Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies
American Economic Review
vol. 106,
no. 4, April 2016
(pp. 1073-99)
Abstract
Many salient rules to allocate private goods are not only strategy-proof, but also group strategy-proof, in appropriate domains of definition, hence diminishing the traditional conflict between incentives and efficiency. That is so for solutions to matching, division, cost sharing, house allocation, and auctions, in spite of the substantive disparity between these cases. In a general framework encompassing all of them, we prove that the equivalence between the two forms of strategy-proofness is due to an underlying common structure that transcends the many differences between the contexts and the mechanisms for which it holds. (JEL C78, D44, D63, D71, D82)Citation
Barberà, Salvador, Dolors Berga, and Bernardo Moreno. 2016. "Group Strategy-Proofness in Private Good Economies." American Economic Review, 106 (4): 1073-99. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20141727Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D44 Auctions
- D63 Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design