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  1. Home
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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2010
  5. Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions

  • Benjamin Edelman
  • Michael Schwarz
American Economic Review
vol. 100, no. 2, May 2010
(pp. 597-602)
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Citation

Edelman, Benjamin, and Michael Schwarz. 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Equilibrium Selection in Sponsored Search Auctions." American Economic Review, 100 (2): 597-602. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.2.597

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
  • M37 Advertising