American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Love and Money by Parental Matchmaking: Evidence from Urban Couples in China
American Economic Review
vol. 102,
no. 3, May 2012
(pp. 555–60)
Abstract
Parental involvement in marriage matchmaking may distort the optimal spouse choice because parents are willing to substitute love for money. The rationale is that the joint income of married children can be shared among extended family members more easily than mutual attraction felt by the couple themselves, and as a result, the best spouse candidate in the parents' eyes can differ from what is optimal to the individual, even though parents are altruistic and care dearly about their children's welfare. We find supporting evidence for this prediction using a unique sample of urban couples in China in the early 1990s.Citation
Huang, Fali, Ginger Zhe Jin, and Lixin Colin Xu. 2012. "Love and Money by Parental Matchmaking: Evidence from Urban Couples in China." American Economic Review, 102 (3): 555–60. DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.3.555JEL Classification
- O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
- P25 Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
- J12 Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- P36 Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions: Consumer Economics; Health; Education and Training: Welfare, Income, Wealth, and Poverty
- R23 Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Economics: Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics