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  5. How to Judge Voting Schemes

Journal of Economic Perspectives

ISSN 0895-3309 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7965 (Online)

How to Judge Voting Schemes

  • Amartya Sen
Journal of Economic Perspectives
vol. 9, no. 1, Winter 1995
(pp. 91–98)
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Abstract

This symposium on voting procedures presents many interesting findings and insights. This note scrutinizes them and discusses two general issues. First, the assumption that voters' preferences are menu-independent (and based on one canonical ordering of the alternatives) underestimates the importance of the process of voting (voting for x, against y). Second, evaluation can be a two-way process, including the axiomatic method (of social choice theory), going from isolated properties to voting schemes, and the converse method of first identifying attractions and perversities of particular voting schemes (as in this symposium) and then using properties for later axiomatic use.

Citation

Sen, Amartya. 1995. "How to Judge Voting Schemes." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9 (1): 91–98. DOI: 10.1257/jep.9.1.91

JEL Classification

  • D72 Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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