Intelligence Disclosure in Repeated Interactions

Online Appendix

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I Additional Tables

Table O.1: **Battle of Sexes with Low Inequality: Preferred choices in Heidelberg and Frankfurt**. The dependent variable is the subject making their preferred choice. Panel logit estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Controls for supergame, period, gender, Big 5 personality traits, risk aversion, size of session, average length of past supergames are included in the regressions but omitted from the table. Std errors clustered at the individual level in brackets; * $p-value < 0.1$, ** $p-value < 0.05$, *** $p-value < 0.01$.

	Own IQ > Partner IQ		Own IQ < Partner IQ	
	Frankfurt b/se	Heidelberg b/se	Frankfurt b/se	Heidelberg b/se
preferredchoice				
Disclosure	1.51126	1.19148	0.62555	0.99154
	(0.5916)	(0.1454)	(0.1877)	(0.1208)
Own IQ	0.98239	1.00360	1.01426	0.97688
	(0.0450)	(0.0187)	(0.0504)	(0.0142)
N	1456	6279	1456	6279

Table O.2: **Battle of Sexes with Low Inequality: Preferred outcomes in Heidelberg and Frankfurt**. The dependent variable is subject's preferred outcome. Panel logit estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Controls for supergame, period, gender, Big 5 personality traits, risk aversion, size of session, average length of past supergames are included in the regressions but omitted from the table. Std errors clustered at the individual level in brackets; * $p-value<0.1$, ** $p-value<0.05$, *** $p-value<0.01$.

	Own IQ > Partner IQ		Own IQ < Partner IQ	
	Frankfurt	Heidelberg	Frankfurt	Heidelberg
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
preferredoutcome				
Disclosure	1.13918	0.89673	0.48298***	0.89502
	(0.1980)	(0.1073)	(0.0893)	(0.0802)
Own IQ	0.98353	1.00494	0.97572	0.99953
	(0.0319)	(0.0170)	(0.0361)	(0.0155)
Partner IQ	1.01917	1.02277**	1.07330*	1.00420
	(0.0215)	(0.0094)	(0.0412)	(0.0174)
N	1456	6279	1456	6279

Table O.3: **Battle of Sexes with Low Inequality: Effect of disclosure on payoffs.** The dependent variable is subject payoff. The variable IQ diff. represents the absolute difference between the IQ of the two players. Panel GLS estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Controls for supergame, period, gender, Big 5 personality traits, risk aversion, size of session, average length of past supergames are included in the regressions but omitted from the table. Clustered Std errors in brackets; * $p-value<0.1$, ** $p-value<0.05$, *** $p-value<0.01$.

	Own IQ > Partner IQ		Own IQ < Partner IQ	
	1	2	3	4
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Disclosure	–1.80465*	–0.38960	–2.19794**	–0.62964
	(1.0055)	(1.5490)	(1.0238)	(1.8434)
Disclosure*IQ diff.		–0.23907		–0.28198
		(0.1851)		(0.2597)
Own IQ	0.05836	0.18700	0.11187	–0.03224
	(0.1426)	(0.1797)	(0.1371)	(0.1770)
Partner IQ	0.22247**	0.08042	0.08762	0.21878
	(0.0900)	(0.1409)	(0.1440)	(0.1796)
N	7735	7735	7735	7735

Table O.4: **Battle of Sexes with Low inequality: Coordination in Heidelberg and Frankfurt**. The dependent variable is coordination on the non-zero payoff outcomes. Panel logit estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Controls for supergame, period, gender, Big 5 personality traits, risk aversion, size of session, average length of past supergames are included in the regressions but omitted from the table. Clustered Std errors in brackets; * $p-value<0.1$, ** $p-value<0.05$, *** $p-value<0.01$.

	Frankfurt	Heidelberg
	b/se	b/se
coordboseq		
Disclosure	0.60555***	0.88571
	(0.0891)	(0.0848)
Own IQ	0.98629	1.01855**
	(0.0225)	(0.0088)
Partner IQ	1.01428	1.01904***
	(0.0128)	(0.0064)
N	2912	12558

Table O.5: **Battle of Sexes with High inequality: Effect of disclosure on payoffs.** The dependent variable is subject payoff. The variable IQ diff. represents the absolute difference between the IQ of the two players. Panel GLS estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Controls for supergame, period, gender, Big 5 personality traits, risk aversion, size of session, average length of past supergames, and average profit before t are included in the regressions but omitted from the table. Clustered Std errors in brackets; * $p-value<0.1$, ** $p-value<0.05$, *** $p-value<0.01$.

	Own IQ > Partner IQ		Own IQ < Partner IQ	
	1	2	3	4
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
Disclosure	–0.31071	0.77963	1.94891***	1.12097
	(0.8332)	(1.5463)	(0.6857)	(1.1240)
Disclosure*IQ diff.		0.14285		0.13219
		(0.2015)		(0.1486)
Own IQ	0.10169	0.19704	0.17443*	0.24534*
	(0.1242)	(0.1711)	(0.0955)	(0.1396)
Partner IQ	0.34048***	–0.01020	0.00705	–0.06127
	(0.0810)	(0.1615)	(0.0896)	(0.1257)
N	7280	3760	7280	7280

Table O.6: **Battle of Sexes with High Inequality: Preferred choices in Heidelberg and Frankfurt**. The dependent variable is subject making their preferred choice. Panel logit estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Controls for supergame, period, gender, Big 5 personality traits, risk aversion, size of session, average length of past supergames are included in the regressions but omitted from the table. Std errors clustered at the individual levels in brackets; * $p-value<0.1$, ** $p-value<0.05$, *** $p-value<0.01$.

