American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation
American Economic Review
vol. 99,
no. 4, September 2009
(pp. 1178–1205)
Abstract
We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning that provides sharp predictions as to how learning members of an organization might cope with the simultaneous learning of others as a function of fundamental variables, e.g., firm size and the discount factor. While the problem of learning while others are learning is quite difficult, we find support for the comparative static predictions of the model's unique symmetric equilibrium. (JEL C72, D23, D83)Citation
Blume, Andreas, John Duffy, and April M. Franco. 2009. "Decentralized Organizational Learning: An Experimental Investigation." American Economic Review, 99 (4): 1178–1205. DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.4.1178Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C72 Noncooperative Games
- D23 Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief