

**Elder care and the household division of labor and income:  
Bringing the gender contract into the comparison of welfare states**

**Sevinc Rende**

Department of Economics  
Isik University  
Istanbul

**Abstract**

Welfare states encourage the practices of mutual responsibility and obligation to other citizens and as a result foster social cohesion. In this paper, I investigate the relationship between the inter-generational and gender contracts sorted the type of the welfare regime. Using the Gender and Generations Survey, I explore the nexus of the household divisions of tasks and finances and the opinions expressed regarding the responsibilities for elderly care in Norway, France and Russia, representing Nordic, Christian Democratic and post-transition welfare regimes, respectively. The results suggest some of the implications of the austerity programs now being applied in Europe and offer some pointers for the design of equitable and efficient welfare systems in countries without a mature welfare regime.

**1. Introduction**

Welfare states encourage the practices of mutual responsibility and obligation to other citizens and as a result foster social cohesion. By broadly distributing the costs of risk and ensuring individual security in the face of aging, disability and illness, a welfare state aims to achieve egalitarian distribution as a buffer against market failures. The dual relationship between the gender contract and the welfare state, however, requires further exploration. On the one hand, welfare states challenge the prevailing gender contract by shaping the fall back options available to men and women. On the other hand, the gender contract alters the extent of the provisions of the welfare system. This relationship has gained importance in the wake of one of the most pervasive economic crises of the modern capitalist system in the late 2000s, during which the social contract has been subject to significant revisions.

Previous research on elder care in welfare states has tended to focus on either the mechanisms ensuring the quality of care or the institutional care structures in place (Chevreul & Berg, 2013; Kay, 2011; van Riemsdijk, 2010). Little attention has been paid to the relationships among the gender contract that manifests itself within households, the structure of the welfare system and the opinions expressed regarding filial obligations. In this paper, I examine the following research question: What is the relationship between the gender division of household tasks and income and the norms supporting filial obligations? And in what ways do these relationships vary across the types of welfare regimes? This exercise serves two purposes. First, it helps us to assess the implications of the current austerity programs being applied in Europe for the social contract. Second, it provides clues for the design of equitable and efficient welfare systems in countries without mature welfare regimes.

I first begin with a short account of households as sites of cooperation and conflict, then briefly review the literature examining welfare regimes in Norway, France and the Russian Federation, representing Nordic, corporate-conservative and post-transition liberal welfare regimes, respectively. Using the Gender and Generations Survey (GSS), I then explore empirically the nexus of the gender division of household tasks and income and the opinions expressed on the responsibilities for elder care in Norway, France and the Russian Federation. The results show that in welfare states that encourage autonomy, females are less driven by filial obligations, and that the gender division of household tasks and income play a role in the formation of opinions on elder care. The last section concludes with a discussion of the findings and the study's implications for future research.

## **2. Literature Review: Care Work and Welfare States**

The literature on who cares for whom and for what reasons is vast. Disciplines from sociology to psychology, economics to anthropology and geography investigated the daily and inter-generational sustenance of human wellbeing. It is thus challenging to present a review that is adequately comprehensive (Hames & Draper, 2004; Hassim, 2008; Lawson, 2007; McGrath & DeFilippis, 2009;

Quick, 2008). Anthropological studies discuss unexpected puzzles that arise in dependency and care relations in societies in which households continue to be the main source of care work (Hrdy, 2007; Kramer, 2002). Scholars working within geography opened up the black box of the ethics of care and asserted that just as class, race and caste constraints vary across societies, so too the responsibilities and obligations for care (Cox, 2010; Milligan & Wiles, 2010; Raghuram, 2012).

Yet, accounting for care work has always been difficult within orthodox economic theory. Care is provided in and outside of markets and, by definition, describes an outcome as well as a process (Himmelweit, 2007). In addition, care work involves dependency for the person who is unable to sell their labor power to ensure survival, and reflects the role of agency and power in a market-driven economy (Power, 2004). The payoff matrix, namely what people gain and lose, for paid and unpaid work is not sufficient to include all aspects of care work, in particular the emotional, physical and pecuniary resources dispensed even when its provision is through the market (Folbre, 2008). Put simply, one can scratch the surface and find that at its core orthodox economic theory often presumes that production is for men, reproduction is for women. This assumption has led feminist economists to examine why it is important, yet difficult, to account for care work (Budlender, 2008; Folbre, 2006). Even though the work has been ubiquitous and all societies provide some form of care for the dependents, it has been equally difficult to ensure a commitment to the welfare of dependents and their care providers (Davis, 2004; Folbre, 1994).