	Own IQ > Partner IQ		Own IQ < Partner IQ	
	Frankfurt b/se	Heidelberg b/se	Frankfurt b/se	Heidelberg b/se
preferredchoice				
Disclosure	1.18672	0.41634	1.58703*	0.71758
	(0.2090)	(0.2259)	(0.3951)	(0.1967)
Own IQ	1.00217	0.96233	0.96764*	0.99480
	(0.0181)	(0.0368)	(0.0176)	(0.0225)
N	5824	1456	5824	1456

Table O.7: **Battle of Sexes with High Inequality. Preferred outcomes in Heidelberg and Frankfurt**. The dependent variable is subject's preferred outcome. Panel logit estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Panel logit estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Controls for supergame, period, gender, Big 5 personality traits, risk aversion, size of session, average length of past supergames are included in the regressions but omitted from the table. Clustered Std errors in brackets; * $p-value<0.1$, ** $p-value<0.05$, *** $p-value<0.01$.

	Own IQ > Partner IQ		Own IQ < Partner IQ	
	Frankfurt b/se	Heidelberg b/se	Frankfurt b/se	Heidelberg b/se
preferredoutcome				
Disclosure	0.79990**	1.09318	1.00069	1.51427**
	(0.0910)	(0.2806)	(0.0699)	(0.2552)
Own IQ	0.99277	1.06472**	1.01093	1.01315
	(0.0128)	(0.0330)	(0.0098)	(0.0186)
Partner IQ	1.03545***	1.01663	0.99839	0.99466
	(0.0086)	(0.0233)	(0.0097)	(0.0179)
N	5824	1456	5824	1456

Table O.8: **Battle of Sexes with High Inequality: Coordination in Heidelberg and Frankfurt**. The dependent variable is coordination on the non-zero payoff outcomes. Panel logit estimator with random effects and errors clustered at the individual level. Controls for supergame, period, gender, Big 5 personality traits, risk aversion, size of session, average length of past supergames are included in the regressions but omitted from the table. Clustered Std errors in brackets; * $p-value<0.1$, ** $p-value<0.05$, *** $p-value<0.01$.

	Frankfurt b/se	Heidelberg b/se
coordboseq		
Disclosure	0.79756*	1.45786**
	(0.0963)	(0.2792)
Own IQ	1.01965*	1.03359**
	(0.0107)	(0.0163)
Partner IQ	1.02237***	1.03092**
	(0.0063)	(0.0130)
N	11648	2912

Table O.9: **Prisoner's Dilemma: Expanded strategies estimation in the SGs in the first half of the session.** Each coefficient represents the probability estimated using ML of the corresponding strategy. Gamma is the error coefficient that is estimated for the choice function used in the ML and beta is the probability estimated that the choice by a subject is equal to what the strategy prescribes. When beta is close to 1/2, choices are essentially random and when it is close to 1 then choices are almost perfectly predicted. Tests equality to 0 using the Waldtest: * $p-values<0.1$, ** $p-values<0.05$ **, $p-values<0.01$ ***

	Own IQ > Partner IQ				Own IQ < Partner IQ			
	No Disclosure		Disclosure		No Disclosure		Disclosure	
Strategy								
Always Cooperate	0.0540		0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
	(0.0555)		(0.0327)		(0.1005)		(0.0044)	
Always Defect	0.1256	**	0.1395		0.2301	***	0.1437	
	(0.0557)		(0.0909)		(0.0750)		(0.1146)	
Grim after 1 D	0.3013	**	0.3025	***	0.2547	**	0.3561	***
	(0.1421)		(0.0983)		(0.1008)		(0.1079)	
Tit for Tat (C first)	0.4163	***	0.4005	***	0.3306	***	0.3420	***
	(0.1032)		(0.0852)		(0.0950)		(0.1001)	
Tit for Tat (D first)	0.0136		0.0350		0.0399		0.0893	
	(0.0593)		(0.0442)		(0.0254)		(0.0579)	
Grim after 2 D	0.0892		0.0351		0.0000		0.0000	
	(0.0585)		(0.0464)		(0.0426)		(0.0474)	
Grim after 3 D	0.0000		0.0000		0.0726		0.0000	
	(0.0142)		(0.0205)		(0.0660)		(0.0104)	
Tit for two Tats (C first)	0.0000		0.0874		0.0720		0.0687	
Gamma	0.4980	***	0.5510	***	0.5067	***	0.5842	***
	(0.0924)		(0.0384)		(0.0610)		(0.0416)	
beta	0.882		0.860		0.878		0.847	
Average Periods	3.625		3.625		3.625		3.625	
Observations	1,152		1,248		1,152		1,248	

Table O.10: **Prisoner's Dilemma: Expanded strategies estimation in the SGs in the second half of the session.** Each coefficient represents the probability estimated using ML of the corresponding strategy. Gamma is the error coefficient that is estimated for the choice function used in the ML and beta is the probability estimated that the choice by a subject is equal to what the strategy prescribes. When beta is close to 1/2, choices are essentially random and when it is close to 1 then choices are almost perfectly predicted. Tests equality to 0 using the Waldtest: * $p-values<0.1$, ** $p-values<0.05$ **, $p-values<0.01$ ***

	Own IQ > Partner IQ		Own IQ < Partner IQ	
	No Disclosure	Disclosure	No Disclosure	Disclosure
Strategy				
Always Cooperate	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0014)	(0.0157)	(0.0007)	(0.0059)
Always Defect	0.1476 **	0.1082 *	0.1972 ***	0.1252
	(0.0712)	(0.0648)	(0.0666)	(0.0800)
Grim after 1 D	0.4661 **	0.3478 ***	0.4487 ***	0.3082 **
	(0.1805)	(0.0928)	(0.1262)	(0.1219)
Tit for Tat (C first)	0.3244 **	0.3985 ***	0.1637	0.3062 ***
	(0.1467)	(0.1077)	(0.1144)	(0.1169)
Tit for Tat (D first)	0.0000	0.0178	0.0282	0.0503
	(0.0118)	(0.0268)	(0.0476)	(0.0422)
Grim after 2 D	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0511)	(0.1060)	(0.0516)	(0.1326)
Grim after 3 D	0.0000	0.0000	0.0570	0.0000
	(0.0421)	(0.0651)	(0.0719)	(0.0538)
Tit for two Tats (C first)	0.0619	0.1276	0.1051	0.2100
Gamma	0.3104 ***	0.3826 ***	0.3487 ***	0.3960 ***
	(0.0644)	(0.0382)	(0.0476)	(0.0453)
beta	0.962	0.932	0.946	0.926
Average Periods	2.818	2.818	2.818	2.818
Observations	1,056	1,144	1,056	1,144

Table O.11: **Battle of Sexes with Low Inequality: Expanded strategy estimation in the SGs in the first half of the session.** Gamma is the error coefficient that is estimated for the choice function used in the ML and beta is the probability estimated that the choice by a subject is equal to what the strategy prescribes. When beta is close to 1/2, choices are essentially random and when it is close to 1 then choices are almost perfectly predicted. Tests equality to 0 using the Waldtest: * $p-values < 0.1$, ** $p-values < 0.05$ **, $p-values < 0.01$ ***

	Own IQ > Partner IQ				Own IQ < Partner IQ			
	No Disclosure		Disclosure		No Disclosure		Disclosure	
Strategy								
Always Preferred	0.1245	***	0.1782	***	0.1057	**	0.0823	
	(0.0453)		(0.0664)		(0.0507)		(0.0638)	
Always Concede	0.0154		0.0382		0.0269		0.0767	**
	(0.0336)		(0.0240)		(0.0320)		(0.0381)	
Forceful Naïve Alternation	0.0179		0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
	(0.0351)		(0.0259)		(0.0260)		(0.0319)	
Submissive Naïve Alternation	0.0142		0.0000		0.0000		0.0197	
	(0.0356)		(0.0158)		(0.0367)		(0.0456)	
Forceful Tit for Tat	0.0211		0.0436		0.0480		0.0803	**
	(0.0319)		(0.0426)		(0.0498)		(0.0338)	
Submissive Tit for Tat	0.0555	**	0.0154	**	0.0186		0.0282	
	(0.0267)		(0.0069)		(0.0277)		(0.0377)	
Forceful Rev. Tit for Tat	0.3595	***	0.2361	***	0.1806	*	0.0944	
	(0.0986)		(0.0904)		(0.0934)		(0.0617)	
Submissive Rev. Tit for Tat	0.2833	***	0.1824	***	0.1844	***	0.3254	***
	(0.0752)		(0.0544)		(0.0637)		(0.0594)	
Forceful Alternating Grim	0.0000		0.0938	**	0.0303		0.0351	
	(0.0251)		(0.0440)		(0.0500)		(0.0387)	
Submissive Alternating Grim	0.0000		0.0530	*	0.0000		0.0637	
	(0.0168)		(0.0283)		(0.0149)		(0.0428)	
Submissive Teaching	0.0172		0.0585		0.1715	**	0.0693	*
	(0.0343)		(0.0393)		(0.0667)		(0.0383)	
Forceful Teaching	0.0914		0.1008	*	0.2340	***	0.1251	**
Gamma	0.6383	***	0.6838	***	0.8195	***	0.8207	***
	(0.0322)		(0.0470)		(0.0698)		(0.0507)	
beta	0.827		0.812		0.772		0.772	
Average Periods	3.625		3.625		3.625		3.625	
Observations	1,872		2,208		1,872		2,208	

Table O.12: **Battle of Sexes with Low Inequality: Expanded strategy estimation in the SGs in the second half of the session.** Each coefficient represents the probability estimated using ML of the corresponding strategy. Gamma is the error coefficient that is estimated for the choice function used in the ML and beta is the probability estimated that the choice by a subject is equal to what the strategy prescribes. When beta is close to 1/2, choices are essentially random and when it is close to 1 then choices are almost perfectly predicted. Tests equality to 0 using the Waldtest: * $p-values < 0.1$, ** $p-values < 0.05$ **, $p-values < 0.01$ ***

	Own IQ > Partner IQ				Own IQ < Partner IQ			
	No Disclosure		Disclosure		No Disclosure		Disclosure	
Strategy								
Always Preferred	0.0764	*	0.0954		0.1002	*	0.0599	
	(0.0424)		(0.0593)		(0.0524)		(0.0537)	
Always Concede	0.0000		0.0000		0.0000		0.0555	
	(0.0032)		(0.0060)		(0.0041)		(0.0343)	
Forceful Naïve Alternation	0.0162		0.0427		0.0612		0.0523	
	(0.0368)		(0.0395)		(0.0432)		(0.0360)	
Submissive Naïve Alternation	0.0264		0.0557	**	0.0921	**	0.0600	
	(0.0365)		(0.0262)		(0.0465)		(0.0440)	
Forceful Tit for Tat	0.0000		0.0006		0.0000		0.0440	
	(0.0078)		(0.0087)		(0.0197)		(0.0534)	
Submissive Tit for Tat	0.0192		0.0000		0.0000		0.0000	
	(0.0252)		(0.0013)		(0.0055)		(0.0110)	
Forceful Rev. Tit for Tat	0.4000	***	0.3141	***	0.3233	***	0.3193	***
	(0.1117)		(0.1116)		(0.0907)		(0.0956)	
Submissive Rev. Tit for Tat	0.3049	***	0.1850	***	0.3598	***	0.2904	***
	(0.0745)		(0.0523)		(0.0864)		(0.0870)	
Forceful Alternating Grim	0.0000		0.0561		0.0000		0.0000	
	(0.0232)		(0.0436)		(0.0186)		(0.0004)	
Submissive Alternating Grim	0.0023		0.0709	**	0.0000		0.0666	
	(0.0157)		(0.0321)		(0.0316)		(0.0485)	
Submissive Teaching	0.0000		0.0620		0.0000		0.0519	
	(0.0320)		(0.0382)		(0.0631)		(0.0499)	
Forceful Teaching	0.1547	*	0.1174		0.0633		0.0000	
Gamma	0.5767	***	0.5537	***	0.6338	***	0.6182	***
	(0.0490)		(0.0418)		(0.0614)		(0.0615)	
beta	0.850		0.859		0.829		0.834	
Average Periods	2.818		2.818		2.818		2.818	
Observations	1,716		2,024		1,716		2,024	

Table O.13: **Battle of Sexes with High Inequality: Expanded strategy estimation in the SGs in the first half of the session.** Each coefficient represents the probability estimated using ML of the corresponding strategy. Gamma is the error coefficient that is estimated for the choice function used in the ML and beta is the probability estimated that the choice by a subject is equal to what the strategy prescribes. When beta is close to 1/2, choices are essentially random and when it is close to 1 then choices are almost perfectly predicted. Tests equality to 0 using the Waldtest: * $p-values < 0.1$, ** $p-values < 0.05$ **, $p-values < 0.01$ ***

	Own IQ > Partner IQ				Own IQ < Partner IQ			
	No Disclosure		Disclosure		No Disclosure		Disclosure	
Strategy								
Always Preferred	0.1473	*	0.0359		0.1093	**	0.2088	***
	(0.0831)		(0.0394)		(0.0519)		(0.0721)	
Always Concede	0.0000		0.0340		0.0000		0.0000	
	(0.0137)		(0.0213)		(0.0087)		(0.0029)	
Forceful Naïve Alternation	0.0000		0.0409		0.0413		0.0000	
	(0.0288)		(0.0385)		(0.0387)		(0.0396)	
Submissive Naïve Alternation	0.0801	**	0.0000		0.0000		0.0712	*
	(0.0399)		(0.0235)		(0.0369)		(0.0413)	
Forceful Tit for Tat	0.0572	***	0.0496		0.0667		0.0341	
	(0.0189)		(0.0329)		(0.0653)		(0.0289)	
Submissive Tit for Tat	0.0000		0.0000		0.0333		0.0000	
	(0.0023)		(0.0174)		(0.0298)		(0.0162)	
Forceful Rev. Tit for Tat	0.2619	***	0.3005	***	0.1139	*	0.4213	***
	(0.0774)		(0.0983)		(0.0613)		(0.0851)	
Submissive Rev. Tit for Tat	0.2823	***	0.3204	***	0.3090	***	0.2363	***
	(0.0660)		(0.0666)		(0.0600)		(0.0609)	
Forceful Alternating Grim	0.0177		0.0000		0.0753		0.0283	
	(0.0324)		(0.0532)		(0.0635)		(0.0350)	
Submissive Alternating Grim	0.0312		0.0000		0.0311		0.0000	
	(0.0400)		(0.0188)		(0.0272)		(0.0383)	
Submissive Teaching	0.0000		0.0068		0.0530		0.0000	
	(0.0749)		(0.0346)		(0.0477)		(0.0285)	
Forceful Teaching	0.1223	**	0.2120	**	0.1670	**	0.0000	
Gamma	0.6269	***	0.7611	***	0.7822	***	0.7485	***
	(0.0634)		(0.0538)		(0.0544)		(0.0489)	
beta	0.831		0.788		0.782		0.792	
Average Periods	3.625		3.625		3.625		3.625	
Observations	1,968		1,872		1,968		1,872	

Table O.14: **Battle of Sexes with High inequality: Expanded strategy estimation in the SGs in the second half of the session.** Each coefficient represents the probability estimated using ML of the corresponding strategy. Gamma is the error coefficient that is estimated for the choice function used in the ML and beta is the probability estimated that the choice by a subject is equal to what the strategy prescribes. When beta is close to 1/2, choices are essentially random and when it is close to 1 then choices are almost perfectly predicted. Tests equality to 0 using the Waldtest: * $p-values < 0.1$, ** $p-values < 0.05$ **, $p-values < 0.01$ ***

	Own IQ > Partner IQ		Own IQ < Partner IQ	
	No Disclosure	Disclosure	No Disclosure	Disclosure
Strategy				
Always Preferred	0.1278 *	0.0289	0.1049 **	0.1469 **
	(0.0680)	(0.0309)	(0.0492)	(0.0711)
Always Concede	0.0157	0.0169	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0143)	(0.0146)	(0.0238)	(0.0012)
Forceful Naïve Alternation	0.0000	0.0394	0.0000	0.0265
	(0.0219)	(0.0407)	(0.0332)	(0.0424)
Submissive Naïve Alternation	0.0284	0.0000	0.0000	0.0732
	(0.0258)	(0.0060)	(0.0375)	(0.0454)
Forceful Tit for Tat	0.0000	0.0000	0.0317 *	0.0000
	(0.0181)	(0.0030)	(0.0181)	(0.0032)
Submissive Tit for Tat	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0044)	(0.0017)	(0.0110)	(0.0010)
Forceful Rev. Tit for Tat	0.3748 ***	0.4597 ***	0.3107 ***	0.3808 ***
	(0.0901)	(0.1013)	(0.0880)	(0.0919)
Submissive Rev. Tit for Tat	0.3242 ***	0.3002 ***	0.3816 ***	0.2808 ***
	(0.0782)	(0.0709)	(0.0784)	(0.0715)
Forceful Alternating Grim	0.0000	0.0328	0.0123	0.0164
	(0.0081)	(0.0309)	(0.0321)	(0.0231)
Submissive Alternating Grim	0.0000	0.0000	0.0094	0.0000
	(0.0058)	(0.0074)	(0.0470)	(0.0332)
Submissive Teaching	0.0000	0.0384	0.0133	0.0309
	(0.0602)	(0.0792)	(0.0495)	(0.0476)
Forceful Teaching	0.1290	0.0837	0.1361 **	0.0446
Gamma	0.5932 ***	0.5304 ***	0.6936 ***	0.6340 ***
	(0.0394)	(0.0443)	(0.0401)	(0.0393)
beta	0.844	0.868	0.809	0.829
Average Periods	2.818	2.818	2.818	2.818
Observations	1,804	1,716	1,804	1,716

II Timeline of the Experiment

1. Participants randomly assigned a seat number.
2. Participants sat at their corresponding computer terminals, which were in individual cubicles.
3. Instructions about the Raven task were read together with an explanation on how the task would be paid.
4. The Raven test was administered (36 matrices with a total of 30 minutes allowed). Three randomly chosen matrices out of 36 tables were paid at the rate of 1 Euro per correct answer.
5. The Holt-Laury task was explained verbally.
6. The Holt-Laury choice task was completed by the participants (10 lottery choices). One randomly chosen lottery out of 10 played out to be paid.
7. The game that would be played was explained using en example screen on each participant's screen, as was the way the matching between partners, the continuation probability and how the payment would be made.
8. The infinitely repeated game was played. Each experimental unit earned corresponded to 0.003 Euro.
9. A demographics and personality questionnaire was administered.
10. Calculation of payment was made and subjects were paid accordingly.

III Session Dates, Size and Characteristics

Tables O.15, O.16 and O.17 below summarise the dates and timings of each session across all treatments.

Table O.20 summarises the statistics about the Raven scores for each session in the PD, table O.21 for the BoSLI and table O.22 for the BosHI. Figure O.1 presents the overall distribution of Raven scores across our treatments. Tables O.23 until O.28 present some summary statistics description of the main data across all our treatments. Table O.29 shows the correlations among individual characteristics.

Table O.15: **Dates and details for Prisoners' Dilemma Sessions.**

	Date	Time	Subjects	Disclosure	Location
Session 1	28/11/2018	14:00	20	Yes	Heidelberg
Session 2	10/12/2018	15:00	20	No	Heidelberg
Session 3	11/12/2018	14:00	18	Yes	Heidelberg
Session 4	13/12/2018	14:00	16	No	Heidelberg
Session 5	21/01/2019	11:00	14	Yes	Heidelberg
Session 6	22/01/2019	13:00	12	No	Heidelberg
Total Participants			100		

Table O.16: **Dates and details for Battle of Sexes (low ineq.) Sessions**

	Date	Time	Subjects	Disclosure	Location
Session 1	29/11/2018	10:00	20	Yes	Heidelberg
Session 2	29/11/2018	14:00	18	No	Heidelberg
Session 3	12/12/2018	14:00	20	Yes	Heidelberg
Session 4	19/12/2018	15:00	12	No	Heidelberg
Session 5	19/02/2019	16:00	20	Yes	Heidelberg
Session 6	26/02/2019	16:00	16	No	Heidelberg
Session 7	08/07/2019	10:00	14	Yes	Heidelberg
Session 8	10/07/2019	14:00	18	No	Heidelberg
Session 9	19/07/2019	13:00	14	No	Frankfurt
Session 10	05/09/2019	15:30	18	Yes	Frankfurt
Total Participants			170		

