Structural Models in Development: Migration, Marriage and the Family
Paper Session
Sunday, Jan. 8, 2017 1:00 PM – 3:00 PM
Hyatt Regency Chicago, Burnham
- Chair: Arthur Lewbel, Boston College
Terms and Engagement: Marriage and Migration in India
Abstract
Indian marriage markets are characterized by an enormous level of female migration, the presence of dowries, and by differing levels of participation in the decision by women. We formulate and estimate a dynamic, equilibrium, two-sided matching model which allows for estimation of separate preferences for men and women. We recover male and female preferences over partner characteristics, dowry, and migration costs in the presence of differing degrees of female independence and unobserved heterogeneity. In counter-factual simulations we focus on how likely changes in sex-ratios, female autonomy, and education affect equilibrium marriage matching and welfare. Our estimates suggest that men prefer less educated and less autonomous women, and so increases in female education and autonomy reduce the welfare of women in the marriage market, even if education and autonomy improve welfare outside of marriage. Declining sex-ratios improve welfare for some, but not all, women largely by increasing the value of marrying later.Why Are Older Women Missing in India? The Age Profile of Bargaining Power and Poverty
Abstract
Almost half of missing women in India are of post-reproductive ages. I argue that intra-household gender inequality and gender asymmetry in poverty account for a substantial fraction of these missing women. Using a natural experiment, I link changes in women's intra-household bargaining power to their health. Using a structural model of households, I estimate the age profile of women's bargaining power and construct relative poverty rates for women. I find that bargaining power declines with age, and that women's relative poverty rates closely match their higher than expected mortality rates by age. This match is nearly exact at post-reproductive ages.LATE With Mismeasured or Mispecified Treatment: An Application On Woman Empowerment in India
Abstract
We show that a local average treatment effect (LATE) can sometimes be identified and consistently estimated when treatment is mismeasured, or when treatment is estimated using a possibly misspecified structural model. Our associated estimator, which we call Mismeasurement Robust LATE (MR-LATE), is based on differencing two different mismeasures of treatment. In our empirical application, treatment is a measure of empowerment: whether a wife has control of substantial household resources. Due to measurement difficulties and sharing of goods within a household, this treatment cannot be directly observed without error, and so must be estimated. Our outcomes are health indicators of family members. We first estimate a structural model to obtain the otherwise unobserved treatment indicator. Then, using changes in inheritance laws in India as an instrument, we apply our new MR-LATE estimator. We find that women's empowerment substantially decreases their probability of being anemic or underweight, and increases children's likelihood of receiving vaccinations. We find no evidence of negative effects on men's health.Discussant(s)
Andrew Beauchamp
, Wright State University
Seth Richards-Shubik
, Lehigh University
Frederic Vermeulen
, University of Leuven
Lauren Cherchye
, University of Leuven
JEL Classifications
- D0 - General