American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique
American Economic Review
vol. 110,
no. 11, November 2020
(pp. 3431–53)
Abstract
Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking.Citation
Armand, Alex, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente, and Inês Vilela. 2020. "Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique." American Economic Review, 110 (11): 3431–53. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190842Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C73 Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
- O13 Economic Development: Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Q33 Resource Booms
- Q34 Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts