American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply
American Economic Review
vol. 108,
no. 2, February 2018
(pp. 561–63)
Abstract
In a comment, Okamoto (2018) identifies and corrects a misspecification of the rationing rule in Ausubel (2004). This reply elaborates on the observation that the optimality of truthful bidding in dynamic auctions may be sensitive to the fine details of the rationing rule. It then discusses the wider role of sequential bid processing in restoring truthful bidding.Citation
Ausubel, Lawrence M. 2018. "An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects: Reply." American Economic Review, 108 (2): 561–63. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20171408Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D44 Auctions