Care work crosses the boundaries of the gender based responsibilities in households, labor market policies and social policy. Gendered inter-generational obligations vary across cultures and across time, shaping the expectations of the care responsibilities of generations (Aboim, 2010). Yet, as much as filial obligations reflect the socio-economic culture in which people live, they also depend on individual circumstances (Dykstra, 2010; Gans & Silverstein, 2006). Nevertheless, over the long term, an aging population coupled with higher women's labor force participation, carries the potential to create a care deficit within a society. Therefore, understanding the care relationship between the welfare state and the

gender contract that manifests itself within households is required to design and implement equitable care policies for the elderly.

### 3. Context

To frame the comparison of cross-country filial obligations, I will rely on a well-established typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Nordic welfare systems represent the social democratic welfare regime, in which redistributive policies support equality with generous and comprehensive packages for the support of elderly people in need of care. In contrast, conservative-corporate welfare regimes aim to protect class structure and traditional values. The third type, the liberal welfare regimes rely on targeted transfers, primarily by restricting the role of the state in providing social safety nets and thereby narrowing the claims of citizenship.

The three countries, Norway, France and the Russian Federation, represent Nordic, conservative-corporate and post-transition liberal welfare regimes, respectively. Table 1 illustrates the differences in the demographic and economic indicators across the countries.

The share of the elderly population in France is slightly higher than the share of the elderly population in Norway and Russian Federation. The French culture has a preference for family care, although in recent years traditional family care has been supported with monetized incentives. In France, cash-for-care service allows the elderly to employ a care worker, including a relative. This service, in addition to addressing the care deficit, has increased service employment (Da Roit & Le Bihan, 2010). It also offers a private insurance mechanism for long-term care.

Table 1: Demographic and economic indicators, 2004 - 2008

	France	Norway	Russian Federation
Population size*	62,702,121	4,591,910	143,849,574
Percentage population aged 60+*	16.4	14.8	13.6
Female*	18.9	17.0	17.3
Male*	13.7	12.5	9.4
Life expectancy at birth*	80	80	65
Female*	84	82	72
Male*	77	78	59
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US\$)*	30,420	53,200	3,410
Health expenditure, public (% of total health expenditure)*	78.8	83.5	59.6
Legal obligations toward parents**	Yes	No	Yes

Source: \* World Bank, \*\* Multilinks database on intergenerational policy indicators

Among the three countries, Norway has the highest per capita income and more generous health expenditures, whereas the living standard, as measured by per capita GNI, is lowest in the Russian Federation. Norway offers universal long-term care and does not require children to assume responsibility for their aging parents, however intra-family transfers to aging parents are not lower than those reported for the other OECD countries (Meagher & Szebehely, 2013; Swartz, 2013). A comparison of the legal aspects of filial obligations shows that only in Norway is there no legal obligation of adult children to parents.

The health indicators show that health is far poorer in the Russian Federation where average life expectancy at birth is registered at 59 and 72 years for males and females, respectively, during the years

the GSS was conducted. <sup>1</sup>In Russia, the transition period has seen a shift to a “means-testing” method of distributing welfare entitlements as social policy has moved toward the liberal model. These efforts to manage government resources have been accompanied by an increase in the provision of services by private and non-governmental organizations (Jappinen, Kulama, & Saarinen, 2011). Yet, as the state’s role in the provision of social security has changed, multiple and interlinked formal and informal networks have played a predominant role in the provision of elder care (Kay, 2011).

#### 4. Data and Empirical Work

For empirical analysis, I use the first wave of the Generations and Gender Survey (GSS). The GSS is a comparative survey that deals with inter-generational and gender relations in relation to attitudes toward childbearing, childrearing, leisure and work decisions. The data were collected in 2004 in Russia, in 2005 in France and in 2007–08 in Norway. The surveys captured representative samples of the non-institutionalized population aged 18 – 79 in each country. I included only the cohabiting or married respondents, as single adult headed households represent a different subpopulation.

I will assume a canonical probit model to express the support for filial obligations. The model is hypothesized as follows:

$$(1) \quad \Pr(Y = 1|X) = \Phi(\beta_0 + \beta_1\mathbf{X}_c + \beta_2\mathbf{T}_m + \beta_3\mathbf{X}_p + \beta_4\mathbf{X}_h)$$

where  $\Pr(Y=1|X)$  is the probability of supporting the norm that family is the main responsible party, if realized, is equal to 1 and conditioned on the independent variables,  $\mathbf{X}$ , with a standard normal distribution function of  $\Phi(\cdot)$ , also known as the z-index value. The indicators  $\mathbf{T}_m$  measure the gender division of household tasks and income, vector  $\mathbf{X}_c$  is of the respondent characteristics,  $\mathbf{X}_p$  is a vector of household characteristics and  $\mathbf{X}_h$  is a vector of extended family characteristics. Considering spatial

---

<sup>1</sup> Recently, Russian life expectancy has since begun to recover, while Norway and France have remained fairly stable, with the current numbers for all three.

differences in the availability of welfare services, error terms are corrected by the region of the respondent.

The dependent variables are the measures of support for elder, outcome variables in this study, and are represented by dichotomous categorical variables. The questions in the GSS measured the degree of agreement with responsibility for elder care and on financial support to elderly people. A five-category response scale was employed, ranging from stating that responsibility is “mainly a task for family” to “mainly a task for society”. The dependent variables take the value of one if the respondent agrees that “family” is the main responsible party for elder care and for financial support to the elderly. The empirical model then tests the association between family-driven norms for elder care and the division of household tasks and income, after controlling for other factors.

I measure the gender division of household tasks by averaging the responses to the three female dominated tasks, one male dominated task and one neutral task. The respondent was asked whether she or her partner usually performs that particular task. The variable, “Gender Contract” assigns high values to the cases where female partner is the main responsible party for female dominated tasks and the male partner is the main responsible party for the male dominated task. The second variable of interest, “Household Income Division”, is similarly constructed and measures the contribution of each partner to the household income. However, the questionnaire for Norway differs from the questionnaires of France and Russia. In France and Russia, the respondents reported the partner controlling the household finances. In Norway, the respondents reported each partner’s share in household income, thereby making the responses proportionate. Before proceeding to the discussion of the results, one caveat is in order. In both cases, a bias in the respondent’s perception is expected. People tend to overestimate their contribution or underestimate the partner’s contribution to household chores and finances (Kamo, 2000). On the other hand, without a time-use survey, it is difficult to obtain the precise amount of individual contributions. I will note this discrepancy as a systematic reporting bias in the dataset.

The remaining independent variables in the models can be divided into three groups: individual characteristics, household poverty and labor market conditions, and extended family characteristics. The respondent's schooling is defined by three indicator variables based on the ISCED code (primary, secondary and tertiary). Household structure is controlled by the number of children at home, which aims to capture the "sandwich generation", a generation of adults responsible for elder and child care at the same time. With no income data, I use a proxy variable for household level poverty, an indicator variable which takes the value of one when the respondent reports that the household can't afford its basic needs.

The sample statistics, summarized in Table 2, show that family-based care for elderly people receives the least support in Norway. Furthermore, in all countries, respondents overwhelmingly reject the statement that families should carry the responsibility for supporting the elderly financially. On average, the division of household tasks is more gender-based in the Russian Federation and in France than in Norway. In the majority of households in Norway, couples contribute equally to household income. In France and the Russian Federation, the division of income responsibility tends to be equal, but more equal in France. The age of the representative respondent is youngest in Russian Federation, at 39. In the samples, females are slightly overrepresented. Interestingly, the respondents in France received slightly less education than their counterparts in the Russian Federation and in Norway.

For the majority of respondents in Norway, work provides flexible time options. In the Russian Federation, less than one third of respondents reported a similar flexibility at work. Of the respondents in the Russian Federation, an overwhelming percentage, 89% reported that the household cannot make ends meet. In France, the percentage of respondents reporting that they have trouble in meeting their needs is slightly lower than half, at 46%. In Norway, household poverty is very low, only 11% of the respondents report that they have trouble in making the ends meet.



Overall, the sample statistics show that the representative samples are similar in sex, education and age composition. However, the samples differ by the living standards reported and by the extent to which family is perceived as the main party responsible for elder care.

TABLE 2. Variables in the analyses, 2004–08

	Russia (N=2996)	France (N=1369)	Norway (N=4156)
Care support for the elderly: Family (=1)	0.52	0.41	0.03
Financial support for the elderly: Family (=1)	0.09	0.17	0.02
Gender division of household tasks (=1)	0.54	0.54	0.44
Gender division of household income* (RUS, FR: 0 Joint, 1 Female, 2 Male; NOR 0)	0.53	0.27	0.54
Sex (=1 F)	0.55	0.53	0.55
Age	39.11	42.15	43.03
Education (1=Primary, 2=Secondary, 3=Tertiary)	2.34	2.03	2.45
No of children	1.74	1.99	2.00
Flexible Time at work (=1)	0.27	0.50	0.65
Household Poverty (=1)	0.89	0.46	0.11
Respondent's number of brothers	0.90	1.89	1.12
Respondent's number of sisters	0.97	1.92	1.10

Source: Generations and Gender Survey, 2004 - 2008

## 5. Results

The reduced form models are presented in Tables 3A, 3B, 3C for perceptions on support for elder care and in Tables 4A, 4B, 4C for perceptions on financial support for elder people. The non-linearity in the estimates of the probit model is adjusted and the corresponding marginal effects are reported in the tables.

