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  5. Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India’s Direct Benefit Transfer Policy

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Curbing Leakage in Public Programs: Evidence from India’s Direct Benefit Transfer Policy

  • Prabhat Barnwal
American Economic Review (Forthcoming)

Abstract

Targeted price subsidies create a gap between subsidized and unsubsidized prices. The resulting dual pricing can lead to arbitrage opportunities where intermediaries divert the subsidized goods to unintended beneficiaries via the black market. I study India’s Direct Benefit Transfer policy for cooking fuel subsidies, which altered the existing subsidy program by transferring subsidies directly to beneficiaries’ bank accounts. The policy decreased subsidized fuel purchases, indicating a reduction in diversion to the black market. Changes in unsubsidized fuel sales and black-market prices provide supporting evidence that leakage was reduced. These results suggest that addressing the underlying perverse incentives in welfare delivery can improve efficiency by curbing leakages.

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