American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
American Economic Review
vol. 99,
no. 5, December 2009
(pp. 1954–78)
Abstract
The design of the New York City (NYC) high school match involved trade-offs among efficiency, stability, and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences -- ties -- in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking indifferences the same way at every school -- single tiebreaking -- in a student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism. Any inefficiency associated with a realized tiebreaking cannot be removed without harming student incentives. Finally, we empirically document the extent of potential efficiency loss associated with strategy-proofness and stability, and direct attention to some open questions. (JEL C78, D82, I21)Citation
Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth. 2009. "Strategy-Proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match." American Economic Review, 99 (5): 1954–78. DOI: 10.1257/aer.99.5.1954Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- I21 Analysis of Education