American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry
American Economic Review
vol. 105,
no. 8, August 2015
(pp. 2595–2643)
Abstract
When entry is exogenous, strong buyers should be discriminated against weak buyers to maximize revenues (Myerson 1981). When entry is endogenous so that entrants' expected payoffs do not depend on the proposed mechanism, optimal discrimination takes a completely different form. The revenue-maximizing equilibrium requires that there should be no discrimination with respect to entrants irrespective of their ex ante characteristics. Besides, those buyers who always participate should be discriminated against entrants independently of their strength. These predictions are independent of the equilibrium selection when the number of potential entrants grows large. The optimality of first-price auctions is also discussed. (JEL D44, H57)Citation
Jehiel, Philippe, and Laurent Lamy. 2015. "On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry." American Economic Review, 105 (8): 2595–2643. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20131580Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions
- H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement