American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 2,
no. 4, November 2010
(pp. 148–72)
Abstract
In producer-friendly economies—economies that are ruled by productive agents and have strong property rights institutions—international trade causes an institutional improvement and an aggregate shift of talent towards production, and away from socially wasteful appropriation. However, in predator-friendly economies—economies that are ruled by rent seekers and have weak institutions—international trade leads to an institutional deterioration, and a more unfavorable talent allocation. (JEL D72, F12, K11)Citation
Stefanadis, Christodoulos. 2010. "Appropriation, Property Rights Institutions, and International Trade." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2 (4): 148–72. DOI: 10.1257/pol.2.4.148JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- F12 Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- K11 Property Law
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