I construct the empirical model in three steps. In the first step, only the variables measuring person-level controls, such as sex, age and education level, and number of children of the respondent and the main variables of interest, gender division of household tasks and income, are included. In the second step, measures of market-level controls, household poverty and flexible time options at work are added. The

last model incorporates the extended family dimension, the number of siblings, of the respondent. This strategy of expanding the models helps to identify the extent to which the association between the gender division of household tasks and income and the support for filial obligations is robust to inclusion of other personal level factors. Considering the spatial variations in the availability of services for the elderly, in all models standard errors are corrected for regional variations. To avoid redundancy, I will discuss primarily the results of the augmented model, Model 3, reported in the last two columns of Tables 3C and 4C.

In the Russian Federation, female respondents are 6 percentage points more likely than male respondents to consider elder care as a family responsibility. In contrast, in Norway females are less likely to agree than male respondents that elder care is the responsibility of family, the difference between male and female respondents is 1.2 percentage points. While respondents with more education are less likely to support the norm of family responsibility for elder care in France and in Norway, the analysis cannot find a statistically significant association between education and filial obligations in the Russian Federation. The results also suggest cohort-based variations. In the Russian Federation, older respondents are more likely to agree that elder care is mainly a responsibility of the family, whereas in Norway we observe that older respondents seem more likely to agree that the society should assume the main responsibility for elder care. The age of the respondent is not statistically associated with the family driven norm of elder care in France. However, an increase in the number of children increases the probability of family support for elderly by 3.2 percentage points in France. Only in Norway, flexible time at work exerts a statistically significant and positive influence on filial obligations.

I next consider the results in Table 4C measuring financial obligations toward the elderly. The results suggest that in Norway and in France, females tend to disagree that family must assume the main responsibility in providing financial support to elderly people. In the Russian Federation, on the other hand, female respondents, more than male respondents, tend to accept that financial support for the elders is the responsibility of the family. On the other hand, in the Russian Federation, respondents living in

poor households are less likely to agree that families should financially support the elderly. Household poverty exerts no statistically significant influence on the norms in Norway and in France. Only in France, respondents with flexible time at work support the norm that families should provide financial support to the elderly. This factor is not statistically significant in Russian Federation and in Norway.

The estimates of the main variables of interest, labeled as “Gender Contract” and “Household income division” in Tables 3C and 4C, show two interesting results. Firstly, they suggest that the gender division of household tasks and income exert no statistically significant influence on the norm of family responsibility for elder care in the Russian Federation. In contrast, in France and in Norway, the more the division of household tasks is gendered, the less likely that the respondent will accept family as the main responsible party for elder care. In France, each level increase in the gender division of household tasks is associated with 9.9 percentage point decrease in accepting the norm. In Norway, the influence of the gender division of household tasks is lower than in France, 2.8 percentage point. A change in the gender division of household income is statistically significant only in Norway, where we observe that when household income division is less egalitarian, filial obligations are more likely to be supported. In households with non-egalitarian division of finances, the probability of accepting the norm of family responsibility increases by 1.6 percentage points. In the Russian Federation, only when the household income is controlled by the male partner, are the filial obligation for elder care is less likely to be supported.

Consider now the model estimates for the norm supporting family as the main responsible party for financial support to the elderly, reported in Table 4C. The results suggest that neither in the Russian Federation nor in Norway do the gendered division of household tasks and income exert any influence on agreement with providing financial support to the elderly. Only in France, the more prominent the gender division of household tasks, the less likely that the respondent will consider family as the main financial support for elderly people.

<Tables 3A-3C and 4A-4C are approximately here>

## **6. Discussion and Conclusion**

Inter-generational relationships are often investigated through either the parental obligations across generations or the provisions of welfare regimes with respect to the elderly. The analysis here aims at a better understanding of the relationship between the gender division of household tasks and control over household income on the one side and filial obligations on the other within a cross-country framework.

First and most clearly the results show that the respondents are keenly aware that time and money are not substitutes for one another. The statistical significance of the results differ depending on whether the issue is the time commitment or the financial commitment to elder care. The results suggest that the gender division of household income plays a role in the level of assumed filial obligation in Norway and in France, but not in financial obligation toward the elderly in Norway and in France. In the Russian Federation, only in households in which males control household income, does support for the family's responsibility for elder care tend to decrease.

The results indicate cohort differences in support for filial obligations: In the Russian Federation, older people tend to consider elder care as mainly a responsibility of the family, whereas older respondents in Norway tend to see society as the main responsible party. The comparative results suggest that normative obligations toward elder care are less likely to be supported in welfare regimes which support autonomy and independence for the elder population.

This study finds that in Norway and in France, primarily female respondents consider society as the main party responsible for elder care. In contrast, female respondents in the Russian Federation tend to support filial obligations. The results suggest that, in welfare regimes with a low level of support for elder care, females agree that families should fill the care deficit. Finally, the results are informative in regard to the implications of the austerity programs currently being applied in Europe. That females and older people in the Russian Federation rely on filial obligation suggests that in liberal welfare regimes, citizens with

limited opportunities to participate in the labor markets are likely to continue to rely on personal networks for their own sustenance.

The stable intersection of rights and duties within the household is hardly sustainable when the welfare states experience their population growing older or push benefits to lower levels. This study attempted to draw lessons from countries with established welfare regimes by analyzing the relationship between the gender division of household tasks and income and filial support. Future comparative studies should consider other factors, such as changes in the life course of individuals with longitudinal datasets.

Subsequent waves of GSS may help to explore changes in life course, such as the dissolution of families, which was not possible with a cross-sectional dataset.

The findings suggest that there are interesting connections to be drawn between male and female perceptions of the level of care and financial support. What needs to be explored further is the degree of attitude changes resulting from the provision or non-provision of state services. Future studies could look at family patterns a generation or two ago. In light of the current austerity programs, considerable challenges are likely to arise for inter-generational contracts. Finally, the results also allow us to draw a tentative implication that, for many developing countries at the start of a demographic shift and with incomplete welfare regimes, pursuing a liberal welfare regime is likely to create a care deficit.

Table 3A: Responsibility for elderly care (=1 Family, =0 Society)

	RUS		FR		NO	
	Model I	Model I - ME	Model I	Model I - ME	Model I	Model I - ME
Gender Contract	0.130 (0.110)	0.052 (0.044)	-0.249* (0.134)	-0.098* (0.053)	-0.425** (0.192)	-0.028** (0.012)
HH Income Division (=1 Female RUS, FR);(=1 One spouse NOR)	0.031 (0.056)	0.013 (0.022)	-0.068 (0.111)	-0.027 (0.043)	0.254*** (0.069)	0.016*** (0.005)
Household Income Division (=1 Male RUS, FR)	-0.200** (0.098)	-0.080** (0.039)	0.084 (0.141)	0.033 (0.055)		
Sex (=1 Female)	0.154*** (0.053)	0.061*** (0.021)	-0.102 (0.105)	-0.040 (0.041)	-0.221*** (0.068)	-0.015*** (0.005)
Age	0.007** (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.014*** (0.005)	-0.001** (0.000)
Schooling (=1 Secondary)	-0.003 (0.104)	-0.001 (0.041)	-0.195** (0.084)	-0.076** (0.033)	-0.799** (0.404)	-0.065 (0.046)
Schooling (=1 Tertiary or more)	-0.087 (0.099)	-0.034 (0.040)	-0.280*** (0.069)	-0.108*** (0.026)	-0.603 (0.384)	-0.036 (0.024)
No of Kids	-0.037 (0.032)	-0.015 (0.013)	0.080*** (0.018)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.003 (0.025)	0.000 (0.002)
Constant	-0.250* (0.145)		0.106 (0.252)		-0.813 (0.543)	
Log likelihood	-2346	-2058	-996.5	-921.8	-553.1	-575.9
N of observations	2996		1369		4156	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 3B: Responsibility for elderly care (=1 Family, =0 Society)

	RUS		FR		NO	
	Model II	Model II - ME	Model II	Model II - ME	Model II	Model II - ME
Gender Contract	0.132 (0.108)	0.052 (0.043)	-0.250* (0.133)	-0.098* (0.053)	-0.435** (0.193)	-0.028** (0.011)
HH Income Division (=1 Female RUS, FR);(=1 One spouse NOR)	0.034 (0.057)	0.013 (0.023)	-0.071 (0.109)	-0.028 (0.042)	0.251*** (0.071)	0.016*** (0.005)
Household Income Division (=1 Male RUS, FR)	-0.200** (0.098)	-0.080** (0.039)	0.088 (0.141)	0.035 (0.056)		
Sex (=1 Female)	0.155*** (0.053)	0.061*** (0.021)	-0.101 (0.105)	-0.040 (0.041)	-0.189*** (0.062)	-0.012*** (0.004)
Age	0.007** (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Schooling (=1 Secondary)	-0.002 (0.103)	-0.001 (0.041)	-0.201** (0.085)	-0.078** (0.033)	-0.797** (0.405)	-0.064 (0.045)
Schooling (=1 Tertiary or more)	-0.087 (0.100)	-0.035 (0.040)	-0.319*** (0.074)	-0.123*** (0.028)	-0.619 (0.387)	-0.036 (0.024)
No of Kids	-0.037 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.013)	0.087*** (0.020)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.009 (0.024)	0.001 (0.002)
Flexible time at work (=1)	0.016 (0.062)	0.007 (0.025)	0.121 (0.106)	0.047 (0.042)	0.208** (0.089)	0.013** (0.005)
Household poverty (=1)	-0.013 (0.066)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.087 (0.088)	-0.034 (0.034)	-0.120 (0.170)	-0.007 (0.009)
Constant	-0.248* (0.148)		0.115 (0.232)		-0.924* (0.544)	
Log likelihood	-2345	-2058	-993.9	-919.4	-549.9	-572.6
N of observations	2996		1369		4156	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 3C: Responsibility for elderly care (=1 Family, =0 Society)

