

Do the Effects of Temporary Ethnic Group Quotas
Persist? Evidence from India

Online Appendix

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Online Appendix Table 1: Power calculations for the natural experiments due to the 2008 and 1974 redistrictings

Scenario:	2008 redistricting	1974 redistricting			
	1	2	3	4	5
<i>Control observations</i>					
Mean (p_1)	0	0	0	0	0
Std. dev. ($\sqrt{p_1(1-p_1)/n_1}$)	0	0	0	0	0
Sample size (n_1)	245	290	290	290	290
<i>Treatment observations</i>					
Mean (p_2)	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Std. dev. ($\sqrt{p_2(1-p_2)/n_2}$)	0.024	0.030	0.030	0.030	0.030
Sample size (n_2)	34	22	22	22	22
No. of follow-up measurements	1	6	6	6	6
Correlation between follow-up measurements	n.a.	0.99	0.9	0.5	0.1
Power	0.995	0.861	0.886	0.978	1

Notes: The table displays the power calculations for the 2008 and 1974 natural experiments for an effect size of 2 percentage points. The control group is assumed to have a mean of 0, which is to say that it is assumed that places without reservations in the past or the present will not elect SCs. The sample sizes, and follow-up measurement assumptions are as per the actual experiments.

Online Appendix Table 2: Placebo tests for the “effects” of the degree to which constituency boundaries remained the same after the 2008 delimitation (OLS)

	Prop. of SC winners	Avg. # of SC candidates	SC cand. as a prop. of cand.	Prop. of cons. > 1 SC ran	Total % of votes received by SCs	Prop. of pop. that is SC	Election year
Degree to which boundaries remained the same	-0.086 (0.063)	-0.811 (0.996)	-0.020 (0.069)	0.010 (0.153)	-7.771 (6.231)	0.054 (0.050)	0.691 (0.659)
Constant	0.234*** (0.040)	3.621*** (0.627)	0.274*** (0.044)	0.694*** (0.096)	23.676*** (3.926)	0.150*** (0.031)	2010.444*** (0.415)
Observations	267	267	267	267	267	267	267
Adjusted <i>R</i> -squared	0.003	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004	0.002	0.001	0.000

Notes: The degree to which boundaries remained the same was calculated by overlaying pre- and post-delimitation GIS maps, calculating the likelihood that two randomly drawn people from a new constituency were from the same old constituency using a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, and then averaging this measure over all new constituencies in the district. See text for details. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Online Appendix Table 3: The effect of reservations on the estimated proportion of SC winners after the 2008 delimitation

Sample: Dependent variable:	Pre-, post-2008 redistricting Est. prop. SC winners	
	1	2
$R_{i,t-1}$	0.164** (0.057)	0.138** (0.047)
$R_{i,t}$	0.927*** (0.091)	0.945*** (0.104)
$C_{i,t-1}$		0.025 (0.123)
$C_{i,t}$		0.014*** (0.002)
Controls?	Y	Y
State fixed effects?	Y	Y
Observations	279	279
Adjusted R -squared	0.65	0.66

Notes: This table illustrates that using estimated instead of actual caste inflates the estimated effect of past reservations. Compare these results with regressions 1 and 2 of Table 1. $R_{i,PRE}$ is the proportion of seats reserved for SCs before redistricting, $R_{i,POST}$ is the proportion of seats reserved for SCs after redistricting, $F_{i,PRE}$ is the proportion of seats that would have been reserved for SCs before redistricting had it been possible to reserve seat fractions, and $F_{i,POST}$ is the proportion of seats that would have been reserved for SCs after redistricting had it been possible to reserve seat fractions. The control set includes the current population share of SCs, the current and past number of seats in the district, and land area. Robust standard errors, clustered by state-year, in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Online Appendix Table 4: Constituency-level analysis for the effect of pre-2008 reservations on the probability of an SC winner and incumbent renomination after reservations were withdrawn

Dependent variable:	Pr(SC winner)			Pr(Incumbent renominated)		
	> 50%	≥90 %	100%	> 50%	≥90 %	100%
Thresholds for considering constituencies comparable:	> 50%	≥90 %	100%	> 50%	≥90 %	100%
Constituencies/observations:	332	282	273	332	282	273
Treatment constituencies/observations:	54	47	46	54	47	46
Difference-in-means	0.019 (0.019)	0.021 (0.022)	0.022 (0.023)	-0.076 (0.074)	-0.055 (0.075)	-0.064 (0.072)
OLS, controlling for % SCs and state fixed effects	0.020 (0.021)	0.022 (0.023)	0.022 (0.023)	-0.120* (0.063)	-0.125* (0.062)	-0.123* (0.062)
Matching on % SCs within states, ATE	0.009 (0.015)	0.007 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.277*** (0.103)	-0.305*** (0.104)	-0.300*** (0.106)

Notes: Post-delimitation constituencies were considered comparable to pre-delimitation constituencies if > 50%, ≥ 90% or 100% of their land area overlapped with a pre-delimitation constituency. The degree of overlap was calculated by overlaying pre- and post-delimitation GIS maps. All observations are for constituencies that were open or not reserved after the 2008 delimitation. Treatment constituencies were reserved for SCs in the election before the 2008 delimitation; control ones were open. Standard errors, clustered by state, are in parentheses. The first estimator is a simple difference-in-means *t*-test. The second estimator is OLS, controlling for the % of SCs per the 2001 census (this is the treatment assignment variable) and state fixed effects. The third estimator uses the nearest-matching method, wherein observations are matched by % SCs per the 2001 census within states. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Online Appendix Table 5: Comparing non-SC and SC incumbents before the 2008 delimitation

	Non-SCs	SCs	Diff.	
Prop. with some college education	0.48	0.45	0.03	
Prop. with some post-grad education	0.14	0.13	0.01	
Prop. female	0.07	0.11	-0.04	**
Prop. charged with crimes	0.29	0.14	0.16	***
Prop. registered with tax authorities	0.55	0.42	0.12	***
Assets, in USD	206,463	67,831	138,632	***
Prop. incumbents	0.42	0.36	0.06	**
Prop. ministers	0.13	0.10	0.03	
Observations	1,713	345		

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.