American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Clientelism in Indian Villages
American Economic Review
vol. 105,
no. 6, June 2015
(pp. 1780–1816)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)Citation
Anderson, Siwan, Patrick Francois, and Ashok Kotwal. 2015. "Clientelism in Indian Villages." American Economic Review, 105 (6): 1780–1816. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20130623Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H23 Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- I38 Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J15 Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- O18 Economic Development: Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure