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  4. Fall 1992
  5. Rationality in Extensive-Form Games

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Rationality in Extensive-Form Games

  • Philip J. Reny
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 6, no. 4, Fall 1992
(pp. 103–118)
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Abstract

Let us adopt the classical point of view that a theory of games is a description of "rational" behavior. Consequently, equipped with a book entitled "Theory of Games," any individual in any strategic situation need only consult the book to make a "rational" decision. One of the questions to address in this context is indeed whether or not strategies other than those provided by backward induction can ever appear in such a book. In offering an answer, we shall also explore the logical limits within which any "Theory of Games" must operate.

Citation

Reny, Philip J. 1992. "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (4): 103–118. DOI: 10.1257/jep.6.4.103

JEL Classification

  • C70 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
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