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  5. Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy

AEA Papers and Proceedings

ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)

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Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy

  • Steven P. Lalley
  • E. Glen Weyl
AEA Papers and Proceedings
vol. 108, May 2018
(pp. 33–37)
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Abstract

Can mechanism design save democracy? We propose a simple design that offers a chance: individuals pay for as many votes as they wish using a number of "voice credits" in the votes they buy. Only quadratic cost induces marginal costs linear in votes purchased and thus welfare optimality if individuals' valuation of votes is proportional to their value of changing the outcome. A variety of analysis and evidence suggests that this still-nascent mechanism has significant promise to robustly correct the failure of existing democracies to incorporate intensity of preference and knowledge.

Citation

Lalley, Steven P., and E. Glen Weyl. 2018. "Quadratic Voting: How Mechanism Design Can Radicalize Democracy." AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108: 33–37. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181002

Additional Materials

JEL Classification

  • D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design