

Taxation, Information, and Withholding: Evidence from Costa Rica*

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Abstract

This paper studies the compliance effect of tax withholding on firms, which is commonly used in developing countries. While a growing literature argues that third-party reporting of tax liabilities is a key mechanism for ensuring tax compliance, and a reason why tax capacity grows along the development path, the literature has ignored the fact that third-party reporting is often associated with tax withholding. Withholding is irrelevant if the tax withheld is fully credited against a taxpayer's liability, but can increase compliance in the presence of costly reclaim, low salience of enforcement or extensive margin compliance gaps. To demonstrate this empirically, we exploit a ten-year panel of income and sales tax records for 400,000 firms and over 20 million third-party information and withholding reports from Costa Rica. We first document the anatomy of compliance, finding that firms are relatively compliant with third-party reports on the extensive, intensive and payment margin. When subject to third-party reporting for the first time, firms' reported taxable income increases by up to 50%. We then isolate the effect of withholding by exploiting a withholding rate increase that left reporting requirements unchanged. A doubling of the withholding rate lead to a 33% increase in sales tax payment among treated firms and an 8% increase in aggregate sales tax revenue. The mechanisms are a default payment effect and reduced misreporting. The large compliance impact of withholding rationalizes its widespread use in developing countries.

Keywords: tax evasion, firms, business taxes, third-party information, withholding.

JEL codes: H25, H26, H32, O10.

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1 Introduction

Low income countries are characterized by lower tax-to-GDP ratios than high income countries, largely due to low tax compliance (Besley and Persson 2013). The availability of third-party reports about taxable economic activities, that can be used to verify taxpayers' self-reports, is considered a key determinant of tax compliance (Kleven et al., 2011; Kleven, Kreiner and Saez, 2016). While there is evidence that an increase in third-party reporting can lead to an increase in reported taxable sales (Naritomi (2016)), there is also evidence that taxpayers can shift evasion to the less verifiable cost margin (Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal, 2016; Slemrod et al., 2015). This paper sheds new light on the impact of third-party reporting, exploiting quasi-experimental increases in firms' coverage by reporting mechanisms. The paper then proceeds to examine the compliance impact of tax withholding on business sales, which is commonly used in conjunction with third-party reporting, but has so far been ignored by the literature.¹ The third party cum withholding agent can be a firm, a financial institution or a state agency, and is responsible for both reporting transactions to the tax authority and remitting tax withheld on those same transactions. As withholding applies to transactions that are also third-party reported, and taxpayers can claim full credit for tax withheld, withholding merely changes the way tax is remitted and not the taxpayer's nominal liability. However, in the presence of extensive margin compliance gaps, misreporting compared to third-party reports, or payment delays, withholding can increase compliance.² The fact that withholding schemes on business sales are common around the world, and particularly in low income countries and low compliance sectors in high income countries (Figure I)³, suggests they may constitute an optimal policy in a low compliance context (Best et al. 2015).

To study the compliance impact of third-party reporting and withholding, we extend a simple evasion model with third-party reporting based on Allingham and Sandmo (1972), allowing the third party to both report a taxpayer's sale, as in Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal 2016, and withhold a share of the transaction amount as advance tax payment for the taxpayer. Third-party reporting puts a lower bound on reported sales. Adding withholding does not affect the taxpayer's evasion decision if she can fully reclaim the tax withheld. If reclaim is costly, however, only a fraction of

¹This is distinct from withholding on wages, a tax compliance mechanism that is applied almost universally and well understood (Kleven et al. 2011).

²Withholding also reduces administrative costs for the tax authority, by shifting the task of receiving tax remittances from the tax authority to the withholding agent, and allowing for more concentrated monitoring of remitting agents, focusing on withholding agents.

³Also see Samanamud 2013, Soos 1990, OECD 2009 for accounts on the use of withholding schemes around the world.

taxpayers reclaim the tax withheld and an increase in the withholding rate may increase reported taxable income.

To test the predictions of our model empirically, we exploit various sources of quasi-experimental variation in the income and sales tax system in Costa Rica, and a ten-year panel of administrative tax records. We construct the Costa Rican tax register from the universe of registration and deregistration records since 2006. We match the register with income and sales tax records from the universe of firms, including over 400,000 self-employed and corporations. We further match these data with over 20 million third-party reports about firm's economic activities, from other firms, state institutions and credit and debit card companies. All firms are required to report transactions with their suppliers and clients if the annual transaction amount passes a threshold; state institutions report all purchases from the private sector; and credit and debit card processing companies report all sales going through card machines. Credit and debit card companies also serve as withholding agents, applying firm-specific and time-varying withholding rates.

Our analysis is divided into three parts. In the first part, we leverage the data to conduct a detailed anatomy of compliance.⁴ To our knowledge, this is the first study to use population-wide third-party and withholding data from a developing country, and to analyze all compliance margins, including the extensive, intensive and payment margin. On the extensive margin, we find that about 50% of tax-liable firms fail to file their income tax declaration. The vast majority of these non-filers are identified through third-party reports, and thus definitely economically active. However, non-filers are disproportionately small. We estimate that total income tax revenue could be increased by at most 10% if all non-filers were to file. On the intensive margin, we find that 14-17% of firms under-report their sales, while 30-50% of them under-utilize their costs compared to third-party reports. The potential revenue gains from perfectly enforcing tax liabilities on third-party reported sales are again approximately 10% of income tax revenue. However, evidence from enforcement interventions on the extensive and intensive margin shows that realized revenue gains are orders of magnitude smaller. On the payment margin, we find that 5-25% of small firms pay their taxes with significant delay. After accounting for these delays, however, payment is above 95% of liabilities for both the income tax and the sales tax.

We interpret this as evidence that a country like Costa Rica, with relatively high institutional capacity, achieves a satisfactory level of tax compliance on third-party reported margins. Some

⁴We borrow the term from [Kleven et al. \(2011\)](#) who conduct an anatomy of compliance for wage earners and the self-employed in Denmark.

administrative follow-up interventions on detectable compliance gaps are necessary as deterrence, to maintain the level of compliance, but increasing investments in these administrative interventions is unlikely to yield substantial revenue gains. Although compliance with third-party reported liabilities is relatively high, compliance with true liabilities might still be low. The Ministry of Finance estimates, based on macro data, that 30% of sales tax liabilities and 70% of corporate income tax liabilities are evaded or avoided ([Hacienda 2015](#)). A large part of these liabilities are simply not observable to the government. We thus investigate whether expanding the coverage of third-party information reporting, and of associated withholding mechanisms, holds more promises to increase tax revenues substantially.

We turn to analyze the impact of information reporting in the second part. We begin by showing that bunching at the first bracket threshold in the income tax schedule - a proxy for misreporting⁵ - is large and sharp in the full sample, but significantly smaller among firms covered by information-reporting from other firms. Bunching is even smaller among firms covered by reporting by state institutions or credit/debit card companies, the two reporting mechanisms which are also associated with withholding. While the heterogeneity of bunching by proxies of evasion propensity has been analyzed elsewhere (e.g. [Almunia and Rodriguez 2015](#)), this is to our knowledge the first exercise of estimating the heterogeneity in bunching by actual third-party information coverage. We then exploit within-firm changes over time in the coverage by information reporting in an event study. We find that reported tax liability increases by up to 50% after firms are reported for the first time by another firm, by 22% after the first report from a state institution and by 25% after the first report from a credit/debit card company. These effects emerge sharply at event time, after otherwise parallel trends between the event and control groups, and can thus not be reconciled with a pure growth effect.

In the third part of our analysis, we isolate the impact of withholding by exploiting a quasi-experimental increase in the withholding rate applied by credit/debit card companies to firms' card sales. As all card sales were already reported to the tax authority and card usage hardly responds to the reform, this rate change did not affect the information environment. Applying a difference-in-difference estimation, we find that a doubling of the withholding rate leads to a 33% increase in sales tax payment among taxpayers subject to withholding. In aggregate, the withholding rate

⁵Previous studies have shown that bunching is largely driven by misreporting rather than real responses (e.g. [Best et al. 2015](#) for the minimum tax kink in Pakistan, [Almunia and Rodriguez 2015](#) for an enforcement notch in the Spanish corporation tax).

reform increased sales tax payments by over 8%.⁶ This effect is driven by a default payment effect, due to firms that do not reclaim the tax withheld and firms that would not have paid their tax liability in the absence of withholding, and an increase in reported tax liabilities among firms subject to withholding. We argue that this reporting response is due to a salience of enforcement effect. Indeed, the response is larger among firms for whom the withholding rate changes from zero to a positive rate (as opposed to firms experiencing a similarly-sized change from a positive to a larger rate), and which are thus informed of the amount of tax withheld for the first time on their credit/debit card machine statement.

Our paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, our work contributes to the literature on taxation and development, as reviewed in [Besley and Persson 2013](#). Theoretical contributions in the tax and development literature have discussed why tax systems in developing countries differ from those in high income countries ([Keen 2008](#), [Gordon and Li 2009](#), [Best et al. 2015](#)). Our results rationalize the prevalence of withholding schemes for firms as an enforcement tool in low compliance environments. Our results are also consistent with [Kopczuk et al. \(2016\)](#) and [Slemrod \(2008\)](#) who argue that the tax remittance arrangement affects compliance, an argument for which we propose a new mechanism. More generally, our evidence highlights the important role of firms in enforcing taxes (here as information reporting and withholding agents), as suggested theoretically by [Kopczuk and Slemrod \(2006\)](#) and [Kleven, Kreiner and Saez \(2016\)](#), and demonstrated empirically by [Best \(2014\)](#) in the context of employer reporting on employees' earnings. In addition, our results contribute to the empirical literature on third-party reporting and compliance. Consistent with [Naritomi 2016](#), we show that expanding the coverage of information reporting increases reported taxable income substantially. We can also reconcile these findings with [Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal 2016](#) and [Slemrod et al. 2015](#), who provide evidence of evasion shifting to the cost margin. Indeed, our analysis suggests that most firms are responsive to the presence of third-party reporting when they are aware of such reporting ex ante, but the remaining misreporters are not responsive to requests to correct their reports ex post. Put differently, most firms voluntarily comply on third-party reported margins, but enforcing compliance among the remaining non-compliers is difficult.

Second, our study extends the literatures on tax withholding and the impact of defaults. A large literature has analyzed withholding for the personal income tax, focusing mostly on the United States ([Barr and Dokko 2008](#), [Gandhi and Kuehlwein 2014](#), [White, Harrison and Harrell 1993](#),

⁶Overall, withholding agents collected 10% of corporate income tax revenue and 20% of sales tax revenue in 2014.

Highfill, Thorson and Weber 1998). Aside from descriptive policy reports (Samanamud 2013, OECD 2009) and legal writing (Soos 1990), the only study analyzing withholding on firms is Carrillo, Emran and Rivadeneira (2012). They show that firms bunch at a withholding rate kink, and interpret this as evidence for a (perceived) discontinuity in the audit function. Our paper is the first to quantify the tax revenue impact of withholding for firms, and examine the impact mechanisms. By showing that withholding establishes a compliance default, we contribute to the behavioral literature on defaults, which shows that defaults increase organ donation (Johnson and Goldstein 2003) and retirement savings (Chetty et al. 2014, Thaler and Benartzi 2004, Madrian and Shea 2001). We show that a default can also be used to induce people into a behavior such as tax compliance that even rational agents may not display.

Finally, we draw on methodological contributions from two literatures. We follow the lead of Fisman and Wei (2004) in identifying misreporting by comparing two data reports on the same tax base. This approach is also used in Zucman (2013), Kumler, Verhoogen and Frías (2015), Best (2014) and Rijkers, Baghdadi and Raballand (2015). Using the approach, we show that firms under-report sales as well as costs, consistent with Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2016). We also construct novel estimates of compliance gaps on the extensive and payment margin. Shedding light on payment delays, we highlight the importance of analyzing payment data in addition to tax liability data, which previous studies have focused on. We also draw on the bunching literature in public finance, initiated by Saez (2010), Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and Waseem (2013), and reviewed in Kleven (2016). This literature provides the techniques to estimate taxpayers' behavioral responses to discontinuities in the tax schedule, and translate them into policy-relevant elasticities.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We start by describing a simple conceptual framework in Section 2. Section 3 presents the Costa Rican tax system and administrative data. Sections 4, 5 and 5 present the anatomy of compliance, the impact of information reporting and the impact of withholding. Section 7 concludes.

2 Conceptual Framework

This section presents a simple conceptual framework to analyze behavioral responses to withholding. The framework is based on the canonical tax evasion model by Allingham and Sandmo (1972), extended by Kleven et al. (2011) and Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2016) to include

third-party reporting for individuals and firms respectively. We first present the basic setup of the model, then introduce withholding with full reclaim and with costly reclaim, and finally consider salience effects.

