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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2006
  5. De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence

  • Daron Acemoglu
  • James A. Robinson
American Economic Review
vol. 96, no. 2, May 2006
(pp. 325–330)
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Citation

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. "De Facto Political Power and Institutional Persistence." American Economic Review, 96 (2): 325–330. DOI: 10.1257/000282806777212549

JEL Classification

  • D02 Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior