American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
On the Selection of Arbitrators
American Economic Review
vol. 104,
no. 11, November 2014
(pp. 3434–58)
Abstract
A key feature of arbitration is the possibility for conflicting parties to participate in the selection of the arbitrator, the individual who will rule the case. We analyze this problem of the selection of arbitrators from the perspective of implementation theory. In particular, theoretical analyses document problems with veto-rank, a simultaneous procedure that is commonly used in practice, and develop a new sequential procedure, shortlisting, with better properties. Experimental results are consistent with the theoretical predictions, highlighting both the disadvantages associated with the veto-rank procedure and the advantages associated with the short-listing procedure.Citation
de Clippel, Geoffroy, Kfir Eliaz, and Brian Knight. 2014. "On the Selection of Arbitrators." American Economic Review, 104 (11): 3434–58. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.11.3434Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior