American Economic Journal:
Economic Policy
ISSN 1945-7731 (Print) | ISSN 1945-774X (Online)
Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
vol. 3,
no. 2, May 2011
(pp. 41–65)
Abstract
We document how manipulation of a targeting system for social welfare programs evolves over time. First, there was strategic behavior of some local politicians in the timing of the household interviews around local elections. Then, there was corrupt behavior with the sudden emergence of a sharp discontinuity in the score density, exactly at the eligibility threshold, which coincided with the release of the score algorithm to local officials. The discontinuity at the threshold is larger where mayoral elections are more competitive. While cultural forces are surely relevant for corruption, our results also highlight the importance of information and incentives. (JEL D72, I32, I38, O15, O17).Citation
Camacho, Adriana, and Emily Conover. 2011. "Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 3 (2): 41–65. DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.2.41Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- I32 Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
- I38 Welfare and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- O15 Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
- O17 Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
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