This website uses cookies.

By clicking the "Accept" button or continuing to browse our site, you agree to first-party and session-only cookies being stored on your device to enhance site navigation and analyze site performance and traffic. For more information on our use of cookies, please see our Privacy Policy.

  1. Home
  2. Journals
  3. American Economic Review
  4. October 2014
  5. Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions

  • James Albrecht
  • Pieter A. Gautier
  • Susan Vroman
American Economic Review
vol. 104, no. 10, October 2014
(pp. 3288–96)
Download Full Text PDF

Abstract

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.

Citation

Albrecht, James, Pieter A. Gautier, and Susan Vroman. 2014. "Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions." American Economic Review, 104 (10): 3288–96. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.10.3288

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design