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  4. Fall 1994
  5. Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process

  • William P. Rogerson
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 8, no. 4, Fall 1994
(pp. 65–90)
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Abstract

This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.

Citation

Rogerson, William P. 1994. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (4): 65–90. DOI: 10.1257/jep.8.4.65

JEL Classification

  • H57 National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
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