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  3. American Economic Review
  4. September 2007
  5. Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment

American Economic Review

ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)

Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment

  • Emel Filiz-Ozbay
  • Erkut Y. Ozbay
American Economic Review
vol. 97, no. 4, September 2007
(pp. 1407–1418)
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Abstract

This paper demonstrates theoretically and experimentally that in first-price auctions overbidding with respect to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium might be driven from anticipated loser regret (felt when bidders lose at an affordable price). Different information structures are created to elicit regret: bidders know they will learn the winning bid if they lose (loser regret condition); or the second-highest bid if they win (winner regret condition); or they will receive no feedback regarding the other bids. Bidders in loser regret condition anticipated regret and significantly overbid. However, bidders in the winner regret condition did not anticipate regret. (JEL D44)

Citation

Filiz-Ozbay, Emel, and Erkut Y. Ozbay. 2007. "Auctions with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiment." American Economic Review, 97 (4): 1407–1418. DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1407

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions