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  5. Search, Screening, and Sorting

Search, Screening, and Sorting

  • Xiaoming Cai
  • Pieter Gautier
  • Ronald Wolthoff
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics (Forthcoming)

Abstract

We examine how search frictions impact labor market sorting by constructing a model consistent with evidence that employers interview a subset of a pool of applicants. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for sorting in applications and matches. Positive sorting is obtained when production complementarities outweigh a counterforce measured by a (novel) quality-quantity elasticity. Interestingly, the threshold for the complementarities depends on the fraction of high-type workers and can be increasing in the number of interviews. Our model shows how policies like Ban the Box can backfire because when screening workers becomes harder, firms may discourage certain workers from applying.

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