American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture
American Economic Review
vol. 104,
no. 5, May 2014
(pp. 452–56)
Abstract
The paper reports the architecture of a continuous combinatorial auction. Preferences are based on sets of items and feasibility requires the nonintersection of sets. Countdown clocks replace eligibility and activity requirements typical of rounds-based auctions. Bids remain in the system to be combined with new bids to form winning collections. Increment requirements dictate improvements over appropriate collections of existing bids. The auction evolved from experimental methods and operates at high levels of efficiency. Field applications are reported and result in natural equilibration in a few hours as opposed to days or weeks required by round-based architectures.Citation
Plott, Charles R., Hsing-Yang Lee, and Travis Maron. 2014. "The Continuous Combinatorial Auction Architecture." American Economic Review, 104 (5): 452–56. DOI: 10.1257/aer.104.5.452Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions