American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature
American Economic Review
vol. 113,
no. 11, November 2023
(pp. 3090–3128)
Abstract
We model legislative decision-making with an agenda setter who can propose policies sequentially, tailoring each proposal to the status quo that prevails after prior votes. Voters are sophisticated, and the agenda setter cannot commit to future proposals. Nevertheless, the agenda setter obtains her favorite outcome in every equilibrium regardless of the initial default policy. Central to our results is a new condition on preferences, manipulability, that holds in rich policy spaces, including spatial settings and distribution problems. Our findings therefore establish that, despite the sophistication of voters and the absence of commitment power, the agenda setter is effectively a dictator.Citation
Ali, S. Nageeb, B. Douglas Bernheim, Alexander W. Bloedel, and Silvia Console Battilana. 2023. "Who Controls the Agenda Controls the Legislature." American Economic Review, 113 (11): 3090–3128. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221578Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation