | -0.07* |
| Resources/Facilities | Teachers have access to reliable communication technology, including phones, faxes and email. | -0.28*** |
| Resources/Facilities | Teachers have sufficient access to office equipment and supplies such as copy machines, paper, pens, etc. | -0.35*** |
| Resources/Facilities | The reliability and speed of Internet connections in this school are sufficient to support instructional practices. | -0.08* |
| Resources/Facilities | Teachers have adequate space to work productively. | $-0.18 * * *$ |
| Resources/Facilities | The school environment is clean and well maintained. | -0.24*** |
| Resources/Facilities | The physical environment of classrooms in this school supports teaching and learning. | $-0.28 * * *$ |
| Resources/Facilities | Teachers have sufficient access to a broad range of professional support personnel. | -0.17*** |
| Sch. Leadership | There is an atmosphere of trust and mutual respect in this school. | -0.34*** |
| Sch. Leadership | The school leadership consistently supports teachers. | -0.27*** |
| Sch. Leadership | The school improvement team provides effective leadership at this school. | $-0.22^{* * *}$ |
| Sch. Leadership | The faculty and staff have a shared vision. | $-0.26 * * *$ |
| Sch. Leadership | Teachers are held to high professional standards for delivering instruction. | -0.34*** |
| Sch. Leadership | Teacher performance is assessed objectively. | $-0.22^{* * *}$ |
| Sch. Leadership | The procedures for teacher evaluation are consistent. | -0.16*** |
| Sch. Leadership | Teachers receive feedback that can help them improve teaching. | -0.14*** |
| Sch. Leadership | Teachers feel comfortable raising issues and concerns that are important to them. | -0.26*** |
| Sch. Leadership | The school leadership facilitates using data to improve student learning. | -0.15*** |
| Sch. Leadership | The faculty are recognized for accomplishments. | -0.26*** |
| Tchr. Leadership | Teachers are recognized as educational experts. | -0.30*** |
| Tchr. Leadership | Teachers are trusted to make sound professional decisions about instruction. | $-0.29 * * *$ |
| Tchr. Leadership | Teachers are relied upon to make decisions about educational issues. | -0.25*** |
| Tchr. Leadership | Teachers are encouraged to participate in school leadership roles. | -0.29*** |
| Tchr. Leadership | The faculty has an effective process for making group decisions to solve problems. | -0.20 *** |
| Tchr. Leadership | In this school we take steps to solve problems. | $-0.27 * * *$ |
| Tchr. Leadership | Teachers are effective leaders in this school. | $-0.36 * * *$ |

Notes: Sample includes 878 schools serving students in grades 6 through 8. Each row presents an item from North Carolina's 2010, 2012, and 2014 teacher workforce survey. The six domains come directly from the surveys themselves. We present correlations between average responses across all teachers within a school and school-level residual suspensions from 2010, 2012, and 2014. Correlations are weighted by the number of students in the school.

* $\mathrm{p}<0.1^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$

Appendix Table A17. Correlations of Indices from the Teacher Workforce Survey with Conditional Suspensions.
$\left.\begin{array}{lcccccc} & & & \begin{array}{c}\text { Resources } \\ \text { Conditional } \\ \text { Suspensions }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Community } \\ \text { Connection }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { Student } \\ \text { Facilities }\end{array} & \begin{array}{c}\text { School } \\ \text { Conduct } \\ \text { Leadership }\end{array}\end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Teacher } \\ \text { Empowerment }\end{array} \begin{array}{c}\text { Teacher } \\ \text { Leadership }\end{array}\right]$

Notes: Sample includes 878 schools serving students in grades 6 through 8. We present correlations between six school-level indices from North Carolina's biennial teacher workforce survey and school-level residual suspensions. The six domains come directly from the surveys themselves. Data come from 2010 , 2012, and 2014. Correlations are weighted by the number of students in the school. ${ }^{*} \mathrm{p}<0.1^{* *} \mathrm{p}<0.05{ }^{* * *} \mathrm{p}<0.01$

## Appendix Figure A1. Distribution of Average Days Suspended, by School



Notes: This figure plots the distribution of average number of days suspended, weighted by the number of students in each school. Sample includes all schools serving students in grades 6 through 8 in 2003. The distribution has a mean of 2.158 and standard deviation of 1.332.

## Appendix Figure A2. Distribution of Average Residual Days Suspended, by School



Notes: This figure plots the distribution of average residual number of days suspended, weighted by the number of students in each school. Residuals are calculated at the student-level, by conditioning on student demographics, baseline test scores, grade, and year. Sample includes all schools serving students in grades 6 through 8 in 2003. The distribution has a mean of 0.029 and standard deviation of 0.719 .


Notes: Sample includes 878 schools serving students in grades 6 through 8 . We present bivariate relationships between six school-level indices from North Carolina's biennial teacher workforce survey and school-level residual suspensions. The six domains come directly from the surveys themselves. Data come from 2010, 2012, and 2014. OLS best-fit lines are weighted by the number of students in the school.

