AEA Papers and Proceedings
ISSN 2574-0768 (Print) | ISSN 2574-0776 (Online)
Workplace Signaling and Financial Commitment: Evidence from a Field Experiment
AEA Papers and Proceedings
vol. 108,
May 2018
(pp. 438–43)
Abstract
We provide evidence of strategic behavior in financial decisions that occur in the workplace and are observable to one's employer. We offer factory workers the opportunity to sign up for a commitment savings account that credibly signals the intention to remain employed with the firm. Workers are more likely to sign up when the account is endorsed by their employer and their decision is observed by the firm. An experiment with the firm's managers shows that the firm is more likely to invest in the human capital of workers with accounts, suggesting that financial commitment is rewarded by the employer.Citation
Breza, Emily, Martin Kanz, and Leora Klapper. 2018. "Workplace Signaling and Financial Commitment: Evidence from a Field Experiment." AEA Papers and Proceedings, 108: 438–43. DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20181011Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C93 Field Experiments
- D22 Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- J24 Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- M53 Personnel Economics: Training
- O14 Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration