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  3. American Economic Review
  4. September 2010
  5. Strategic Redistricting

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Strategic Redistricting

  • Faruk Gul
  • Wolfgang Pesendorfer
American Economic Review
vol. 100, no. 4, September 2010
(pp. 1616–41)
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Abstract

Two parties choose redistricting plans to maximize their probability of winning a majority in the House of Representatives. In the unique equilibrium, parties maximally segregate their opponents' supporters but pool their own supporters into uniform districts. Ceteris paribus, the stronger party segregates more than the weaker one, and the election outcome is biased in the stronger party's favor and against the party whose supporters are easier to identify. We incorporate policy choice into our redistricting game and find that when one party controls redistricting, the equilibrium policy is biased towards the preferences of the redistricting party's supporters. (JEL C72, D72)

Citation

Gul, Faruk, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 2010. "Strategic Redistricting." American Economic Review, 100 (4): 1616–41. DOI: 10.1257/aer.100.4.1616

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C72 Noncooperative Games
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior