Journal of Economic Perspectives
ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)
The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 19,
no. 3, Summer 2005
(pp. 89–108)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of self-enforcing constitutions, addressing the question, how do some constitutions provide incentives for political officials to abide by the constraints announced in the constitution? To understand the mechanisms underlying successful constitutions, the paper begins by exploring a simple society facing the dilemma of policing the government: a sovereign, who controls the government, and two citizens. It then moves to a discussion of how constitutions are often formed out of crises, with some more detailed discussion of two main examples: England's Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the U.S. Constitution.Citation
Weingast, Barry, R. 2005. "The Constitutional Dilemma of Economic Liberty." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19 (3): 89–108. DOI: 10.1257/089533005774357815JEL Classification
- K10 Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
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