	RUS		FR		NO	
	Model III	Model III - ME	Model III	Model III - ME	Model III	Model III - ME
Gender Contract	0.130 (0.107)	0.052 (0.043)	-0.253** (0.128)	-0.099* (0.051)	-0.441** (0.190)	-0.028** (0.011)
HH Income Division (=1 Female RUS, FR);(=1 One spouse NOR)	0.031 (0.057)	0.012 (0.023)	-0.073 (0.112)	-0.028 (0.043)	0.254*** (0.070)	0.016*** (0.005)
Household Income Division (=1 Male RUS, FR)	-0.200** (0.096)	-0.080** (0.038)	0.085 (0.144)	0.033 (0.057)		
Sex (=1 Female)	0.151*** (0.053)	0.060*** (0.021)	-0.102 (0.108)	-0.040 (0.043)	-0.193*** (0.065)	-0.012*** (0.005)
Age	0.006** (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Schooling (=1 Secondary)	-0.006 (0.102)	-0.002 (0.041)	-0.183** (0.087)	-0.072** (0.034)	-0.768** (0.372)	-0.061 (0.041)
Schooling (=1 Tertiary or more)	-0.078 (0.101)	-0.031 (0.040)	-0.288*** (0.074)	-0.111*** (0.028)	-0.582* (0.352)	-0.034 (0.022)
No of Kids	-0.043 (0.029)	-0.017 (0.012)	0.081*** (0.019)	0.032*** (0.007)	0.004 (0.023)	0.000 (0.001)
Flexible time at work (=1)	0.016 (0.063)	0.006 (0.025)	0.118 (0.106)	0.046 (0.042)	0.211** (0.091)	0.013** (0.005)
Household poverty (=1)	-0.018 (0.066)	-0.007 (0.026)	-0.096 (0.090)	-0.037 (0.035)	-0.117 (0.170)	-0.007 (0.009)
No of Brothers	0.031 (0.026)	0.012 (0.010)	0.010 (0.022)	0.004 (0.009)	0.009 (0.026)	0.001 (0.002)
No of Sisters	0.039 (0.026)	0.016 (0.010)	0.041** (0.020)	0.016** (0.008)	0.050 (0.048)	0.003 (0.003)
Constant	-0.274* (0.148)		0.026 (0.226)		-0.995* (0.510)	
Log likelihood	-2343	-2055	-992.4	-917.9	-549.1	-571.8
N of observations	2996		1369		4156	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1



Table 4A: Financial support to the elderly (=1 Family; =0 Society)

	RUS		FR		NO	
	Model I	Model I - ME	Model I	Model I - ME	Model I	Model I - ME
Gender Contract	0.174	0.028	-0.241*	-0.060*	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.159)	(0.027)	(0.134)	(0.034)	(0.156)	(0.006)
HH Income Division (=1 Female RUS, FR);(=1 One spouse NOR)	-0.095	-0.015	0.006	0.001	-0.068	-0.003
	(0.093)	(0.015)	(0.184)	(0.046)	(0.097)	(0.004)
Household Income Division (=1 Male RUS, FR)	0.140	0.024	0.026	0.007		
	(0.112)	(0.021)	(0.119)	(0.030)		
Sex (=1 Female)	0.101*	0.016*	-0.186*	-0.046*	-0.577***	-0.023***
	(0.059)	(0.009)	(0.105)	(0.026)	(0.086)	(0.006)
Age	-0.001	-0.000	0.012***	0.003**	0.000	0.000
	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.000)
Schooling (=1 Secondary)	0.110	0.018	-0.023	-0.006	-0.942*	-0.050
	(0.180)	(0.029)	(0.095)	(0.024)	(0.568)	(0.043)
Schooling (=1 Tertiary or more)	0.178	0.029	-0.183	-0.044	-0.920**	-0.031*
	(0.196)	(0.034)	(0.129)	(0.030)	(0.450)	(0.017)
No of Kids	0.063	0.010	0.033	0.008	-0.017	-0.001
	(0.055)	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.008)	(0.037)	(0.001)
Constant	-1.686***		-1.243***		-0.884	
	(0.242)		(0.257)		(0.673)	
Log likelihood	-1029	-902.5	-662.9	-613.2	-350.4	-364.9
N of observations	2996		1369		4156	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 4B: Financial support to the elderly (=1 Family; =0 Society)