2.1 A Tax Evasion Model with Third-Party Reporting

The basic setup of our model follows Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2016). Firms have revenue $R = R_T + R_S$, where revenue can be either third-party reported or self-reported, indexed by T and S , and firms declare \hat{R} . Firms have costs $C = C_S$, which we assume for simplicity to be fully self-reported, and firms chose to report \hat{C} . The government levies tax at rate τ on declared profits $\hat{\pi} = \hat{R} - \hat{C}$. The tax liability is $T = \tau\hat{\pi}$. With probability p , firms are audited, in which case any evasion is certain to be detected, and evaders pay a fine θ which is proportional to the evaded liability. Firms maximize expected utility⁷ over after-tax income in the audited and non-audited state of the world, Y_A and Y_N :

$$\begin{aligned} EU &= (1 - p)U(Y_N) + pU(Y_A) \\ &= (1 - p)U(\pi - \tau\hat{\pi}) + pU(\pi - \tau\pi - \theta\tau(\pi - \hat{\pi})). \end{aligned}$$

To take into account the tax authority's use of risk scores to target audits (or enforcement interventions in general), we further follow Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2016) by assuming that the audit probability is decreasing in the reported profit rate, $p = p((\hat{\pi} + \varepsilon)/\hat{R})$ with $p' < 0$. Mis-reporting against third-party information leads to certain detection: $p = 1$ if $\hat{R} < R_T$.⁸ With these assumptions, firms choose to report $\hat{R}^* \geq R_T$, and choose $\hat{C}^* \geq C$ to satisfy the first-order condition.

To ensure that the government always prefers less evasion, i.e. $\partial R/\partial \hat{\pi} > 0$, we assume that θ and p' are small, which are reasonable assumptions in most countries. As is also standard in the literature, we assume that the second-order condition is met and avoid non-concavities by imposing $p'' \geq 0$.

⁷As Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2016), we consider that modeling firms in a developing country context as risk-averse is reasonable, since more than half of the firms in our sample are unincorporated, and most firms are vulnerable to income volatility.

⁸The inclusion of ε , a small positive number, ensures that firms declaring zero profits on a large revenue base incur a higher audit probability than firms declaring zero profits on a small revenue base, thus differentiating the two corner cases where $\hat{\pi} = 0$. Assuming $p = 1$ instead of the more realistic specification $p = \bar{p} = \max(p)$ if $\hat{R} < R_T$ simplifies the exposure, but results are similar in the latter case.

2.2 Withholding with Full Reclaim

We introduce withholding into the model by assuming that tax is withheld at a rate μ on third-party reported revenue R_T . The information reporting agent thus also becomes the withholding agent. As firms are already choosing to report revenue larger than or equal to third-party reported revenue, the introduction of withholding leaves the information environment unchanged. In a first step, we assume that the tax withheld can be fully reclaimed, as is technically the case in most withholding systems. This means that firms' net tax liability and hence payment is $P = T - \mu R_T$, where the tax withheld is deducted from the gross tax liability. There are no restrictions on the sign of P , $P \geq 0$, so that firms can request a refund if the reported tax liability is smaller than the tax withheld.

In this model, firms' after-tax income in the audited and non-audited state of the world are

$$\bar{Y}_N = \pi - \mu R_T - [\tau \hat{\pi} - \mu R_T] = \pi - \tau \hat{\pi} = Y_N,$$

$$\bar{Y}_A = \pi - \mu R_T - [\tau \pi - \mu R_T] - \theta[(\tau \pi - \mu R_T) - (\tau \hat{\pi} - \mu R_T)] = \pi - \tau \pi - \theta \tau (\pi - \hat{\pi}) = Y_A.$$

After-tax income in both states is exactly equal to after-tax income in the model without withholding. Withholding is thus irrelevant to firms' evasion decisions. This trivial result relies on the assumption of full and costless reclaim, which we relax in the next section.⁹

2.3 Withholding with Costly Reclaim

To bring the model closer to reality, we assume that firms pay a firm-specific fixed cost f_i , distributed according to the cumulative distribution function $H(f)$, to reclaim the tax withheld μR_T . This fixed cost can represent the cost of collecting withholding receipts for each transaction and adding up the amounts when preparing the tax return.¹⁰ The presence of the fixed cost generates a cut-off $\bar{f} < \mu R_T$ such that firms with $f_i < \bar{f}$ reclaim the tax withheld and firms with $f_i \geq \bar{f}$ do not reclaim. A first testable prediction of the model is thus that reclaim of the tax withheld is incomplete, $H(\bar{f}) < 1$, and that the share of reclaimers increases in the withholding rate, $\partial H(\bar{f})/\partial \mu > 0$.

Comparative Statics for Firms Absent any behavioral response, reclaimers experience a decrease in their after-tax income of $f_i < \mu R_T$ in both the audited and non-audited state, and non-

⁹It is also obvious that withholding would mechanically increase tax payment in the case of compliance gaps on the extensive margin or payment margin.

¹⁰It can also capture, albeit in a crude way, the monetary cost of an increase in the monitoring or audit probability that firms may face when reclaiming tax withheld. The latter mechanism could also be modeled more explicitly as a discontinuous increase in the audit probability p for reclaimers, e.g. $p = 1$ for firms reclaiming $\mu R_T > \tau \hat{\pi}$, which would generate bunching at the threshold where the reported tax liability equals the tax withheld, for sufficiently risk averse firms, as show in [Carillo, Emran and Rivadeneira \(2012\)](#).

reclaimers experience a decrease of their after-tax income of μR_T in the non-audited state only. In the case of an audit, the tax withheld is reccredited by the tax authority against any outstanding liability and fines. Taxpayers adjust their reporting behavior in response to the decrease in after-tax income. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion, as in [Allingham and Sandmo \(1972\)](#), one can show that reclaimers declare $\hat{\pi}_R$ and non-reclaimers declare $\hat{\pi}_{NR}$ with $\hat{\pi}_R > \hat{\pi}^* > \hat{\pi}_{NR}$, where $\hat{\pi}^*$ is the taxpayers' optimum in the baseline model without withholding. Intuitively, the decrease in after-tax income hurts reclaimers more in the audited state, and thus induces them to become more compliant. This simultaneously reduces the likelihood of detection and increases after-tax income in the case of detection. The opposite is true for non-reclaimers.¹¹ It is trivial to see that $\partial \hat{\pi}_R / \partial f > 0$ for reclaimers, with μ being irrelevant, and $\partial \hat{\pi}_{NR} / \partial \mu < 0$ for non-reclaimers. However, an increase in the withholding rate also pushes some non-reclaimers to become reclaimers. The impact of a withholding rate increase on total reported profits is thus ambiguous.

Comparative Statics for the Government Government revenue G is equal to total tax payment by all firms. Assume a continuum of firms of measure 1 with fixed costs distributed according to $H(f)$. Then government revenue is the weighted average of revenue across the audited and non-audited state of the world, where in each state, a fraction $H(\bar{f})$ of firms are reclaimers who pay exactly the declared (or true) tax liability and the remaining fraction $(1 - H(\bar{f}))$ of firms are non-reclaimers from whom the government collects the reported tax liability plus the tax withheld in the non-audited state, and the true tax liability in the audited state:

$$G = (1 - p) [H(\bar{f})[\tau \hat{\pi}_R] + (1 - H(\bar{f}))[\tau \hat{\pi}_{NR} + \mu R_T]] \\ + p [\tau \pi + H(\bar{f})\theta \tau (\pi - \hat{\pi}_R) + (1 - H(\bar{f}))[\theta \tau (\pi - \hat{\pi}_{NR})]].$$

On the one hand, a higher withholding rate pushes a larger share of firms to become reclaimers, who report higher profits and accordingly pay a higher liability. On the other hand, non-reclaimers reduce their reported profits, but by less than the amount of tax withheld, and thus pay more tax than they otherwise would. Therefore, assuming that p and/or θ is small, a withholding rate increase raises total tax revenue.

¹¹As has been shown in the referenced papers, $\hat{\pi}$ also increases in p , θ and R_T .

2.4 Withholding and Salience of Enforcement

If taxpayers are not fully aware of third-party reporting about them (i.e. misperceive R_T), the withholding system may affect their behavior through a salience channel (Chetty, Looney and Kroft 2009). Third-party reporting mechanisms usually require information reports to be submitted by the reporting agent to the tax authority, but not necessarily to the taxpayer. Withholding mechanism, however, normally require the withholding agent to inform both the tax authority and the taxpayer about the amount of tax withheld, so as to enable the taxpayer to make a reclaim.¹² For taxpayers unaware of third-party reporting, the introduction of withholding thus raises (their perception of) third-party reported sales from 0 to R_T and moves reported profits from $\hat{\pi}^*(0)$ to $\hat{\pi}^*(R_T)$ with $\hat{\pi}^*(R_T) > \hat{\pi}^*(0)$ if $p' \neq 0$. Furthermore, the introduction of withholding and the associated communication of the amount of tax withheld to the taxpayer by the withholding agent may increase the salience of tax enforcement in general, captured by the audit probability p in our simple framework. For instance, taxpayers may react to a perceived audit probability \tilde{p} which is a function of the number of times they have witnessed tax enforcement in practice (e.g. have observed an audit or received a communication from the tax authority). Being confronted with the tax withholding mechanism (another form of enforcement) may then lead taxpayers to revise \tilde{p} upwards and increase $\hat{\pi}$.¹³

3 Context and Data

We proceed to estimate the impact of third-party reporting and withholding empirically using policy variation and administrative tax records from Costa Rica, where tax revenue is predominantly derived from the income tax on firms and the sales tax. Firms in Costa Rica register either as *persona física* (unincorporated firm, i.e. self-employed individuals) or as *persona jurídica* (corporation), using the D140 registration form. There are no size thresholds or other requirements obliging firms to chose one firm type or the other, but the governance structure and income tax schedule for the two firm types differ.¹⁴ This section presents first the income and sales tax system in Costa Rica, and then the compliance mechanisms used to enforce taxes, and finally the

¹²See Figure XII for an illustration of the type of information provided by card processing companies in Costa Rica to affiliated businesses.

¹³Note however that in a model as in Finkelstein (2009), in which salience merely increases the link between the perceived and actual tax rate, but without moving the misperception in a particular direction, a change in salience has an ambiguous effect on taxpayer behavior.

¹⁴Wage earners are taxed according to yet another tax schedule, which features three tax brackets with marginal rates of 0, 10 and 15% respectively. The highest kink for wage earners is below the lowest kink for the self-employed.

administrative data used in this study.

3.1 Income Tax

For all firms, income tax is levied on taxable profits, and filed annually by December 15, with three quarterly advance payments due in March, June and September.¹⁵ The self-employed face a kinked tax schedule on profits, with five tax brackets. As Table I shows, the location of all the kinks is adjusted annually for expected inflation. The new kink locations are announced by decree each year in the early fall, before the beginning of the new fiscal year. The marginal tax rates which apply to incomes in the five brackets are 0, 10, 15, 20 and 25% respectively. These rates do not change over the period 2006-2014.

Corporations face a notched tax schedule on revenue, with three tax brackets and no exempt amount.¹⁶ A firm's revenue determines its average tax rate, which is then applied to profits. The notch locations are again inflation-adjusted annually, and the average tax rates of 10, 20 and 30% have not changed during the period we study. Note that the annual adjustment of kink and notch locations generates 54 different thresholds over 2006-2014. Out of these, only two are at a round number (kink 1 in 2011, and kink 2 in 2009), facilitating the identification of bunching driven by the tax rate change.

3.2 Sales Tax

Costa Rica does not have a fully-fledged VAT, but levies a sales tax which firms need to declare monthly by the tenth working day of the following month. The base for the sales tax is the sale of goods and certain specified services, which includes for example hotels, tailors, and florists, but excludes most professional services, for instance those provided by lawyers and doctors. The standard rate has been constant at 13% for the entire period of our study, and reduced rates of 10% and 5% respectively are levied on wood and residential electricity. Sales tax paid on inputs can be claimed as credit, which makes the sales tax effectively a VAT with a narrow base. Any sales taxpayer is liable for the income tax, but the reverse is not necessarily true. In our sample, approximately 20% of income tax compliant firms also file sales tax.

¹⁵Fiscal year t in Costa Rica starts on October 1 in year $t - 1$ and ends on September 30 in year t . Taxpayers can request to pay taxes according to a different fiscal period, which we take into account in our analysis. The quarterly advance payment is a quarter of either the previous year's tax liability, or the average liability over the last three years, whichever is higher.

¹⁶Corporations also claim a different set of deductions than unincorporated firms.

Retailers in certain sectors and below certain size thresholds (annual purchases less than 150 base salaries, fixed assets less than 350 base salaries, less than six employees) can opt into a simplified regime, unifying income and sales tax. In this regime, tax is levied on input at sector-specific rates that vary from 3% to 9.8%. Firms file and pay tax quarterly, and can claim credit for withholding by state institutions for the income tax, but not for withholding by credit card institutions for the sales tax. Firms can opt out of the regime by submitting a D140 modification form.

3.3 Compliance Mechanisms

To enhance tax compliance among firms, the tax authority in Costa Rica makes use of information reporting and tax withholding by different third parties. The relevant *informative declarations*, submitted by public or private sector agents about the economic activities of tax-liable firms and individuals, are listed in Table III. An informant submits one informative declaration for each client/supplier, specifying the tax identification number of the informant and the taxpayer, the transaction amount, the tax withheld if applicable, and the income/transaction type. All information reporting and withholding mechanisms apply in the same way to the self-employed and corporations. For reporting mechanisms not associated with withholding, taxpayers are not provided with the informative declarations at the time they file their declaration, and are not notified about the existence of an informative record. However, given the structure of reporting requirements explained below, the tax authority expect firms to be aware of any third-party records about them.¹⁷

The tax authority uses all informative declarations, combined with customs declarations D166 and D167 on imports and exports, to automatically cross-check all income tax declarations. Taxpayers with strong discrepancies between the third-party information and the self-assessment declaration are then selected for intensive margin controls or audits.

3.3.1 Information Reporting

Declarations D151 and D158 are pure reporting declarations, not involving any withholding. Declaration D151 must be filed by all firms conducting purchases or sales above a certain threshold. Purchases and sales must be reported if the accumulated annual amount of transactions with a sin-

¹⁷In the rare case that a taxpayer inquires with the tax authority about the third-party information held about her economic activities, the authority is legally obliged to provide the information to the taxpayer.

gle transaction partner reaches CRC 2.5 mio (Costa Rican colones).¹⁸ The payment of rent, commissions, professional service fees or interests must be reported if the annual transaction amount with a single transaction partner reaches CRC 50,000. These transactions must be reported by both the seller and the purchaser. Declaration D158 must be filed by the organizers of agricultural auctions, and covers all sales and purchases at the auction. Each transaction must be reported only once, either by the seller or the buyer.

3.3.2 Withholding System

Declarations D150 and D153 are filed by withholding agents, and are accompanied by remittance of the tax withheld to the tax authority.¹⁹ Declaration D150 is filed by state institutions making purchases from firms, and by firms purchasing certain specified services (e.g. transport, communications) from non-resident firms. State institutions withhold tax at a rate of 2% on all purchases, and firms withhold at a rate of 3% on the specified purchases. This tax withheld is creditable against the withholder's income tax liability.

Declaration D153 is filed for the purpose of sales tax withholding by companies processing credit/debit card payments. The companies report all sales that their sales-tax-liable customers conduct through card transactions. On this base, they withhold sales tax at a firm-specific rate varying between 0 and 6%.

The sales tax withholding rate schedule is displayed in Table II. Prior to August 2011, the withholding rate was determined by a notched schedule on value-added. Value-added is defined as the ratio of taxed sales over taxed purchases and imports reported on the sales tax declaration. The notches are located at 5, 20, 30, 40, 55, and 75% of value-added. All notches are associated with a one percentage point increase in the withholding rate. Prior to August 2011, 40.3% of firms subject to D153 reporting benefited from the zero-withholding rate, and only 21.8% were subject to the 6% rate.

To increase the extent of withholding, a reform announced by decree in July 2011 and effective since August 2011 consolidated the withholding rate schedule to three rates of 0, 3 and 6% and changed the rate determination. The rates are now based on the share of local sales in total sales, with notches at 0 and 50%. Since the reform, 68.7% of D153-covered firms are subject to a withholding rate of 6%.

¹⁸As of December 5, 2016, 1 US dollar is 545 CRC.

¹⁹Withholding agents remit the tax withheld the day after the transaction takes place, and thus have no liquidity benefit.

For the entire period of our study, withholding rates for semester t are based on the value-added/share of local sales reported in firms' sales tax returns in semester $t - 2$. The tax authority calculates the withholding rate and communicate it to the withholding agent, using sector averages for firms with no tax history. In special circumstances, firms can request the tax authority to change the withholding rate before the end of the semester. In this case, the realized withholding rate may differ from the rate predicted by value-added or share of local sales in semester $t - 2$.

A taxpayer whose tax payment has been (partially) withheld can deduct the corresponding amount on the relevant tax declaration (income or sales tax) for the same fiscal period (henceforth called "reclaim"), or in future fiscal periods (through the tax return box "compensation request"). If the taxpayer has a tax liability of zero in three consecutive months, and can thus not make use of these deduction options, the taxpayer can make a "refund request". This requires detailed information on the withholding agent, amount of tax withheld and timing of withholding, and a confirmation by the taxpayer that she has no outstanding liabilities in any other tax. The processing of refund requests is done on a case-by-case basis and can take several months.

3.4 Data

Our analysis combines anonymized tax return data and third-party and withholding declarations from the General Directory for Taxation in Costa Rica. The tax return data contains the universe of income tax declarations (D101) for 2006-2015 and sales tax declarations (D104) for 2008-2015, as well as the corresponding payment returns (D110) for the income and sales tax. Since 2006, all tax returns have been digitized, and electronic filing has gradually been introduced for the different declarations, ensuring that the data have nearly complete coverage and a high degree of accuracy. The filing software EDDI-7 conducts automatic validation checks to ensure the internal consistency of filed returns. The data contain all line items of the tax return, including firm type and sector, income sources, cost items, deductions, gross and net liability and payment. The final data set contains 112,000 to 250,000 self-employed per year, 90,000 to 150,000 corporations and 58,000 to 70,000 sales tax filers per month.²⁰

We merge the tax records with the informative declarations D150, D151, D153 and D158, also for the period 2006-2015. These data have been filed electronically through the DECLAR@7

²⁰Only the tax records for 2012-2014, and a small share of records for 2010 and 2011 have firm type indicators (self-employed or corporation). During this period, we observe only a handful of firms switching firm type. We therefore use the 2010-2014 tax return data and the tax register to assign a firm type to the tax returns for 2006-2011. We drop returns for which we cannot determine the firm type with this strategy.

system, which conducts similar validation checks as EDDI-7. Table III provides an overview of the number of records and their coverage for each of the informative declarations.

Declaration D151 registers both the largest number of observations, and the widest coverage, being available for approximately half of all firms. The coverage is similar for the self-employed and corporations. The filing of informative declarations is more concentrated than the coverage, meaning that a smaller share of firms act as informants (results available upon request). Note that information reporters are slightly more likely to report their own costs than their own sales, as evidence by the fact that 54.3% of the D151 records represent sales records. Declaration D158 is similar to D151 in that sense, but has much lower coverage, given the specific nature of the transactions it covers (agricultural auctions). In our analysis, we thus use the sum of third-party information on sales/costs from D151 and D158. We henceforth refer to these reports as information reports by other firms or D151 reports.

Withholding by state institutions and financial institutions, as reported in D150 and D153, has a much lower coverage among firms than pure information reporting, especially for the self-employed. D150 and D153 records are available for only 5.0% and 5.8% of the self-employed and 8.4% and 11.% of corporations respectively.²¹ 98.5% of D150 records are submitted by state institutions, meaning that withholding by private non-financial firms is minimal. A significant share of informative declarations cannot be matched with income tax records, suggesting that a large number of firms covered by third-party information or withholding are incompliant on the extensive margin.

In addition to the tax returns and informative declarations, we use the D140 and D141 registration and deregistration records for 2006-2014 to construct snapshots of the tax register for each fiscal period. Firms use the D140 form both for registration purposes, as well as for modification and deregistration. If the government deregisters a firm *de officio*, which happens if a firm has not filed taxes for at least three years, a D141 form is used.

4 Anatomy of Compliance

This section presents the anatomy of tax compliance in Costa Rica, identifying mis-reporting through discrepancies between two data reports on the same tax base, as applied by [Fisman and Wei \(2004\)](#). We start with the extensive margin, estimating the share of non-filers by matching tax

²¹As indicated by the percentages in squared brackets in Table III, the coverage of D153 declarations among sales-tax-liable firms is higher, since they constitute only a small subsample of income taxpayers.

declarations filed to the set of tax liable firms as constructed from the tax register and available third-party reports. We then consider the intensive margin, estimating misreporting by comparing third-party reported and self-reported sales and costs. Finally, we estimate compliance with the payment obligation, comparing tax returns with payment receipts. We compare compliance by the self-employed and by corporations, as the two groups face different tax schedules and the self-employed have been identified in the literature as a particularly evasion-prone segment of taxpayers.

4.1 Extensive Margin Compliance

To examine compliance on the extensive margin, we construct the set of tax liable firms and compare it to the self-assessment declarations filed for the income tax and the sales tax. A firm is considered income tax liable for fiscal year t if it fulfills at least one of the following conditions: (i) the firm is in the tax register in year t , (ii) has filed income tax in t , (iii) is covered by at least one third-party informative declaration in t ,²² (iv) has filed income tax in $t - 1$ and has not deregistered since, or (v) has registered in the last year and has not deregistered since. For the sales tax, we consider as sales tax liable for month m only firms that have either (i) filed sales tax between month m and $m - 4$, (ii) registered as liable for the sales tax in the last four months and have not changed their registration status since, or (iii) are subject to withholding by credit/debit card providers for the purpose of sales tax compliance.²³

Table IV reports the share of non-filers for different taxes and subsamples. The overall share of non-filers for the income tax is substantial in all years, having increased from 38% to 55% of tax liable firms from 2010 to 2013 (panel A, column 1). It seems that non-filing for the sales tax is less prevalent, with a non-filing share of about 20%, which is consistent with the self-enforcing nature of the VAT. However, the fact that only a subsample of income taxpayers are liable for the sales tax lowers our estimates. Non-filers that are identified only through third-party reports, and are not subject to withholding, need to be dropped from the pool as it is not possible to determine whether they are sales tax liable. The majority of sales tax non-filers are thus registered firms

²²We exclude information from D151 cost reports, which could pertain to wage-earning individuals who purchased goods from a firm.

²³This algorithm is described in more detail in appendix section 8.1. Note that our algorithm is more conservative than the tax authority's own algorithm, which considers firms that filed in the past three years and have not deregistered since as tax liable. We report estimates using a more lenient algorithm (going back three years for the income tax and 12 months for the sales tax) in appendix table VIII. The estimates are marginally higher for the income tax, and about one third higher for the sales tax. The three-year window reflects the tax authority's practice of deregistering a firm *de officio* if it has not filed for three years.

which file only intermittently. In contrast, the majority of income tax non-filers are identified through third-party information (column 2). This suggests that, though third-party information helps to identify taxable activities, it does not necessarily induce the reportees to comply with their tax filing obligations.

An analysis of filing behavior across firm types shows that non-filing rates are generally lower for registered firms (panel B, column 1), and lower for registered corporations than for registered self-employed (columns 2 and 4).²⁴ Besides, there is a positive correlation between coverage by information reporting and filing, as theory would predict (columns 3 and 5), and the correlation is stronger for corporations. Distinguishing different sources of third-party information, panel C shows that firms reported by state institutions or credit/debit card companies display significantly lower non-filing rates than firms reported only by their suppliers or clients. This suggests that reporting mechanisms which are accompanied by withholding may have a stronger compliance impact.

To proxy the loss of tax revenue due to non-filing, we estimate that the share of undeclared sales represents 16-23% of declared sales, and the estimated share of unreported liabilities represents 7-10% of reported liabilities for the income tax (panel A, columns 4 and 5). The estimates rely on non-filers' third-party reported sales or their most recent available tax return, the assumption that the distribution of profits rates by firms size is similar for non-filers and filers and that the tax schedule is applied as per the law (see the notes to Table IV for details). The numbers suggest that even if the tax authority was able to perfectly enforce the tax filing obligation at no cost, income tax revenue would increase by 10% at most.

Given the incomplete nature of the third-party information trail, these estimates are a weak lower bound of extensive margin compliance gaps. Our algorithm does not capture firms that are fully informal and do not transact with any withholding or information reporting agents. However, we consider that our estimates capture the policy-relevant subsample of extensive margin non-compliers. Indeed, while several studies find that formalizing fully informal firms is difficult and costly (de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff 2013, Bruhn and McKenzie 2014), a companion paper by Brockmeyer et al. (2015) shows that filing rates among firms known to the tax authority can be increased significantly through low-cost deterrence messages. Nonetheless, filing rates still remain below 40% in the sample of initial late-filers, and revenue gains from increased filing are small

²⁴Note that column 1 in panel B is not the average of columns 2 and 4, as column 1 also includes firms for which the firm type indicator, identifying self-employed and corporations, is missing.

(less than 1% of aggregate income tax revenue).

4.2 Intensive Margin Compliance

To examine compliance on the intensive margin, we compare self-reports and third-party reports, for sales and costs respectively. We construct a taxpayer's third-party reported sales as the sum of sales reported by other firms (the taxpayer's clients, D151 sales), state institutions (D150), debit/credit card companies (D153) and exports.²⁵ A taxpayer's third-party reported costs are the sum of sales reported by the taxpayer's suppliers (D151 costs). Underreporters (overreporters) are firms reporting an amount at least 0.25% smaller (larger) than the relevant comparison amount.

