American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics
ISSN 1945-7782 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7790 (Online)
Microfinance Games
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
vol. 2,
no. 3, July 2010
(pp. 60–95)
Abstract
Microfinance banks use group-based lending contracts to strengthen borrowers' incentives for diligence, but the contracts are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion. We systematically unpack microfinance mechanisms through ten experimental games played in an experimental economics laboratory in urban Peru. Risk-taking broadly conforms to theoretical predictions, with dynamic incentives strongly reducing risk-taking even without group-based mechanisms. Group lending increases risk-taking, especially for risk-averse borrowers, but this is moderated when borrowers form their own groups. Group contracts benefit borrowers by creating implicit insurance against investment losses, but the costs are borne by other borrowers, especially the most risk averse. (JEL D82, G21, G31, O16)Citation
Giné, Xavier, Pamela Jakiela, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Morduch. 2010. "Microfinance Games." American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (3): 60–95. DOI: 10.1257/app.2.3.60Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information
- G21 Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G31 Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- O16 Economic Development: Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
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