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  3. American Economic Review: Insights
  4. March 2022
  5. Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

American Economic Review: Insights

ISSN 2640-205X (Print) | ISSN 2640-2068 (Online)

Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

  • Marcelo Ariel Fernandez
  • Kirill Rudov
  • Leeat Yariv
American Economic Review: Insights
vol. 4, no. 1, March 2022
(pp. 18–33)
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Abstract

We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.

Citation

Fernandez, Marcelo Ariel, Kirill Rudov, and Leeat Yariv. 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information." American Economic Review: Insights, 4 (1): 18–33. DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210123

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • D11 Consumer Economics: Theory
  • D21 Firm Behavior: Theory
  • D47 Market Design