Table O.17: **Dates and details for Battle of Sexes (high ineq.) Sessions**

	Date	Time	Subjects	Disclosure	Location
Session 1	05/07/2019	10:00	22	Yes	Frankfurt
Session 2	05/07/2019	13:00	24	No	Frankfurt
Session 3	05/07/2019	16:00	20	Yes	Frankfurt
Session 4	12/07/2019	10:00	22	No	Frankfurt
Session 5	12/07/2019	13:00	18	Yes	Frankfurt
Session 6	12/07/2019	16:00	22	No	Frankfurt
Session 7	21/10/2019	15:00	14	No	Heidelberg
Session 8	23/10/2019	16:00	18	Yes	Heidelberg
Total Participants			160		

Table O.18: **Maximal period (T) of each SG for all treatments.**

SG	T
1	1
2	4
3	2
4	2
5	1
6	2
7	12
8	4
9	4
10	5
11	8
12	2
13	1
14	7
15	2
16	4
17	4
18	1
19	4
20	1
21	5
22	7
23	3
24	1
25	1
26	4

Figure O.1: **Distribution of Raven scores.** Top-left panel shows Raven distribution for all participants in the PD treatments, top-right shows Raven distribution for all participants in the BoS (low ineq.) treatments and bottom left panels shows Raven distribution for all participants in the BoS (high ineq.) treatments.



Table O.19: **Comparing Characteristics across the subject pool in Heidelberg and Frankfurt**

	Heidelberg	Frankfurt	Difference	Std. Dev.	N
Raven	23.726	23.694	0.032	0.526	430
Age	23.137	23.456	-0.319	0.385	430
Female	0.537	0.475	0.062	0.050	430
Openness	3.718	3.649	0.069	0.054	430
Conscientiousness	3.451	3.504	-0.054	0.059	430
Extraversion	3.373	3.268	0.105	0.077	430
Agreableness	3.746	3.637	0.109**	0.055	430
Neuroticism	2.864	2.923	-0.059	0.073	430
Risk Aversion	5.607	5.694	-0.086	0.165	430

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table O.20: Raven Scores by Session in Prisoner's Dilemma Treatments

Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
PD Disclosure - Session 1	24.3	4.824	13	30	20
PD Non-disclosure - Session 1	22.55	7.729	2	36	20
PD Disclosure - Session 2	25.056	4.952	17	32	18
PD Non-disclosure - Session 2	23.625	4.193	18	32	16
PD Disclosure - Session 3	25.786	4.98	16	32	14
PD Non-disclosure - Session 3	22.5	4.777	13	29	12

Table O.21: Raven Scores by Session in Battle of Sexes (low ineq.) Treatments

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
BoS Disclosure - Session 1	22.5	4.407	14	30	20
BoS Non-disclosure - Session 1	22.444	5.305	14	34	18
BoS Disclosure - Session 2	23.85	5.019	10	30	20
BoS Non-disclosure - Session 2	23.417	4.907	17	32	12
BoS Disclosure - Session 3	22.45	5.336	3	28	20
BoS Non-disclosure - Session 3	22.313	6.107	10	31	16
BoS Disclosure - Session 4	26.5	3.322	21	32	14
BoS Non-disclosure - Session 4	24.944	4.345	17	33	18
BoS Non-disclosure - Session 5 (FRA)	25.786	5.221	16	32	14
BoS Disclosure - Session 5 (FRA)	24.556	4.866	15	33	18

Table O.22: Raven Scores by Session in Battle of Sexes (high ineq.) Treatments

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
BosHI Disclosure- Session 1	22.545	5.18	8	32	22
BosHI Non-disclosure - Session 1	22.958	5.599	10	33	24
BosHI Disclosure - Session 2	23.65	5.509	14	33	20
BosHI Non-disclosure - Session 2	24.455	4.021	15	31	22
BosHI Disclosure - Session 3	23.722	4.496	11	29	18
BosHI Non-disclosure - Session 3	22.864	5.462	12	33	22
BosHI Non-disclosure - Session 4 (HD)	26.5	6.111	12	35	14
BosHI Disclosure - Session 4 (HD)	22.222	6.916	7	33	18

Table O.23: PD Non-disclosure, Main Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Choice	0.729	0.449	0	1	48
Partner Choice	0.729	0.449	0	1	48
Age	22.563	3.5	18	36	48
Female	0.646	0.483	0	1	48
Round	92	0	92	92	48
Openness	3.767	0.48	3	4.9	48
Conscientiousness	3.486	0.511	2.556	4.333	48
Extraversion	3.424	0.763	1.875	4.625	48
Agreableness	3.826	0.513	2.889	4.778	48
Neuroticism	2.927	0.642	1.75	4.5	48
Raven	22.896	5.947	2	36	48
Risk Aversion	5.75	1.695	2	10	48
Final Profit	3624.792	419.604	2796	4380	48
Profit x Period	39.4	4.561	30.391	47.609	48
Total Periods	92	0	92	92	48

Table O.24: PD Disclosure, Main Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Choice	0.769	0.425	0	1	52
Partner Choice	0.769	0.425	0	1	52
Age	23.25	3.793	19	35	52
Female	0.442	0.502	0	1	52
Round	92	0	92	92	52
Openness	3.742	0.625	2.5	4.8	52
Conscientiousness	3.382	0.675	1.556	4.889	52
Extraversion	3.531	0.815	1.5	5	52
Agreableness	3.682	0.66	2.111	4.889	52
Neuroticism	2.748	0.763	1.375	4.5	52
Raven	24.962	4.851	13	32	52
Risk Aversion	5.558	1.434	3	8	52
Final Profit	3573.154	443.977	2676	4384	52
Profit x Period	38.839	4.826	29.087	47.652	52
Total Periods	92	0	92	92	52

