Journal of Economic Perspectives
ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)
Analyzing the Airwaves Auction
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 10,
no. 1, Winter 1996
(pp. 159–175)
(Complimentary)
Abstract
The design of the Federal Communications Commission spectrum license auction is a case study in the application of economic theory. Auction theory helped address policy questions such as whether an open auction or a sealed-bid auction should be used; whether the licenses should be auctioned sequentially or simultaneously; whether the government should allow bids for combinations of licenses or accept only single-license bids; how the auction should should be structured to promote the interests of minority-owned and other designated firms; whether the government should impose royalties or reserve prices; and how much the bidders should be informed about their competition.Citation
McAfee, R. Preston, and John McMillan. 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1): 159–175. DOI: 10.1257/jep.10.1.159JEL Classification
- L96 Telecommunications
- D44 Auctions
- D45 Rationing; Licensing
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