American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 13,
no. 1, January 2021
(pp. 235–66)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We use a policy experiment in Indonesia to show how local political boundaries affect ethnic tension. Redrawing district borders along group lines reduces conflict. However, the gains in stability are undone or even reversed when new boundaries increase ethnic polarization. Greater polarization leads to more violence around majoritarian elections but has little effect around lower-stakes, proportional representation elections. These results point to distinct incentives for violence in winner-take-all settings with contestable public resources. Overall, our findings illustrate the promise and pitfalls of redrawing borders in diverse countries where it is infeasible for each group to have its own administrative unit.Citation
Bazzi, Samuel, and Matthew Gudgeon. 2021. "The Political Boundaries of Ethnic Divisions." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 13 (1): 235–66. DOI: 10.1257/app.20190309Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
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