American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Delegation in Veto Bargaining
American Economic Review
vol. 111,
no. 12, December 2021
(pp. 4046–87)
Abstract
A proposer requires a veto player's approval to change a status quo. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer's preferences. We show that Vetoer is typically given a non-singleton menu, or delegation set, of options to pick from. The optimal set balances the extent of compromise with the risk of a veto. We identify conditions for certain delegation sets to emerge, including "full delegation": Vetoer can choose any action between the status quo and Proposer's ideal action. By contrast to expertise-based delegation, Proposer gives less discretion to Vetoer when their preferences are more (likely to be) aligned.Citation
Kartik, Navin, Andreas Kleiner, and Richard Van Weelden. 2021. "Delegation in Veto Bargaining." American Economic Review, 111 (12): 4046–87. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201817Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design