	RUS		FR		NO	
	Model II	Model II - ME	Model II	Model II - ME	Model II	Model II - ME
Gender Contract	0.175 (0.159)	0.028 (0.027)	-0.253* (0.139)	-0.062* (0.035)	-0.001 (0.154)	-0.000 (0.006)
HH Income Division (=1 Female RUS, FR);(=1 One spouse NOR)	-0.086 (0.093)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.183)	-0.002 (0.045)	-0.068 (0.096)	-0.003 (0.004)
Household Income Division (=1 Male RUS, FR)	0.137 (0.111)	0.024 (0.021)	0.034 (0.124)	0.008 (0.031)		
Sex (=1 Female)	0.109* (0.059)	0.017* (0.009)	-0.189* (0.102)	-0.047* (0.025)	-0.579*** (0.090)	-0.023*** (0.006)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.011** (0.004)	0.003** (0.001)	0.000 (0.006)	0.000 (0.000)
Schooling (=1 Secondary)	0.118 (0.183)	0.019 (0.029)	-0.028 (0.097)	-0.007 (0.024)	-0.946* (0.550)	-0.050 (0.042)
Schooling (=1 Tertiary or more)	0.180 (0.199)	0.030 (0.034)	-0.222 (0.137)	-0.052* (0.030)	-0.922** (0.441)	-0.031* (0.017)
No of Kids	0.069 (0.054)	0.011 (0.009)	0.041 (0.033)	0.010 (0.008)	-0.017 (0.039)	-0.001 (0.001)
Flexible time at work (=1)	-0.071 (0.123)	-0.011 (0.019)	0.223** (0.088)	0.055** (0.022)	-0.019 (0.090)	-0.001 (0.003)
Household poverty (=1)	-0.238* (0.131)	-0.043 (0.028)	-0.039 (0.067)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.172)	-0.000 (0.006)
Constant	-1.489*** (0.247)		-1.322*** (0.268)		-0.866 (0.597)	
Log likelihood	-1025	-899.2	-658.7	-609.3	-350.4	-364.9
N of observations	2996		1369		4156	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Table 4C: Financial support to the elderly (=1 Family; =0 Society)

	RUS		FR		NO	
	Model III	Model III - ME	Model III	Model III - ME	Model III	Model III - ME
Gender Contract	0.169 (0.154)	0.027 (0.026)	-0.256* (0.138)	-0.063* (0.035)	-0.017 (0.149)	-0.001 (0.005)
HH Income Division (=1 Female RUS, FR);(=1 One spouse NOR)	-0.092 (0.096)	-0.014 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.180)	-0.002 (0.044)	-0.075 (0.107)	-0.003 (0.004)
Household Income Division (=1 Male RUS, FR)	0.136 (0.111)	0.023 (0.021)	0.029 (0.126)	0.007 (0.032)		
Sex (=1 Female)	0.102* (0.060)	0.016* (0.009)	-0.189* (0.106)	-0.046* (0.026)	-0.574*** (0.094)	-0.022*** (0.005)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.011** (0.004)	0.003** (0.001)	0.001 (0.007)	0.000 (0.000)
Schooling (=1 Secondary)	0.120 (0.182)	0.019 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.096)	-0.001 (0.024)	-1.043** (0.512)	-0.056 (0.043)
Schooling (=1 Tertiary or more)	0.200 (0.198)	0.033 (0.034)	-0.180 (0.131)	-0.043 (0.030)	-1.021** (0.402)	-0.034** (0.017)
No of Kids	0.058 (0.051)	0.009 (0.008)	0.031 (0.034)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.034)	-0.000 (0.001)
Flexible time at work (=1)	-0.071 (0.123)	-0.011 (0.019)	0.216** (0.089)	0.053** (0.022)	-0.007 (0.086)	-0.000 (0.003)
Household poverty (=1)	-0.247* (0.132)	-0.045 (0.028)	-0.055 (0.066)	-0.013 (0.016)	-0.017 (0.169)	-0.001 (0.006)
No of Brothers	0.063 (0.048)	0.010 (0.008)	0.014 (0.022)	0.003 (0.005)	0.041 (0.053)	0.001 (0.002)
No of Sisters	0.049 (0.043)	0.008 (0.007)	0.052*** (0.016)	0.013*** (0.004)	-0.128 (0.106)	-0.005 (0.004)
Constant	-1.539*** (0.245)		-1.433*** (0.276)		-0.720 (0.508)	
Log likelihood	-1022	-896.2	-656.8	-607.5	-346.9	-361.3
N of observations	2996		1369		4156	