Table V shows the estimates of under-reporting for tax year 2010, distinguishing sales reports and cost reports, and reports by the self-employed and corporations respectively. Panel A focuses on under-reporting for the income tax, panel B on estimating the under-reported income tax liability, and panel C on internal consistency between the different declarations submitted by a taxpayer. Estimating under-reporting for the sales tax is more challenging, given its narrow base and the fact that third-party reports do not distinguish between sales liable and not liable for the sales tax.

While 17% of the self-employed and 14% of corporations under-report sales compared to third-party reports, the share of firms under-reporting their costs is even higher, 50% and 30% respectively for the self-employed and corporations (row 1). Firms thus under-report not just sales but scale, as shown also in Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2016). The higher share of cost under-reporters among the self-employed can be explained by the presence of an exempt tax bracket in the self-employed tax schedule. While under-reporters leave about 40% of their third-party reported sales and 30% of their third-party reported costs unreported (row 5), these amounts represent only about 15% of total third-party reports (row 6). The share of unreported sales in total third-party reported sales is just slightly smaller than the share of sales under-reporters, suggesting that under-reporters are not disproportionately small firms (rows 1 vs 6, columns 1 and 2). The share of under-reported costs in total third-party reported costs is significantly smaller than the share of cost under-reporters (rows 1 vs 6, columns 3 and 4). This suggests that marginal cost under-utilization is widespread, but substantial under-utilization is not.

With a few assumptions, it is possible to translate the unreported sales amounts into unreported tax liability. We assume that under-reporters declare all third-party reported sales, apply the in-

²⁵While inter-firm sales could technically be conducted through a card transaction and would thus appear both on the D151 and on the D153 declaration, in which case our measure would over-estimate third-party reported sales, the tax authority considers this unlikely.

tially reported profit rate to their initially unreported sales, and then apply the tax schedule. This means we allow under-reporters to offset additional reported sales with additional reported costs, proportionately to the initial declared profit rate. This is a realistic assumption, given the evidence in Carrillo, Pomeranz and Singhal (2016) and Slemrod et al. (2015), and consistent with firms' response to desk audits discussed further below. We estimate that reported tax liabilities would increase by 9% for corporations and by 48% for the self-employed if all third-party reported sales were declared (row 11). This large increase for the self-employed is driven by their high initial reported profit rates, given the exempt tax bracket. However, as the self-employed's tax liabilities represents only 3% of corporate tax liabilities, the general conclusion still is that the tax authority could increase income tax revenue from firms by 10% at most if it was able to perfectly enforce all third-party reported sales.

Evidence from the impact of desk audits further supports the conclusion that simply improving enforcement on third-party reported margins cannot increase tax revenue substantially. The tax authority systematically cross-checks third-party reports and self-assessment declarations, and conduct periodic desk audits for firms that exhibit discrepancies. A desk audit entails a one-day examination of the case by a tax officer and a phone call to the taxpayer, with the request to rectify the tax declaration. Figure II displays the results of desk audits for the income tax (panel A) and the sales tax (panel B). Comparing a firm's initial tax return to the post-audit revised return, the figure plots the change in reported costs against the change in reported revenue for panel A, and the change in reported input tax credit against the change in sales tax collected in panel B. The figures focus on the small share of desk-audited firms that actually revise their declaration in response to the phone call: 19% of firms for the income tax and 16% for the sales tax. Revisers clearly offset revenue increases by cost increases, by almost 100% for the income tax and by about two-thirds for the sales tax. The revisers' reported tax liability more than doubles nonetheless, as the initial base is extremely low. The interventions are also highly cost-effective, considering the daily salary of a tax officer, and the load of one case per day. However, the number of revisers and their scale is so small that the revisions increase total revenue by less than .5%.²⁶ The low response rate, offsetting cost adjustments and marginal tax revenue gains of these desk audits are all consistent with the fact that the under-reporting rates in Table V change little when considering firms' final returns rather than their initial returns, or earlier or later fiscal years.

²⁶More generally, whether it is optimal for the tax authority to invest in desk audits rather than full audits or follow-up communications with non-filers or late-payers depends on the relative revenue elasticities of these different enforcement activities, in the spirit of Keen and Slemrod (2016).

This analysis has thus shown that, although misreporting compared to third-party information is present, its levels are moderate, probably due the deterrence effect of routine cross-checks, desk audits and other compliance interventions by the tax authority. The majority of firms comply voluntarily, and the remaining non-compliers are unlikely to be swayed into compliance with standard enforcement tools (e.g. desk audits). Perfectly enforcing reporting of third-party reported margins could increase income tax revenue by 10% in theory, but the realized effect of desk audits is orders of magnitude smaller.

4.3 Payment Compliance

To examine taxpayers' compliance with the obligation to pay their net tax liability, we match the income and sales tax returns with payment records from the D110 payment receipts. Importantly, the payment receipts display both the payment date and the tax period and taxpayer to which the payment corresponds, allowing us to exactly match payments with liabilities. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at estimating payment compliance for the income and sales tax, testing the previously implicit assumption that declared tax liabilities automatically translate into payments.²⁷ The relevant liability is the taxpayer's final tax liability to be paid as per the final (revised) tax returns, after deductions, advance payments and tax withheld have been subtracted.²⁸ We compare this liability to the tax payment that the taxpayer makes herself, excluding payments made by withholding agents and advance payments made by the taxpayer.²⁹ We then take the share of payment over liability for each taxpayer, and average this share across all taxpayers in each fiscal period.

The results are displayed in Figure III, where panel A corresponds to the income tax and panel B correspond to the sales tax, and thick blue and thin red lines correspond to corporations and self-employed respectively. In both panels, the average payment share is below 100% in all fiscal periods, and decreases as we consider more recent tax periods, dropping to 70% for the income tax and 85% for the sales tax in the most recent period considered (solid lines). This is despite the fact that we consider payments made until April 2015, the payment deadline for fiscal year 2014. There are two potential explanations for this downward sloping profile of the average payment

²⁷Del Carpio (2014) provides estimates of property tax compliance in Peru, which are conceptually different from our estimates as property taxes are assessed by the government and thus have no misreporting margin.

²⁸Note that we use the net liability as derived on the firm's tax return, and taking into account only the amount of advance tax payments and tax withheld that the taxpayer chose to reclaim on her tax declaration.

²⁹Including payments that are enforced retroactively by the tax authority through administrative or judicial procedures makes little difference to the results.

rate: a fall in payment compliance over time, or the presence of late-payers. If taxpayers service their tax obligations with substantial delays, then more recent periods will display lower payment compliance than earlier periods, for which a longer series of payment data is available.

To distinguish these two explanations, we add the average payment profiles based on payments made until April 2013 and April 2011 respectively (dashed and dotted lines). These payment profiles are similarly downward sloping and shifted to the left, suggesting that payment delays are indeed at play. For instance, while the income tax payment share for 2010 is about 88% when measured by April 2011, it is above 95% when measured in April 2015. A small share of taxpayers thus pay with large delays. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that cash-constrained firms make tax payments when they are liquid rather than when the payment is due, as fines and interest fees are small. At the same time, the payment share, as measured by the fiscal period-specific payment deadline, is also decreasing over time, from 88% for the income tax in 2010 to 81% in 2014. This suggests that the second explanation - falling payment compliance over time - is also at play. Overall, however, payment compliance is relatively high, not only when averaged across firms, but especially in the aggregate. As non-payers and late-payers are disproportionately small, the aggregate payment rate, that is the sum of payments divided by the sum of final liabilities, is close to 100% soon after the payment deadline and stable over time.³⁰ Although the enforcement of outstanding payments through administrative and judicial procedures is part of the regular activities of the tax authority in Costa Rica, and important from a deterrence perspective, increasing enforcement on this margin is unlikely to increase tax revenue substantially.

To summarize, the anatomy of compliance allows the following conclusions. First, a substantial share of firms fail to file their taxes, and there are limits to the extent to which third-party information induces compliance on the extensive margin. Second, a non-negligible share of firms under-report sales compared to third-party reports, despite the fact that the authority conducts systematic cross-checks and regularly requests corrections of discrepancies. Finally, a group of predominantly small firms pay their outstanding liabilities with several months, sometimes years, of delay. Overall, while compliance gaps are present on all margins, they are relatively modest compared to total tax revenue. As evidence from a filing intervention and desk audits show, increased enforcement on third-party reported margins is unlikely to yield large revenue gains, precisely because voluntary compliance is relatively high and the remaining non-compliers respond little to enforcement. Instead of increasing enforcement, expanding the coverage of third-party infor-

³⁰Results available upon request.

mation, and the application of associated withholding mechanisms, may be a much higher-return investment than increased enforcement, a question that we turn to in the next two sections.

5 Impact of Information Reporting

This section examines the compliance impact of information reporting while section 6 isolates the impact of withholding. We first analyze the heterogeneity of bunching, as a proxy for misreporting, across subsamples of firms with different degrees of information reporting coverage, and then conduct an event study of the response to information reporting.

5.1 Heterogeneity in Bunching

Bunching at kinks or notches in the tax schedule has been used in numerous studies to estimate the response of reported taxable income to the tax rate, and bunching is usually shown to be driven by an evasion/avoidance response rather than a real response (e.g. [Bachas and Soto 2016](#), [Almunia and Rodriguez 2015](#), [Seim 2015](#)). In Costa Rica, we observe large and sharp bunching at the first kink in the self-employed tax schedule and at the first notch in the corporate tax schedule, and bunching moves every single year with the location of the kink, as shown in [Figure IV](#) for the self-employed.³¹ There is rarely any excess mass at the previous year's kink, suggesting that firms adjust almost immediately and fully to the new kink location. The consistent and speedy adjustment supports the interpretation of bunching as a reporting response rather than a real production change.³² We thus use bunching as a proxy for misreporting.

To examine the heterogeneity of bunching with coverage by information reporting, we pool the data for 2006 to 2015 and display the distribution as percentage difference from the year-specific

³¹The first threshold in each schedule is the most salient one, and also the largest in terms of the tax rate change for the self-employed. We focus on this threshold, considering [Chetty et al. \(2011\)](#) who argue that larger kinks generate stronger bunching, as the size of the tax incentive allows some taxpayers to overcome optimization frictions that would otherwise prevent them from bunching.

³²Strikingly, the excess mass is always concentrated to the left of the kink. For the years 2010 to 2014, the distribution also displays a clear missing mass to the right of the kink, which is at odds with the prediction of standard utility theory. This theory predicts that kinks generate symmetric bunching around the threshold, and notches generate asymmetric bunching below the threshold and a missing mass in a dominated range above the threshold [Kleven and Waseem \(2013\)](#). However, as discussed in [Kleven \(2016\)](#), several studies have found asymmetric bunching also at kink points, suggesting that taxpayers may perceive a kink as a notch. One possible explanation is that crossing the kink may be associated with a fixed cost, such as having to make a payment, as is the case for the first kink in the self-employed tax schedule in Costa Rica. However, tax payments can be done online and should generate little transaction cost in Costa Rica. Another explanation is that the threshold creates a reference point, which constitutes a notch in the firm's utility function, so that bunching is driven by reference point dependence rather than the traditionally assumed response to the financial incentive change at the kink. This warrants caution when using bunching to estimate the elasticity of taxable income, but does not prevent us from interpreting bunching as a measure of misreporting which generates a revenue loss for the government.

threshold location in 1% bins. To estimate the size of bunching, we fit a flexible polynomial to the observed distribution, excluding a range around the thresholds, as is standard in the bunching literature (Chetty et al. 2011, Kleven and Waseem 2013). Given the asymmetric nature of bunching, we estimate bunching to the left of the kink and the missing mass to the right of the kink. As the missing mass does not seem to be the same size as the excess mass, at least for the self-employed, we apply the estimation strategy suggested by Best and Kleven (2015) rather than the convergence method. We choose the lower bound of the excluded range as the point where bunching starts and the upper bound as the point where the derivative of the observed distribution shifts from positive to negative.³³

Figure V displays the observed distribution (dotted blue line), the estimated counterfactual (solid red line) and excess mass and missing mass estimates for different subsamples. The top row (A) shows the distribution of taxable income for the self-employed around the first kink; the bottom row (B) shows the distribution of revenue for corporations around the first notch. In each row, panel 1 reflects the firm-year observations not covered by any information reporting or withholding mechanisms, panel 2 reflects observations that are subject to information reporting by other firms only (declaration D151 by suppliers or clients), and panels 3 and 4 reflect observations subject to reporting by state institutions and credit/debit card companies respectively (declarations D150 and D153).

