American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Employed for Higher Pay? How Medicare Payment Rules Affect Hospital Employment of Physicians
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 11,
no. 4, November 2019
(pp. 249–71)
Abstract
Hospitals employ an increasing number of physicians and bill for a growing share of outpatient procedures. We exploit a plausibly exogenous increase in Medicare prices for hospital-employed physicians relative to Medicare prices for other physicians to show that payer reimbursement rules explain part of this trend. The shock we study explains 20 percent of the increase in physician employment and 75 percent of the increase in hospital-billed outpatient procedures between 2009 and 2013.Citation
Dranove, David, and Christopher Ody. 2019. "Employed for Higher Pay? How Medicare Payment Rules Affect Hospital Employment of Physicians." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11 (4): 249–71. DOI: 10.1257/pol.20170020Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- G22 Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I11 Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I13 Health Insurance, Public and Private
- J23 Labor Demand
- J31 Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- J44 Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
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