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  3. American Economic Review
  4. May 2007
  5. An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

  • Dirk Bergemann
  • Stephen Morris
American Economic Review
vol. 97, no. 2, May 2007
(pp. 125–130)
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Citation

Bergemann, Dirk, and Stephen Morris. 2007. "An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty." American Economic Review, 97 (2): 125–130. DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.2.125

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design