Among both firm types, the largest excess mass is found in the sample of firms not subject to information reporting (panel A). The subsample of firms subject to information reporting by other firms (panel B) still exhibits a large excess mass around both the kink and the notch, but in both cases, the excess mass estimate is significantly smaller than the estimate for firms not subject to information reporting. The excess mass drops from 4.5 to 2.08 for the self-employed and from 4.49 to 3.17 for corporations, and those drops are statistically significant at the 1% level.³⁴ The fact that bunching is smaller but still highly significant among information-covered firms is consistent with the fact that bunching can be partly driven by legal avoidance, and that the information trail is incomplete, covering only large transactions. Firms can still manipulate their taxable income

³³The convergence method would require the missing mass and the excess mass to be of the same size and assumes that there are no extensive margin responses, which is unlikely in a context with high shares of non-filers even among registered firms.

³⁴Note that the change in the missing mass estimate is driven by a change in the counterfactual density which scales the excess mass, rather than by a change in the absolute size of the excess mass. The missing mass drops for corporations, but increases for the self-employed. In fact, the missing mass for the self-employed is clearly visible only in panels 2 and 3. This suggests that the threshold may be perceived as a kink by some self-employed in the subsample not covered by information reporting.

by misreporting small and cash transactions and sales to the final consumer, or inflating costs, deductions and exemptions.

Information reporting by state institutions and credit/debit card companies, which also act as withholding agents, is associated with a further reduction in misreporting behavior (panels B and C). For the self-employed, the excess mass among firms subject to state reporting is similar to the excess mass among firms subject only to information reporting by other firms, but the excess mass drops to .52 for firms subject to credit/debit card reporting. For corporations, the excess mass drops to 1.44 and 1.35 respectively for firms subject to state reporting and credit/debit card reporting. These drops are again highly statistically significant.

The heterogeneity of bunching across subsamples is thus consistent with a compliance impact of information reporting, and an even stronger impact of withholding.³⁵ However, our estimates capture a cross-sectional correlation rather than a causal effect. Firms subject to information reporting, and especially firms subject to withholding, are on average larger, more urban and probably equipped with more sophisticated management and accounting systems. It is possible that these characteristics, rather than coverage by the tax compliance mechanisms, explain at least part of the heterogeneity in bunching.

5.2 Event Study

To move a step further towards estimating a causal effect of information reporting, we exploit within-firm variation across time in the coverage of information reporting. Each year, over a thousand firms become third-party reported for the first time. If third-party reporting of transactions to the tax authority forces firms to declare a larger share of their transactions on their self-assessment declarations, coverage by information reporting should be associated with an increase in reported taxable sales and income. This prediction is motivated by the fact that the tax authority regularly follows up on firms with discrepancies between third-party and self-reports, leading most firms to report sales weakly larger than the third-party reported amounts (section V).

We thus conduct an event study of reported taxable income around the time of the first information report about a firm, distinguishing reports by the different informing agents (other firms, state institutions, credit/debit card companies).³⁶ Of course, whether or not a firm becomes subject

³⁵Our results are also consistent with audit-based estimates from the United States, where the Internal Revenue Service reports tax evasion rates of 56%, 8% and 1% respectively on income covered by little information reporting, income covered by substantial information reporting and income subject to withholding (IRS 2012).

³⁶The Costa Rican tax authority, unlike the Internal Revenue Service in the United States, do not notify taxpayers about the informative reports received about them. However, given the structure of reporting requirements, each firm

to information reporting is partly under the firm's control. A firm is nearly certain to be reported to the tax authority if it sells to a state institution or conducts sales via a credit/debit card terminal, as state institutions and card companies are considered highly compliant with their reporting obligations. Conducting transactions with another firm above the relevant annual threshold amount should also trigger information reporting, although firms may be less compliant with their reporting obligations, and transacting partners may collude not report their transactions.³⁷

An additional concern is that the event of becoming subject to information reporting may increase not only the share of true taxable income that is reported to the tax authority, but may increase also the level of true taxable income, which would raise reported taxable income even if the share of income that is reported remains unchanged. For instance, securing a government contract has been shown to increase firm growth (Ferraz, Finan and Szerman 2016), and offering consumers the opportunity to pay by credit/debit card may allow firms to attract additional customers. While there are no credible estimates of the potential size of these demand effects, we discuss below why our estimates are unlikely to be fully driven by them.

To address the identification concerns, we consider the event group E of firms that become third-party reported for the first time at event time $k = 0$, and the event control group C of firms which have not switched into coverage by $k = 0$. As a careful precaution, but without substantively modifying the core results, we follow Hilger (2014) and Naritomi (2016) in reweighting the control group to resemble the treatment group pre-event trend. For each event period, we estimate the firms' propensity score of being third-party reported for the first time.³⁸ Following DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996), we re-weight the control group by quintile bins of the propensity score to match the distribution of the event group. We consider the event's impact on income tax declarations and sales tax declarations. For the income tax, we consider a balanced panel of firms that we can observe for at least four years before and three years after the event, allowing us to evaluate events happening in event periods $p = \{2010, 2011, 2012\}$. For the sales tax, we consider

should be aware of the informative declarations held by the tax authority about its business activities. Each inter-firm transaction above the relevant threshold amount needs to be reported by both the seller and buyer (declaration D151). State institutions and credit/debit card companies acting as withholding agents are obliged by law to provide taxpayers with a receipt stating the amount of tax withheld. Compliance with this information requirement is considered to be high.

³⁷Incomplete compliance by firms with their reporting obligation is not a concern for our identification, as we seek to identify the impact of actual (observed) third-party reports rather than of reporting obligations, the former effect being the policy-relevant one.

³⁸This propensity score is estimated separately for each declaration type and event year/month, using firm type and tax administration dummies, and the two lags of a third-order polynomial of total income and taxable income. See also Yagan (2015) for a detailed description of the reweighting procedure.

a balanced panel of firms that we can observe for at least five months before and after the event, allowing us to evaluate events happening in event periods between February 2009 and August 2014.³⁹

Each panel in Figure VI displays the trend in (real) reported taxable income for the event group (orange dots) and the control group (blue crosses), scaled by the pre-event average, along with the difference-in-difference coefficient obtained from estimating

$$y_{ipk} = \gamma_k + \alpha_{ip} + \beta \cdot I\{k \geq 0, g = E\} + u_{ipk}. \quad (1)$$

The unit of observation in this estimation is a firm i in event period p at event time k . For instance, a firm may be in the control group for events happening in 2010 and 2011, but in the treatment group for events happening in 2012. Each firm-year observation for this firm will thus appear in the event dataset three times, for event years 2010, 2011 and 2012. We estimate the firm's reported taxable income as a function of event-time dummies γ_k , firm-event-period fixed effects α_{ip} , and the post-event and treatment group dummy $I\{k \geq 0, i \in E\}$.⁴⁰ The top row (A) of Figure VI corresponds to the self-employed, and the bottom row (B) corresponds to corporations.

For most firms, the first transacting partner reporting to the tax authority is a supplier, leading to a D151 cost report about the firm's purchase. As panels A1 and B1 show, receipt of this first information report is associated with a 26% increase in reported taxable income for the self-employed and a 49% increase for corporations. This large effect emerges precisely and entirely at event time, after otherwise identical trends in the event and control group, which means it is unlikely to be driven purely by true income growth. A real growth spurt in the event group, if it occurred, would have to be weak and temporary, as the event and control group immediately return to parallel trends in the post-event period. The smaller effect for the self-employed might be due to the lower tax rates for these firms, and the presence of an income exemption which allows firms with true income below the exemption threshold to declare without paying any tax.

Over time, firms gradually become covered by more information reports, such as reports from their clients (D151 sales). This event, which happens on average a year after the first cost report, is

³⁹Results are robust to considering fewer or more event periods, or omitting the propensity score reweighting.

⁴⁰Contrary to Naritomi (2016), we conduct the estimation at the firm level rather than on the collapsed data, to estimate the standard errors. The results are qualitatively similar in a simple event study without control group, in which we estimate coefficients for each event time. However, reduced statistical power makes the point estimates significantly more noisy. Firm-event-period fixed effects and clustering of standard errors at the firm level account for potentially repeated appearance of firm-year/firm-month observations. Outcomes are in levels rather than logs, to include the large number of firms with zero values, and winsorized at the 95th percentile to limit the influence of outliers.

considered in panels A2 and B2. The first sales report is associated with a much smaller increase in taxable income than the first cost report, likely because part of the relevant transactions have already been reported to the tax authority in response to the first cost report. The effect size is again larger for corporations than for the self-employed (25% vs 9%).

Reporting by state institutions or credit/debit card companies (panels A3-B4) has a relatively homogenous effect on the self-employed and corporations⁴¹, leading to a 21-26% increase in reported taxable income in both samples.⁴² Although most firms are already subject to reporting by other firms when being first reported by a state institution or card company, these new reports enforce different margins - sales to state institutions and to final consumers, as opposed to inter-firm transactions - and should thus have an additional effect on reporting.

In all figures, the event and control group follow similar, almost identical trends until the event, and then diverge precisely at event time $k = 0$ ⁴³, until the difference between the two groups stabilizes at approximately $k = 1$. In the monthly sales tax data, the event group has a slightly higher pre-event growth rate than the control group, but the sudden divergence in the event month still supports a causal interpretation of the effect. Although offering consumers the possibility to pay by credit/debit card may increase sales, this effect is unlikely to materialize immediately, as consumers need to acquire the new information and adjust their purchasing behavior. We thus conclude that the size and timing of the effect is hard to reconcile with a pure growth effect, and must be at least partly driven by a compliance response to information reporting.

6 Impact of Withholding

Having shown that information reporting increases reported taxable income, this section studies whether withholding has an impact on compliance beyond the impact generated by associated information reporting. We use the August 2011 reform of the sales tax withholding rate schedule to isolate the impact of withholding, holding the information environment constant. We start by

⁴¹The effect is likely similar for both firms types, as these events are relevant for firms with higher profit levels, where the self-employed and corporations face similar marginal tax rates.

⁴²Consistent with the fact that firms under-report both sales and costs, the taxable income response to all events is driven by a similarly-sized increase in reported sales and reported costs, as the numbers in squared brackets demonstrate. Note also that the increase in reported taxable income (reported tax liability for the sales tax) is associated with an increase in the reported profit rate (reported value-added rate for the sales tax). For the event of credit/debit card reporting (last two figures) we use the reported tax liability (rather than reported taxable income) as outcome variable, and sales tax collected and input tax credits deducted (rather than sales and costs) for the decomposition, as these variables are available on the monthly sales tax declarations.

⁴³The only exception to this pattern are corporations receiving a first sales report from other firms (fourth panel), whose trend diverges from the control group at $k = -1$ rather than $k = 0$.

analyzing the first-stage impact of the reform on realized withholding rates and credit/debit card use, then conduct a difference-in-difference estimation of the tax payment response to the withholding rate increase, and finally examine the mechanisms of the withholding impact.

6.1 First Stage and Impact on Card Use

As discussed in section 3.3.2, a reform in August 2011 revised the withholding rate schedule for the sales tax. Panel A in Figure VII shows that the reform led to a large increase (approximately a doubling) of the average withholding rate applied to sales taxpayers. The graph also displays small jumps every semester, when the withholding rates are revised by the tax authority and communicated to the withholding agents. This suggests a relatively high compliance by withholding agents (card companies) with the government-assigned withholding rates. To better understand the extent of deviation between the assigned and realized withholding rate, we predict each firm's withholding rate based on its past tax returns and the withholding rate schedule in Table II. As panel B shows, the predicted rate tracks the realized rate closely, for firms for which we can observe both rates, but the realized withholding rate is always slightly higher. This is consistent with the fact that firms can request a lowering of the withholding rate from the tax authority, for instance if they have losses for several consecutive months.⁴⁴

Panels C and D investigate whether the reform reduced firms' propensity to file their sales declaration, or use their credit/debit card machine, which would have limited information reporting and withholding by card companies. Both the number of sales tax declarations and of credit/debit card reports (D153 informative declaration by card processing companies) filed with the tax authority are steadily increasing and smooth at reform time. Similarly, the share of sales tax declarations that can be matched with at least one credit/debit card report and vice-versa does not display a discontinuity at reform time. In fact, the share of credit/debit card reporters that file sales tax was decreasing prior to the reform (driven by an increase in the number of credit/debit card reporters), but then stagnated after the reform. The possibility of reclaiming the tax withheld may have increased withholder's propensity to file sales tax. Overall, we conclude that the reform did not reduce tax filing and credit/debit card machine usage on the extensive margin.

A remaining concern is that the reform may have decreased the intensity of card machine usage. However, as panels E and F show for firms using a card machine (i.e. reported by at least

⁴⁴There is only a weak behavioral response to the withholding rate notches in reported value-added and the share of local sales, suggesting that few firms manipulate the withholding rates by misreporting the relevant line items on their sales tax declaration.

one credit/debit card company), neither the sum of card sales over total sales nor the average over the firm-specific share of card sales changes discontinuously at reform time. While both series display a small drop at reform time, this drop is statistically significant only when considering the average share of card sales, suggesting it is driven by firms with a relatively small sales volume. The size of the drop is economically insignificant even in this sample - one percentage point of an average share of 50%.

