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  1. Home
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  3. American Economic Review
  4. September 2005
  5. The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

  • Marco Pagano
  • Paolo F. Volpin
American Economic Review
vol. 95, no. 4, September 2005
(pp. 1005-1030)
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Abstract

We analyze the political determinants of investor and employment protection. Our model predicts that proportional electoral systems are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than majoritarian systems. This prediction is consistent with international panel data evidence. The proportionality of the voting system is significantly and negatively correlated with shareholder protection in a panel of 45 countries, and positively correlated with employment protection in a panel of 21 OECD countries. Other political variables also affect regulatory outcomes, especially for the labor market. The origin of the legal system has some additional explanatory power only for employment protection.

Citation

Pagano, Marco, and Paolo F. Volpin. 2005. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance." American Economic Review, 95 (4): 1005-1030. DOI: 10.1257/0002828054825646

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • G34 Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
  • K22 Business and Securities Law