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  4. Fall 2024
  5. Designing Simple Mechanisms

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Designing Simple Mechanisms

  • Shengwu Li
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 38, no. 4, Fall 2024
(pp. 175–92)
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Abstract

It matters whether real-world mechanisms are simple. If participants cannot see that a mechanism is incentive-compatible, they may refuse to participate or may behave in ways that undermine the mechanism. There are several ways to formalize what it means for a mechanism to be "simple." This essay explains three of them, and suggests directions for future research.

Citation

Li, Shengwu. 2024. "Designing Simple Mechanisms." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 38 (4): 175–92. DOI: 10.1257/jep.38.4.175

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D44 Auctions
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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