American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation
American Economic Review
vol. 103,
no. 1, February 2013
(pp. 80–106)
Abstract
In Fall 2009, Chicago authorities abandoned a school assignment mechanism midstream, citing concerns about its vulnerability to manipulation. Nonetheless, they asked thousands of applicants to re-rank schools in a new mechanism that is also manipulable. This paper introduces a method to compare mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. Our methodology formalizes how the old mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other plausible mechanism, including the new one. A number of similar transitions took place in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes. (JEL C78, D82, H75, I21, I28)Citation
Pathak, Parag A., and Tayfun Sönmez. 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation." American Economic Review, 103 (1): 80–106. DOI: 10.1257/aer.103.1.80Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H75 State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
- I21 Analysis of Education
- I28 Education: Government Policy