American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power in Managed Care Networks
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 7,
no. 1, February 2015
(pp. 243–74)
Abstract
We investigate the impact of hospital system membership on negotiations between hospitals and managed care organizations (MCOs). Previous research finds that system hospitals secure higher reimbursements by exploiting local market concentration. By leveraging system membership in the bargaining game, however, system hospitals may also extract a higher percentage of their value to an MCO. Our findings reveal that more of the observed price gap between system and nonsystem hospitals can be attributed to bargaining power differences than to differences linked to relative concentration. These results highlight the importance of explicitly modeling the bargaining process when evaluating negotiated-price markets more generally. (JEL C78, I11, I13, L14)Citation
Lewis, Matthew S., and Kevin E. Pflum. 2015. "Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power in Managed Care Networks." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 7 (1): 243–74. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20130009Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C78 Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
- L14 Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
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