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  4. Winter 1995
  5. Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance

  • Roger B. Myerson
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 9, no. 1, Winter 1995
(pp. 77–89)
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Abstract

This paper develops an economic perspective on political theory as a guide to some problems and directions of current research. The electoral system and the allocation of powers to elected offices together define the game that politicians play. So democratic structures should be compared and evaluated by analyzing game models to see how equilibrium behavior of political agents may depend on the structure of the political system. The goal of such research is to predict how the conduct of politicians and the performance of government may depend on the incentives created by the structure of the political system.

Citation

Myerson, Roger B. 1995. "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (1): 77–89. DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.77

JEL Classification

  • D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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