This suggests that most firms have not attempted or do not have the market power to refuse card transactions with the objective of avoiding the withholding rate increase or reducing its scope of application. We can thus consider the information reporting environment constant around the reform, and use the reform to isolate the effect of withholding.⁴⁵

6.2 Difference-in-Difference Estimation

To estimate the impact of the withholding rate increase on total tax payment and other intermediate outcomes, we conduct a difference-in-difference estimation on the balanced panel of firms which consistently submitted sales tax declarations during a 30-months window around the reform. Firms that experienced an increase in the predicted withholding rate between July and August 2011 are considered treated. The control group consists of firms that experienced no rate increase or are not subject to withholding.⁴⁶ Note that the treatment assignment is based on the predicted rather than the realized increase in the withholding rate, as the latter may be affected by a firm-specific request or connection to the tax authority which allowed the firm to obtain a lower withholding rate.⁴⁷ The predicted rate change depends on value added and the share of local sales in the second semester of 2010, long before the reform decree was designed in July 2011, so that firms could not possibly have gamed the system to avoid an increase in the predicted withholding rate.⁴⁸ We estimate the effect of the rate increase using the specification

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \mu_i \cdot t + \beta \cdot Treat_i \cdot Post_t + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (2)$$

⁴⁵Any reduction in credit/debit card usage would simply downward bias our difference-in-difference estimates below. Similarly, if the (small number of) firms that reduced card usage after the withholding rate reform were the firms with the largest potential evasion rents, our estimates would constitute a lower bound on the true compliance impact of withholding.

⁴⁶Results are similar but more noisy when excluding firms that are not subject to withholding. We always exclude firms that experience a reduction in their withholding rate, as the small size of this sample does not allow for separately estimating the impact of a rate reduction.

⁴⁷We consider collusion between the withholding agent and the firm unlikely, given the small number of withholding agents and the intense monitoring they are subject to.

⁴⁸We do not observe firms starting to revise tax returns for 2010 after the reform was announced.

where y_{it} is the outcome reported by firm i in month t ; α_i and γ_t are firm and month fixed effects and μ_i is a firm-specific linear time trend; and $Treat_i$ and $Post_t$ are dummies indicating the treatment group and post-reform period. ε_{it} is the error term. We consider as outcomes all main line items on the sales tax return, as shown in table VI. The table reports the pre-reform mean in the treatment group, and the coefficient β for different specifications, using either the raw data, or winsorizing by the 99.9th, 99th and 95th percentile, in addition to the first percentile. As several outcome variables take value zero for a large share of observations, we use levels rather than logs, and report the treatment effect as marginal effect on the pre-reform average.

To visualize the identifying assumption and treatment effect on total tax payment, panel A in Figure VIII plots the month-on-month change in total tax payment for the treatment and control group, together with the DiD coefficient estimates from Equation 2. For the purpose of this figure, the data is winsorized by the 99th percentile, our preferred specification. Total tax payment is the sum of the tax withheld and the taxpayer’s payment. The treatment and control group exhibit parallel pre-reform trends, and the same seasonal fluctuation with peaks during the December shopping season, which confirms the suitability of the control group. At the time of the reform, tax payments in the treatment group increase sharply by about 33% and remain at this higher level for the next 15 months.⁴⁹

Given this large treatment effect, and the size of treated firms, the withholding rate reform increased aggregate sales tax revenue by 8.4%. Panel B in Figure VIII illustrates this result, using a simple regression discontinuity in time, on demeaned semester-wise revenue data. Importantly, these revenue figures are from official government statistics and net of any tax refunds granted to taxpayers.⁵⁰ We also show in Panel C that revenue from the simplified regime tax, which is paid quarterly, evolves completely smoothly at the time of the withholding rate reform, refuting concerns that the change in sales tax revenue may be driven by business cycle fluctuations.⁵¹

⁴⁹There is an additional increase over time during the post-reform period, but this parallels a qualitatively similar development in the control group. The results are robust to considering a longer post-reform period.

⁵⁰The number and total amount of the refund requests increased slightly at the time of the reform, but there are usually less than 300 refund requests per month, compared to about 6000 treated firms in our balanced panel, and less than half of the refund requests are filed by sales tax payers. The delay in receiving a refund is reportedly several months, and the request procedure is cumbersome and thus undertaken primarily by large and sophisticated firms.

⁵¹The last three rows in Table VI also show that firms do not reduce income tax payment in response to the withholding rate reform. While firms can deduct sales tax withheld as “compensation” from their income tax liability (if their net sales tax liability is zero for three consecutive months), this applies only to a small number of taxpayers. The main treatment effect barely changes when considering as outcome total sales tax payments net of any refunds requests and income tax compensations. When using the sum of total income and sales tax payments minus refunds as dependent variable (dividing annual income tax payments equally across months of the relevant fiscal year for estimation purposes), we estimate that the reform increased tax payment by 22.5% (column 5). Given that annual sales tax payments are on average almost twice as high as income tax payments, this is consistent with the demonstrated

6.3 Mechanisms of Withholding Impact

We investigate two potential mechanisms for the withholding impact: a default mechanism, whereby incomplete reclaim of the tax withheld and incomplete payment of declared tax liabilities mean that a withholding rate increase mechanically translates into higher tax payment; and a salience mechanism, whereby the withholding rate increase raises the salience of enforcement, and hence reported liabilities.

As panel A in Figure IX shows, the share of withholdees making a reclaim on their sales tax declaration, conditional on having a non-zero gross tax liability, is only around 50% before the reform, and drops close to 40% at the time of the reform. This drop occurs because the reform increases the number of taxpayers subject to withholding, and many of the new withholdees are likely unfamiliar with the reclaim procedure. As these new withholdees start to reclaim the tax gradually, the share of withholdees making a reclaim increases, and eventually surpasses the pre-reform share of reclaimers by approximately 10 percentage points. The average share of withheld tax reclaimed, as displayed in the second panel, follows a similar pattern but is much higher. The share fluctuates between 80% and 95% before the reform, then drops sharply at the time of the reform, and recovers gradually. Given the low share of reclaimers and high share of tax reclaimed in total tax withheld, it seems that incomplete reclaim applies mostly to small firms. Similarly, non-payment or late payment of outstanding tax liabilities is more common among smaller firms. Accordingly, columns 1 and 2 in table VII show that the withholding rate increase generated a larger increase in tax payment for the self-employed (small firms) than for corporations.⁵²

A back-of-the-envelope calculation yields that the default mechanism through incomplete reclaim and incomplete payment of tax liabilities can explain at most 40% of the total increase in tax payment after the withholding rate reform. This suggests that a second mechanism must be at play, which is analyzed in the bottom panels of Figure IX. The panels display results from estimating Equation 2, as in Figure VIII, with different outcome variables, as indicated in the panel titles. Panels C and D show that the reform did not affect the amount of sales tax collected (nor the amount of total reported sales), but led to a 3% reduction in reported input tax credits in the treatment group. Combining these two results means that the reported gross tax liability in the

increase of sales tax payments by 33% and even a slight increase of income tax payments. Indeed, to the extent that taxpayers are internally consistent, i.e. report the same tax base on the income and sales tax declaration, an increase in sales tax compliance would spillover to the income tax.

⁵²We chose the firm type division as it is based on a time-invariant characteristics that is unlikely to be misreported. Results are similar when splitting the sample by median pre-reform revenue.

treatment group increased by 17% (panel E). This is consistent with the hypothesis that firms were evading sales tax by over-reporting input tax credits prior to the reform, but started to report more accurately after the withholding rate was increased.⁵³ This reporting effect accounts for another 50% of the total increase in tax payment after the withholding rate reform.

The findings raise the question of what drives the improvement in reporting, given that enforcement by the tax authority has not increased, as evidenced in panel F by the relatively constant audits rates. One possibility is that firms increase reported taxable income when reclaiming the tax withheld, in anticipation of a higher probability of cross-checks or monitoring. However, columns 3 and 4 of table VII show that firms which never make any reclaim experience a similar increase in reported tax liability as firms making a reclaim.

Another possibility is that a withholding rate increase raises the salience and hence the perceived intensity of enforcement for some taxpayers, without any change in true enforcement. To see this, it is important to know that firms learn from their daily (or occasionally monthly) credit/debit card machine statements (cf. Figure XII) the volume of card sales processed, any commissions applied by the card processors, and the amount of tax withheld and transmitted to the tax authority. Firms experiencing an increase in the withholding rate from a positive rate to a larger rate would notice the rate increase on their card machine statement only if they pay close attention to the amount of transactions processed and the amount of tax withheld, to back out the withholding rate applied. Firms experiencing an increase in the withholding rate from zero, however, are much more likely to notice the rate increase, as the box for tax withheld on their card machine statement switches from being blank to carrying a number. Noticing the application of withholding for the first time may raise the salience of possible enforcement interventions like desk audits, and lead firms to increase compliance.

Consistent with this, columns 5 and 6 in Table VII show that firms experiencing a withholding rate increase from zero exhibit a larger increase both in their reported tax liability and in their total tax paid than firms experiencing a similarly-sized rate increase from a positive to a larger rate.⁵⁴

⁵³We also find a similar increase in reported taxable income after the introduction of tax withholding by credit/debit card companies for the purpose of income tax compliance in 2015 (a reform which again maintained the information reporting environment constant). The results are shown in Appendix Figure XI.

⁵⁴We exclude from the “From-Zero Rate Increase” group all firms that experience the maximum rate increase of six percentage points, to ensure that the average rate increase in this group is not larger than the average rate increase among other treated firms. This significant interaction does not disappear when additionally interacting with the self-employed and claimer indicator, and is always larger than the latter. An alternative explanation for our result might posit that firms are unaware of their true tax liability and thus report with error, but start to report more correctly after the withholding rate reform, as the withholding system provides them with information of their true tax liability. However, this explanation would be consistent with our results only if firms systematically (but non-strategically)

Furthermore, Figure X shows that firms which become subject to withholding for the first time, independently of the withholding rate reform, also exhibit a sudden increase in their reported tax liability. This event study considers firms that are already subject to third-party reporting but not subject to withholding by their credit/debit card company and that experience a change in their withholding rate driven by the semesterly updates of the withholding rates. As the update of the withholding rate between June and July in year t depends on a firm's reported valued-added/share of local sales in the second semester of $t - 1$, any change in the reported tax liability in t is likely driven by the withholding rate change itself rather than the underlying fundamentals driving the withholding rate. Accordingly, the reported tax liability in the event and control group evolves in parallel between March and June. Upon treatment in July, the event group diverges and continues reporting a 5-6% higher tax liability for at least three months.⁵⁵ This event study strongly suggests that the reporting response to the withholding rate increase is driven by a salience effect for firms subject to withholding for the first time.

7 Conclusion

Although withholding schemes for firms are widespread in low income countries, and in low compliance sectors in high income countries, they have been largely ignored by the public finance literature. This paper proposes an explanation for the attractiveness of withholding schemes. In a simple Allingham-Sandmo model with third-party reporting, withholding can create a compliance default if reclaiming the tax withheld is costly, and can enhance the salience of tax enforcement.

Exploiting a unique ten-year panel of tax declarations, third-party information and withholding reports for the universe of firms in Costa Rica, we estimate compliance gaps on the extensive, intensive and payment margin. The estimates suggest that compliance is satisfactory on third-party reported margins, and expanding the coverage of information reporting leads to substantial increases in reported taxable income. An event study finds that firms increase their reported taxable income by 20-50% when being information-reported for the first time by a trading partner. However, compliance with third-party information does not necessarily mean that firms declare their true tax liabilities. Consistent with this, tax withholding further enhances compliance. A doubling in the sales tax withholding rate increases tax payments by 33% among firms subject to withhold-
underestimated their tax liability.

⁵⁵These results are robust to winsorizing the outcome at the 99th or 95th percentile, considering only events before or only after the withholding rate reform in 2011, and reducing or increasing the considered pre and post-event period which conditions the size of the balanced sample.

ing and by 8% in aggregate. This effect is driven by incomplete reclaim of the tax withheld, and increased reporting. We find no evidence that withholding reduces output, which suggests that the liquidity costs associated with the regime are negligible.

Given the large compliance impact of withholding, investigating the optimal scope for withholding would be a fruitful area for future research. In addition to state institutions and credit/debit card companies, which currently act as withholding agents in Costa Rica, the government could also nominate other financial institutions and large firms as withholding agents, while ensuring that a transaction is not covered by multiple withholding agents. However, increasing the scope of withholding can raise monitoring costs for the government and administrative costs for withholding agents. The costs are likely smallest for firms that are already large taxpayers and thus subject to increased government monitoring, and those that have sophisticated accounting departments able to deal with the additional paperwork required. In some countries, for instance China, the government also provides withholding agents with financial incentives as a share of the tax withheld.

Policy makers should also take into account the possibility that withholding generates spillover effects on firms along the supply chain - as it changes treated firms' reported tax liabilities, and on competitor firms in the same sector or neighborhood as firms subject to withholding - as it changes withholders' effective tax liability. Analyzing these spillovers would allow decomposing the aggregate revenue impact of withholding into the direct effect on treated firms and the potential indirect effects.

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TABLE I: INCOME TAX SCHEDULE

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Panel A: Self-Employed										
Kink 1	1,858	2,074	2,252	2,599	2,747	2,890	3,042	3,171	3,339	3,522
Kink 2	2,775	3,097	3,362	3,880	4,102	4,316	4,543	4,735	4,986	5,259
Kink 3	4,629	5,167	5,609	6,473	6,843	7,199	7,577	7,898	8,317	8,773
Kink 4	9,276	10,354	11,241	12,972	13,713	14,427	15,185	15,827	16,667	17,581
Panel B: Corporations										
Notch 1	27,811	31,043	33,701	38,891	41,112	43,253	45,525	47,451	49,969	52,710
Notch 2	55,943	62,444	67,791	78,231	82,698	87,004	91,573	95,447	100,513	106,026

Notes: The table shows the income tax schedule for the years 2006 to 2015. Amounts are in thousands of Costa Rican colones (CRC). Panel A shows the location of the kinks on taxable income that separate the five tax brackets for the self-employed. The tax is applied to taxable income at marginal rates of 0, 10, 15, 20 and 25% respectively for the first to fifth tax bracket. Panel B shows the location of the notches on revenue that separate the three tax brackets for corporations. The tax is applied to taxable income at *average* rates of 10, 20 and 30% respectively for the first to third tax bracket. For more information on the tax base, tax schedule and the filing procedure, see <http://www.hacienda.go.cr/contenido/12994-regimen-tradicional>.

TABLE II: WITHHOLDING RATE SCHEDULE FOR SALES TAX

	Withholding Rate						
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Base before 08/2011: Value-Added Rate \leq	5	20	30	40	55	75	∞
Base since 08/2011: Share of Local Sales \leq	0	-	-	50	-	-	100

Notes: The table shows the withholding rate which credit/debit card companies apply to the sales of their sales-tax-liable clients. Prior to August 2011, the average withholding rate was determined by a notched schedule on value-added, with notches at value-added rates of 5, 20, 30, 40, 55 and 75%, and resulting withholding rates between 0 and 6%. Since August 2011, the schedule has been consolidated to three withholding rates of 0, 3 and 6%. The rates are determined by a notched schedule on the share of local sales, with a notch at 50%.

TABLE III: INFORMATIVE DECLARATIONS TO TAX AUTHORITY

(1) Form	(2) Purpose	(3) Record Type	(4) Coverage of Corporations	(5) Coverage of Self-Employed	(6) % Matched With Income Tax Records
D151	Reporting of firm-firm transactions N=17,125,017 (54.3% sales)	Sales	46.5	38.9	37.0
		Purchases	49.3	54.1	65.5
D158	Reporting of transactions at auctions N=369,002 (71.0% sales)	Sales	0.5	1.7	16.4
		Purchases	0.3	0.9	23.5
D150	Withholding on purchases N=759,391 (98.5% state purchase)	State purchases	8.4	5.0	78.7
		Private purchases	0.22	0.08	39.9
D153	Withholding on card transactions for GST N=4,198,384	Sales	11.5 [26.7]	5.8 [18.4]	67.8 [48.7]

Notes: This table provides information about the nature and coverage of third-party informative declarations used by the tax authority in Costa Rica, for 2006 to 2014. Columns 1-3 provide the form number, its purpose, the number of observations and the record type. Columns 4 and 5 display the share of income tax filers covered by the different third-party declarations, distinguishing corporations and the self-employed. Column 6 displays the share of informative declarations which are matched with an income tax declaration. In the last row, the shares in brackets refer to the match rate with the monthly sales tax declarations for 2008-2014. The shares are calculated on the pooled data for all years/months. All declarations identify the reporter and taxpayer by their administration-internal anonymous tax ID, and provide information on the transaction amount, and (where applicable) the amount of the tax withheld. Amounts are accrued. Since January 2012, all declarations must be prepared using the DECLAR@7 software. Sanctions for non-compliance with the obligation to submit informative declarations are specified in the Código de Normas y Procedimientos Tributarios. All declarations are annual, except D153, which is monthly. D151 requires reporting of transactions >2.5 mio CRC annually with a transaction partner, and transactions of >50,000 CRC annually for rent, commissions, professional services or interests. For D150, the withholding rate is 2% and 3% respectively for state and private purchases. For D153, the withholding rate is firm specific, following the schedule in Table II. For more information on the filing of informative declarations, see <http://www.hacienda.go.cr/contenido/12997-declaraciones-informativas>.

TABLE IV: NON-FILING

Panel A: Non-filing among all tax-liable firms					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	% Non-filers	Of which registered non-filers	Non-filers' TPI sales as % of declared TPI sales	Undeclared sales as % of declared sales	Unreported liability as % of declared liability
Income Tax 2010	0.384	0.185	0.155	0.211	0.071
Income Tax 2011	0.485	0.125	0.195	0.230	0.069
Income Tax 2012	0.528	0.116	0.115	0.168	0.071
Income Tax 2013	0.556	0.121	0.114	0.181	0.099
Sales Tax 2011	0.196	0.894	.	.	.
Sales Tax 2012	0.185	0.884	.	.	.
Sales Tax 2013	0.198	0.891	.	.	.

Panel B: Non-filing among registered firms					
	All	Self-Employed	Self-Employed with TPI	Corporations	Corporations with TPI
Income Tax 2010	0.104	0.095	0.082	0.081	0.045
Income Tax 2011	0.105	0.090	0.078	0.061	0.033
Income Tax 2012	0.115	0.080	0.070	0.065	0.028
Income Tax 2013	0.131	0.128	0.094	0.137	0.043
Sales Tax 2011	0.180	0.263	0.122	0.094	0.060
Sales Tax 2012	0.168	0.247	0.103	0.085	0.045
Sales Tax 2013	0.181	0.269	0.079	0.085	0.034

Panel C: Non-filing among firms covered by information reporting					
	All	Reported by firms	Reported by state	Reported by card companies	
Income Tax 2010	0.574	0.579	0.235	0.293	.
Income Tax 2011	0.653	0.659	0.202	0.297	.
Income Tax 2012	0.673	0.679	0.186	0.308	.
Income Tax 2013	0.677	0.682	0.177	0.319	.

Notes: These panels show the share of non-filers (tax liable firms that do not file) for the income tax (rows 1-4) and the sales tax (rows 5-7). The algorithm used to construct the share of non-filers is explained in appendix section 8.1. The share of non-filers for the sales tax is an average across months in a fiscal year. Panel A shows the share of non-filers among all tax liable firms (column 1), the share of non-filers that are registered (2), non-filers' third-party reported sales as share of filers' reported sales (3), non-filers' estimated sales as share of declared sales (4), and non-filers' estimated tax liability as share of declared liability (5). TPI stands for third-party information, and TPI sales is the sum of all third-party reports except cost reports. A non-filing firm's estimated sales in in period t is $\max(\text{third-party reported sales in } t; \text{self-reported sales in the most recent prior reporting period})$. A non-filer's tax liability is estimated using its estimated sales, applying the average profit rate of filers in the corresponding decile of the sales distribution of filers, and then applying the tax schedule. Panel B reports the share of non-filers among all registered firms (1), and among subsamples of registered firms as indicated by the column headings (2-5). Panel C reports the share of non-filers among all firms covered by information reporting (1), and among subsamples of firms reported by different informing agents, as indicated by the column headings (2-4).

TABLE V: MISREPORTING

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Sales Reports		Cost Reports	
	Self-Employed	Corporations	Self-Employed	Corporations
Panel A: Underreporting IT				
1) % Underreporters IT vs TPI	16.9	14.2	50.6	29.8
2) Unreported Amount	270.6	2799.7	271.1	1021.1
3) Underreporters' TPI	652.9	7010.6	953.2	3603.3
4) Total TPI	1859.8	20664.1	1507.5	16421.4
5) Unreported Amount(% UR TPI)	41.4	39.9	28.4	28.3
6) Unreported Amount(% TPI)	14.5	13.5	18	6.2
Panel B: Underreported Liability				
7) Unreported Tax IT	12.7	71.1		
8) Underreporters' Reported Tax	3.3	51.8		
9) Total Reported Tax	26.6	800.1		
10) Unreported Tax (% UR Tax)	385.6	137.4		
11) Unreported Tax (% Tax)	47.7	8.9		
Panel C: Internal Consistency				
12) % Underreporters IT vs OTPI	3.6	5.3	17	8.3
13) % Overreporters IT vs OTPI	43.5	62.9	81.1	90.2
14) % Underreporters IT vs ST	9.4	9.6	14	5.9
15) % Overreporters IT vs ST	53.8	61.6	83.5	93.6

Notes: This table displays estimates of compliance gaps between third-party reports and self-reports for the income tax. Third-party reported sales for the income tax is the sum of sales reported under D150, D151, D158, D153, and exports. Third-party reported costs for the income tax is the sum of costs reported under D151 and D158. Third-party reported sales for the sales tax is the sum of sales reported on D153 declarations. Columns 1-2 are for sales reports, and columns 3-4 for cost reports. In both analyses, we consider separately the self-employed (columns 1 and 3) and corporations (columns 2 and 4). All figures in this table are either in percent (as indicated), or in billions of constant 2015 CRC. Underreporters (overreporters) are firms reporting an amount at least 0.25% smaller (larger) than the relevant comparison amount. Rows 1-6 examine underreporting of third-party reported sales/costs. They show the share of under-reporters among firms subject to third-party reporting for the income tax (1), the amount unreported (as compared to third-party reports) (2), the total third-party reports for under-reporters (3), the total third-party reports for the full sample (4), and the unreported amount as a share of the underreporters third-party reports (5), and as a share of total third-party reports (6). Rows 7-11 convert unreported sales into tax liabilities. They show an estimate of the unreported tax liability (7), the underreporters' reported tax liability (8), and the total reported tax liability (9), and the unreported tax as share of the underreporters' reported tax (10), and as a share of the total reported tax (11). The estimation of the unreported (gross) tax liability assumes that the profit rate on unreported sales is the same as the profit rate on reported sales (capped at 100%), and applies the tax schedule as displayed in Table I. Rows 12-15 analyze internal consistency in filing. Rows 12 and 13 compare self-reports for the income tax to a firm's own third-party reports (third-party reports submitted by the firm itself about transactions with other firms), and rows 14 and 15 compare income tax reports to sales tax reports. All calculations are based on 2010 data. Results are similar for other years, and when focusing only on firms that file according to the regular fiscal period.