Robust standard errors in parentheses; \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## References

- Aboim, S. (2010). Gender cultures and the division of labour in contemporary Europe : a cross-national perspective. *The Sociological Review*, 58(2), 171 – 196.
- Budlender, D. (2008). The Statistical Evidence on Care and Non-Care Work across Six Countries.
- Chevreur, K., & Berg, K. (2013). Financing long-term care for frail elderly in France : The ghost reform. *Health policy*, 111(3), 213–220.
- Cox, R. (2010). Some problems and possibilities of caring. *Ethics, Place & Environment*, 13(2), 113–130.
- Da Roit, B., & Le Bihan, B. (2010). Similar and Yet So Different: Cash-for-Care in Six European Countries' Long-Term Care Policies. *Millbank Quarterly*, 88(3), 286–309.
- Davis, A. (2004). (De)Constructing Dependency: Institutional, Historical Perspectives of Welfare. *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 36(1), 37–51.
- Dykstra, P. A. (2010). *Intergenerational Family Relationships in Ageing Societies*.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Folbre, N. (1994). *Who Pays for the Kids?: Gender and the Structures of Constraint*. Routledge: London and New York.
- Folbre, N. (2006). Measuring Care: Gender, Empowerment, and the Care Economy. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 7(2), 183–199.
- Folbre, N. (2008). Reforming Care. *Politics and Society*, 36(3), 373–387.
- Gans, D., & Silverstein, M. (2006). Norms of Filial Responsibility for Aging Parents Across Time and Generations. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 68(4), 961–976.
- Hames, R., & Draper, P. (2004). Women's work, child care, and helpers-at-the-nest in a hunter-gatherer society. *Human Nature*, 15(4), 319–341.
- Hassim, S. (2008). Global Constraints on Gender Equality in Care Work. *Politics & Society*, 36(3), 388–402.
- Himmelweit, S. (2007). The Prospects for Caring: Economic Theory and Policy Analysis. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 31, 581–599.
- Hrdy, S. B. (2007). Evolutionary Context of Human Development: The Cooperative Breeding Model. In C. A. Salmon & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.), *Family Relationships An Evolutionary Perspective* (1st ed., pp. 9–32). Oxford University Press, USA.
- Jappinen, M., Kulama, M., & Saarinen, A. (Eds.). (2011). *Gazing at Welfare, Gender and Agency in Post-Socialist Countries* (First.). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

- Kamo, Y. (2000). "He Said, She Said": Assessing Discrepancies in Husbands' and Wives' Reports on the Division of Household Labor. *Social Science Research*, 29(4), 459–476.
- Kay, R. (2011). Social Security, care and the "withdrawing state" in rural Russia. In *Gazing at Welfare, Gender and Agency in Post-socialist Countries* (pp. 1– 24). Cambridge Scholars.
- Kramer, K. L. (2002). Variation in Juvenile Dependence Helping Behavior among Maya Children. *Human Nature*, 13(2), 299–325.
- Lawson, V. (2007). Geographies of Care and Responsibility. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 97(1), 1–11.
- McGrath, S., & DeFilippis, J. (2009). Social Reproduction as Unregulated Work. *Work Employment & Society*, 23, 66 – 83.
- Meagher, G., & Szebehely, M. (2013). *Marketisation in Nordic eldercare*. (E. G. Meagher & M. Szebehely, Eds.). Stockholm.
- Milligan, C., & Wiles, J. (2010). Landscapes of care. *Progress in Human Geography*, 34(6), 736–754. doi:10.1177/0309132510364556
- Power, M. (2004). Social Provisioning as a Starting Point for Feminist Economics. *Feminist Economics*, 10(3), 3 – 19.
- Quick, P. (2008). Unpaid, Reproductive, Caring Labor? The Production of Labor Power? Theoretical and Practical Implications of Terms Used for Women's Work. *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 40(3), 308–314.
- Raghuram, P. (2012). Global care , local configurations – challenges to conceptualizations of care. *Global Networks*, 12(2), 155–174.
- Saraceno, C. (2010). Social inequalities in facing old-age dependency: a bi-generational perspective. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 20(1), 32–44.
- Swartz, K. (2013). Searching for a Balance of Responsibilities : OECD Countries ' Changing Elderly Assistance Policies. *Annual Review of Public Health*, 34, 397 – 412.
- Van Riemsdijk, M. (2010). Neoliberal reforms in elder care in Norway : Roles of the state , Norwegian employers , and Polish nurses. *Geoforum*, 41, 930–939.