Table O.25: BoS (low ineq.) Non-disclosure, Main Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Choice	0.551	0.501	0	1	78
Partner Choice	0.551	0.501	0	1	78
Age	23.038	3.068	18	33	78
Female	0.564	0.499	0	1	78
Round	92	0	92	92	78
Openness	3.676	0.494	2.3	4.8	78
Conscientiousness	3.46	0.679	2	4.778	78
Extraversion	3.304	0.781	1.5	4.75	78
Agreableness	3.781	0.59	2.222	4.667	78
Neuroticism	2.904	0.759	1.25	4.875	78
Raven	23.744	5.256	10	34	78
Risk Aversion	5.654	1.536	2	9	78
Final Profit	2268.615	345.573	1498	2964	78
Profit x Period	24.659	3.756	16.283	32.217	78
Total Periods	92	0	92	92	78

Table O.26: BoS (low ineq.) Disclosure, Main Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Choice	0.565	0.498	0	1	92
Partner Choice	0.565	0.498	0	1	92
Age	23.457	4.321	18	57	92
Female	0.478	0.502	0	1	92
Round	92	0	92	92	92
Openness	3.668	0.566	2.3	4.9	92
Conscientiousness	3.502	0.544	2.111	4.556	92
Extraversion	3.357	0.71	1.875	4.875	92
Agreableness	3.763	0.497	2.333	4.778	92
Neuroticism	2.772	0.673	1.375	4.625	92
Raven	23.793	4.823	3	33	92
Risk Aversion	5.554	1.693	0	10	92
Final Profit	2180.478	381.597	1048	2812	92
Profit x Period	23.701	4.148	11.391	30.565	92
Total Periods	92	0	92	92	92

Table O.27: BoS (high ineq.) Non-disclosure, Main Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Choice	0.561	0.499	0	1	82
Partner Choice	0.561	0.499	0	1	82
Age	23.841	4.744	18	45	82
Female	0.488	0.503	0	1	82
Round	92	0	92	92	82
Openness	3.737	0.507	2.5	4.7	82
Conscientiousness	3.514	0.566	2.333	4.556	82
Extraversion	3.306	0.736	1.75	4.75	82
Agreableness	3.648	0.498	1.889	4.667	82
Neuroticism	2.927	0.776	1.125	4.625	82
Raven	23.939	5.350	10	35	82
Risk Aversion	5.695	1.733	0	10	82
Final Profit	1707.073	321.213	792	2424	82
Profit x Period	18.555	3.491	8.609	26.348	82
Total Periods	92	0	92	92	82

Table O.28: BoS (high ineq.) Disclosure, Main Variables

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Choice	0.603	0.493	0	1	78
Partner Choice	0.603	0.493	0	1	78
Age	23.051	3.154	17	34	78
Female	0.5	0.503	0	1	78
Round	92	0	92	92	78
Openness	3.612	0.549	2.3	4.7	78
Conscientiousness	3.447	0.599	2.111	4.556	78
Extraversion	3.178	0.815	1.625	5	78
Agreableness	3.564	0.578	2.222	4.889	78
Neuroticism	3.029	0.752	1.625	4.625	78
Raven	23.026	5.501	7	33	78
Risk Aversion	5.654	1.772	0	10	78
Final Profit	1705.385	291.184	1032	2472	78
Profit x Period	18.537	3.165	11.217	26.87	78
Total Periods	92	0	92	92	78

Table O.29: All participants: Correlations Table (p−*values* in brackets)

Variables	Raven	Female	Risk Aversion	Openness	Conscientiousness	Extraversion	Agreableness	Neuroticism
Raven	1.000							
Female	-0.152	1.000						
	(0.002)							
Risk Aversion	-0.035	0.134	1.000					
	(0.467)	(0.005)						
Openness	0.101	0.044	-0.008	1.000				
	(0.036)	(0.361)	(0.871)					
Conscientiousness	0.100	0.180	-0.005	0.098	1.000			
	(0.039)	(0.000)	(0.911)	(0.043)				
Extraversion	-0.031	0.000	0.005	0.292	0.202	1.000		
	(0.524)	(0.994)	(0.912)	(0.000)	(0.000)			
Agreableness	0.090	0.071	0.009	0.204	0.202	0.132	1.000	
	(0.063)	(0.139)	(0.852)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.006)		
Neuroticism	-0.148	0.340	0.064	0.005	-0.137	-0.260	-0.166	1.000
	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.187)	(0.920)	(0.004)	(0.000)	(0.001)	

IV Experimental Instructions & Invitation Email

BoS: Experimental instructions

Thank you everyone for coming to our experiment today.

Before coming into the room, each one of you received a card number. This card corresponds to your seat number. Please make sure you are seated on the correct seat. If you're not on the correct seat, the money you end up receiving will not correspond to your own decisions.

The first section is to solve some puzzles, a pattern game. On the screen, you will see a set of abstract pictures with one of the pictures missing. You need to choose a picture from the choices below to complete the pattern. You will have a total of 30 minutes to complete 36 such puzzles. During these 30 minutes you will be able to move forwards and backwards and change your answers using the red buttons on your screens. Once the 30 minutes have passed you will no longer be able to change any answers. You can submit all your answers and wait for the others to finish once you reach the last puzzle by clicking on the grey button that will appear and be labelled 'DONE WITH PATTERN GAME'. The first picture you will see will only be an example. You will be paid for a random choice of three out of these 36 puzzles. For each correct choice, you will receive 1 Euro. [In disclosure sessions only:] A range including the number of your correct answers will be shown to other participants during a task later in the session. This will be presented anonymously, and there is no way others can trace the score back to you.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to help you. Please remain silent while we are running the exercise, as otherwise we will be forced to terminate the session!

START RAVEN

The second section now is a choice task. On your screen, you will see a list of 10 lottery choices and for each case; you will be asked to indicate which of the lotteries you would prefer to play. One out of these 10 lottery choices will be randomly picked and then the choice you have made will be played out and you will be paid according to the probabilities indicated.

START HL

I will explain the next task while you look at an example screen on your monitors. Please feel free to ask any questions you might have. But make sure the questions are only clarifying questions. Any comments during the explanation will force me to terminate the session.

In this task, each of you will be randomly matched with someone in this room to make decisions in several rounds.

On your screen, you will a similar screen like what you see now. [In disclosure sessions only:] On the top of your screen, there is a graph that shows the results of the pattern game. The shaded grey line represents the possible range of 0 to 36 correct answers. You can also see a solid black line; this indicates the actual range of scores of people in this room, from lowest to highest score. The number of your correct answers will be highlighted by a yellow point on the line, the yellow point you see now is only for the example, your true own score will be revealed once we load that actual task. Finally, the green range you see indicates a series of scores within which your partner's score is in.

In the center of the screen, the computer will ask you to make a choice between R and Q. Your payoff will be presented on the left table, left side of the screen, and your partner's payoff will be presented on the right table, right side of the screen. In each table, your decisions (R or Q) are represented in the rows, looking up or down on either side of the screen, and your partner's decisions are represented in the columns, looking left or right on either side of the screen.

The payoffs of each round will depend on both your decisions as well as your partner's. I will now go through an example following the table on your screens. As I am doing so, please keep in mind that the numbers are for example purposes, this is meant to help you understand how to read the table and determine payoffs within each round.

- If you choose R, that is up, and your partner chooses Q, that is left, your payoff, looking at the left table, will be 48 and your partner's payoff, looking at the right table, will be 25.
- If you choose Q, that is down, and your partner chooses R, that is left, your payoff, looking at the left table, will be 0 and your partner's payoff, looking at the right table, will be 0.
- If you choose R, that is up, and your partner chooses Q, that is right, your payoff, looking at the left table, will be 0 and your partner's payoff, looking at the right table, will be 0.
- And finally, if you choose Q, that is down, and your partner chooses Q, that is right, your payoff, looking at the left table, will be 25 and your partner's payoff, looking at the right table, will be 48.

For each sequence of rounds (match) you will be randomly matched with someone from this room. This is done completely anonymously and no-one will ever know who you have been matched with.

After each round, there is a 75% probability that the match will continue for at least another round. That is, if there were 100 trials, in 75 of these the match would be repeated and in 25 the match would stop. So, for example, if you are at the second round of the match, the probability there will a third round is 75% and similarly if you are at round 9, there will be a 75% probability for a further round. Once each match is finished, you will again be randomly matched with someone from this room and play a new sequence of rounds accordingly to the 75-25 probability. Whenever this happens, I will be announcing *'New Partners',* if I say nothing that means you are still playing with the same person as in the previous round.

The sum of the units that you will collect through all the matches, will determine your payoff. Each unit corresponds to 0.3 cents. Keep in mind that the game will be repeated many times and so you can potentially earn a lot of money!

Any questions? If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and we will come to help you. Please remain silent throughout the session as otherwise, we will be forced to terminate the exercise.

Again, let me remind you that the length of each match is randomly determined. After each round, there is a 75% probability that the match will continue for at least another round. You will play with the same person for the entire match. In addition, once a match is finished you will be randomly matched with another person for a new match.

START BoS

The fourth and last section is a questionnaire. It is relevant to your background and a personality. Your payment is not affected by these. Again I would like to remind you that everything is anonymous so please answer as truthfully as possible as this is critically important for our research.

If you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to help you.

START QUESTIONAIRE

Invitation Email

Dear %FIRST_NAME% %LAST_NAME%!

Earn money for less than 90 minutes of your time, by participating in our research project "AMRE Study".

You will be asked to solve some puzzles and complete a questionnaire and some decision tasks. The sessions will be run in English.

We have a session running this next Wednesday 23rd October at 16:00-17:30.

All sessions will take place in the AWI-Experimentallabor.

If you want to participate, you can sign up by clicking the below link:

https://heidelberg-awi.sona-systems.com/default.aspx?p_return_experiment_id=195

(If you can not directly click on the link in your e-mail program, just mark it and copy it to the clipboard by right-clicking and selecting "Copy", then launch your web browser and paste the address there in the address window by clicking right there and choosing "Paste".)

For any further questions, please contact the researcher, Andis Sofianos (A.Sofianos@uni-heidelberg.de)

Kind Regards,

Andis Sofianos