TABLE VI: IMPACT OF WITHHOLDING RATE INCREASE

	(1) Pre-Reform Mean Treated, 99.9th pctile	(2) Pre-Reform Mean Treated, 99th pctile	(3) Basline Raw Data	(4) Winsorized 99.9th pctile	(5) Winsorized 99th pctile	(6) Winsorized 95th pctile
Total Sales Reported	71560.380 (996.541)	51664.220 (329.431)	0.200 (0.293)	0.042* (0.018)	0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.006)
Sales Tax Collected	5114.702 (59.499)	3782.567 (19.500)	0.030 (0.023)	-0.008 (0.019)	-0.012 (0.008)	0.011 (0.006)
Input Tax Credits	4309.865 (43.137)	3192.292 (14.898)	-0.087* (0.041)	-0.068** (0.022)	-0.038*** (0.010)	-0.036*** (0.006)
Import Credits	1509.174 (22.230)	882.316 (7.134)	-0.196* (0.081)	-0.120*** (0.036)	-0.024 (0.020)	-0.076*** (0.017)
Local Purchase Credits	2752.913 (27.976)	2064.536 (8.237)	-0.559 (0.546)	-0.055* (0.023)	-0.029** (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.006)
Gross Tax Liability	844.611 (21.245)	548.881 (5.437)	0.096 (0.061)	0.160*** (0.030)	0.167*** (0.021)	0.216*** (0.015)
Withholding Base	10827.196 (146.869)	7293.079 (37.665)	-0.032 (0.035)	0.018 (0.021)	0.017 (0.010)	-0.031*** (0.008)
Withheld Tax	146.758 (5.691)	78.916 (1.222)	1.419*** (0.375)	1.872*** (0.191)	2.423*** (0.093)	2.667*** (0.063)
Withheld Tax Reclaims	137.523 (4.965)	67.647 (1.055)	1.464** (0.543)	1.533*** (0.172)	2.141*** (0.109)	2.309*** (0.075)
Net Tax Liability	703.196 (18.402)	458.880 (4.549)	-0.191 (0.161)	-0.068 (0.043)	-0.049* (0.023)	-0.048** (0.015)
Compensation Requests	15.696 (0.508)	5.116 (0.108)	0.763** (0.281)	0.476* (0.208)	0.123 (0.163)	0.000 (.)
Final Tax To Pay	664.067 (17.415)	419.057 (4.084)	-0.222 (0.182)	-0.094* (0.047)	-0.115*** (0.024)	-0.111*** (0.015)
Taxpayer Sales Tax Payment	646.775 (17.431)	423.248 (4.144)	-0.251 (0.195)	-0.108* (0.047)	-0.098*** (0.024)	-0.100*** (0.016)
Total Sales Tax Payment	802.957 (20.679)	528.147 (5.215)	0.158 (0.083)	0.254*** (0.034)	0.326*** (0.022)	0.519*** (0.018)
Tot. Payment - Refund	802.576 (20.672)	527.766 (5.212)	0.160 (0.084)	0.253*** (0.034)	0.327*** (0.022)	0.518*** (0.018)
Tot. Payment - Refund - IT Comp.	784.958 (20.600)	512.144 (5.179)	0.174* (0.079)	0.257*** (0.034)	0.327*** (0.023)	0.546*** (0.019)
ST + IT - Refund	1237.233 (31.134)	813.674 (8.589)	0.090 (0.060)	0.145*** (0.026)	0.225*** (0.016)	0.347*** (0.013)
Observations	1069680	1069680	1069680	1069680	1069680	1069680
R ²	0.001	0.008	0.962	0.916	0.899	0.880


Notes: This table displays pre-reform means in the treatment group (columns 1 and 2) and OLS estimates of the impact of the withholding rate increase on firms in the treatment group (firms with a predicted rate increase at reform time), as per equation 2 (columns 3-6). The rows reflect different outcome variables, the columns reflect different specifications, as per the row and column titles. For columns 1 and 2, the data is winsorized at the 99.9th and 99th percentile respectively. Columns 3-6 allow for year and firm FE and a firm-specific linear time trend. Point estimates are marginal effects compared to the pre-reform average. Standard errors, clustered at the taxpayer level, are in parantheses. All amounts are in '000 CRC, deflated with base in 01/2015 (1USD=530CRC). All outcome variables correspond to boxes on the sales tax return form, except the variables in the last three rows. Compensation requests are used to deduct any net credits or unreclaimed tax withheld from previous tax periods or from other taxes. Taxpayer payment is the payment made by the taxpayer at the end of each month. Total payment is the sum of taxpayer payment and any tax withheld. Total payment - refund subtracts any refund that taxpayers may have claimed on a separate form (refund request form 402). Total tpayment - refund - IT compensation additionally subtracts any compensation requests that the taxpayer requested on her income tax declaration. ST + IT - refund is the sum of total sales tax and total income tax payment (including tax withheld) minus any refund requested.

TABLE VII: HETEROGENEITY OF WITHHOLDING IMPACT

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Payment	Liability	Payment	Liability	Payment	Liability
Treat	0.290*** (0.021)	0.137*** (0.018)	0.328*** (0.021)	0.188*** (0.017)	0.231*** (0.018)	0.116*** (0.015)
Treat x Self-Employed	0.554*** (0.042)	0.256*** (0.042)				
Treat x Never-Reclaimer			0.261*** (0.078)	-0.059 (0.072)		
Treat x From-Zero WHR Increase					1.681*** (0.167)	0.400*** (0.135)
Observations	1069680	1069680	1069680	1069680	1010120	1010120
R^2	0.757	0.743	0.730	0.737	0.750	0.743

Notes: This table displays OLS estimates of the impact of the withholding rate increase on firms in the treatment group (firms with a predicted rate increase at reform time), as per equation 2. The columns denote the outcome variables, which are winsorized at the 99th percentile. Payment is total tax payment (constructed) and liability is gross tax liability, as in table VI. All amounts are in '000 CRC, deflated with base in 01/2015 (1USD=530CRC). The treatment and control group are specified as in table VI. Never-Reclaimers are treated firms that do not make any reclaim, compensation request or refund request during the post-reform period. The label “From-Zero Withholding Rate Increase” indicates that firms experience an increase of the predicted withholding rate from zero to a positive rate at reform time, as opposed to other treated firms that were already subject to a non-zero withholding rate prior to reform time. We exclude from the former group all firms that experience that maximum rate increase of six percentage points, to ensure that the average rate increase in this group is not larger than the average rate increase among other treated firms.


FIGURE I: WITHHOLDING SYSTEMS AND GDP PER CAPITA




Notes: This figure displays the mean and median GDP per capita, and the 95% confidence interval of the mean, for different subsamples of countries. GDP per capita is measured in thousands of current USD from the World Development Indicators for 2013. The number below each bar displays the sample size. The stars reflect the significance levels of the mean difference between two adjacent bars. The first and second bar refer to countries that use and do not use withholding on the VAT/sales tax respectively. The third and fourth bar refer to countries that use and do not use withholding on business income taxes (i.e. income taxes on corporations and the self-employed/unincorporated businesses) respectively. The fifth and sixth (seventh and eighth) bar further divide the subsample of countries with VAT (income tax) withholding into countries that use a broad withholding regime (that applies across sectors), and those that use a targeted withholding regime, applicable only to certain sectors (e.g. construction, fishing). The analysis is based on a sample of 118 countries for which data was available from the [PKF International Worldwide Tax Guide 2015](#), recent [EY International Tax Alerts](#), [PWC Tax Summaries](#), or the secondary sources referenced in the introduction. The results are robust to using different definitions of GDP (e.g. purchasing power parity), limiting the sample to the 109 countries for which information was available from the PKF Guide, coding countries for which the guide does not specifically mention withholding either as missing or as not having withholding, and different ways of defining targeted withholding systems.

FIGURE II: IMPACT OF DESK AUDITS

A: Income Tax




B: Sales Tax




Notes: The figure shows the revenue and cost adjustments made by firms contacted via phone calls by tax officers, after a desk audit uncovered a discrepancy between self-reported and third-party reported sales. The desk audits are for income tax returns for 2013 and 2014, and for sales tax returns for 2013. The figures focus on firms submitting a revised tax return, and display the change in revenue and costs (sales tax collected and input tax credit deducted in panel B), comparing the initial return with the revised return. The text displays the share of revisers, the initial tax declared by revisers, the difference between their final tax paid after revision and the initial tax declared, this difference as a share of initial total tax revenue for the relevant tax and fiscal year, and the cost of the desk audit intervention. The cost is calculated by multiplying the number of cases by the daily wage of a tax officer, accounting for the fact that tax officers are asked to handle one case per day.

FIGURE III: PAYMENT OF TAX LIABILITIES

A: Income Tax




B: Sales Tax



Notes: This figure shows the average of the payment share, defined as the total payment made by the taxpayer for a specific tax period, divided by the final tax liability to be paid for that period. The average is an unweighted average across all taxpayers with a positive final liability for each fiscal period. The final tax liability is net of any deduction made for tax withheld, and the payment data does not include tax withheld. The income tax data includes all declarations filed and payments made by June 2015. The sales tax data includes all declarations filed and payments made by October 2015. The thin red lines correspond to the self-employed and the thick blue lines correspond to corporations. We show the series for three different cuts in the payment data, taking into account all payments made before the cut date.

FIGURE IV: BUNCHING AT FIRST INCOME TAX KINK FOR SELF-EMPLOYED




Notes: The figures show the frequency distribution of taxable income of the self-employed (personas físicas con actividad lucrativa) around the first kink in the income tax schedule, for the years 2006-2014. The data is aggregated in bins of CRC 20,000. The black solid line marks the kink in year t (as per the figure title), the black dashed line marks the kink in year $t - 1$.


FIGURE V: BUNCHING, INFORMATION REPORTING AND WITHHOLDING

A: Self-Employed


A1: No Information Reporting




A2: Reporting by Firms



A3: Reporting by State




A4: Reporting by Credit/Debit Card




B: Corporations


B1: No Information Reporting




B2: Reporting by Firms



B3: Reporting by State




B4: Reporting by Credit/Debit Card




Notes: The figure shows the density distribution of taxable income for the self-employed around the first kink in the income tax schedule (top row, A), and the density distribution of total revenue for corporations around the first notch in the corporation tax schedule (bottom row, B). The data is pooled for years 2006-2015, represented as percentage distance from the kink, and aggregated in taxable income bins of 1%. The panels show the distribution for different subsamples, as per the panel titles that indicate whether and by what type of information reporting firms in the subsample are covered. The blue dotted line marks the empirical distribution, the red solid line marks the counterfactual, fitted as a flexible polynomial to the observed distribution outside the excluded range. We use a tenth-degree polynomial for self-employed and a sixth-degree polynomial for corporations. The excluded range above the threshold covers four and seven bins respectively in the two groups of firms. The excess mass b and missing mass m are estimated as the difference between the observed and estimated density, weighted by the height of the counterfactual density. The standard errors are bootstrapped.

FIGURE VI: EVENT STUDY OF COMPLIANCE AFTER FIRST INFORMATION REPORT

A: Self-Employed




B: Corporations



Notes: This figure displays event studies for receipt of the information report by different reporting agents, as indicated by the panel titles. The top row (A) is for the self-employed and the bottom row (B) for corporations. Each panel displays the year-on-year change (month-on-month change for credit/debit card reporting) in real reported taxable income (tax liability) for an event group (orange dotted line) and an event control group (blue crossed line). The black solid line marks event time 0, when firms in the event group are reported to the tax authority for the first time by the reporting agent indicated in the panel title. The control group is reweighted by its propensity score of experiencing the event (cf. section 5.2 and footnote 38, for details). Each group consists of a balanced panel of firms that can be observed for the entire period displayed. Panels A1-A3 and B1-B3 consider events happening in 2010-2012. Panels A4 and B4 consider events happening in 02/2009-08/2014. The text displays the difference-in-difference coefficient from estimating equation 1, for different outcome variables as noted. Income refers to taxable income/profits. VA stands for value-added rate.


FIGURE VII: WITHHOLDING RATE REFORM




Notes: The figure displays the first stage of the withholding rate reform and analyzes the reform’s effect on credit/credit card use. Panel A shows the average realized withholding rate among all firms subject to withholding. Panel B shows the average realized and predicted withholding rate among firms for whom we can predict the withholding rate based on previous semester’s tax returns and the withholding rate schedule in Table II. Panel C shows the number of sales tax declarations and credit/debit card withholding declarations presented to the tax authority, correcting for revisions and duplicates. Panel D shows the share of sales tax declarations matched with at least one withholding declaration and vice-versa. Panel E shows the share of card sales in total sales among firms with a credit/debit card machine, and panel E shows the average over the firm-specific shares of card sales among firms with a credit/debit card machine. The black solid line in all panels marks 08/2011, when the increase in the withholding rate for the sales tax entered into effect. Panel E and F show a linear fit that allows for a different trend and constant after the reform. The text displays the pre-reform slope of the linear fit, and the change in slope and constant after the reform, along with standard errors in parantheses.

FIGURE VIII: IMPACT OF WITHHOLDING RATE INCREASE


A: Impact on Sales Tax Payment by Treated Firms



B: Impact on Aggregate Sales Tax Revenue




C: Counterfactual, Simplified Regime Tax Revenue




Notes: Panel A displays the results of the difference-in-difference estimation of Equation 2, with total tax payment as outcome variable. It considers the overall impact of the reform, pooling all firms with a predicted rate increase in the treatment group. The control group includes firms experiencing no increase in the predicted withholding rate and firms not subject to withholding. The black solid line marks 08/2011, when the increase in withholding rates entered into effect. The data is winsorized by the 99th percentile, and scaled by the pre-reform average. The text displays the coefficient β (marginal effect compared to pre-reform average) from estimating Equation 2. The bottom panels show the reform's impact on aggregate sales tax revenue (panel B), and on aggregate revenue from the quarterly simplified regime tax, as a counterfactual (panel C). The sales tax data is based on official revenue statistics from the Ministry of Finance, net of the sum of refunds made by the tax authority to taxpayers who were subject to withholding in excess of their liability, and the simplified regime data is based on firm-level tax declarations. The dots represent semester-wise tax revenue in billions of CRC demeaned by the pre-reform semester-level means. For panel B, semesters are defined to fit exactly around the time of the reform. For each year, the first semester includes February to July, and the second semester includes August to December, and January of the following year. The red line is a linear fit, allowing for a discontinuity at the time of the reform. The text displays the pre-reform semester-level mean revenue from the tax (in blue), and the coefficient and standard error on the post-reform dummy (in red). The results are robust to running the analysis on monthly or quarterly data, using shorter or longer time series, and adding controls for the months of December and January (in the monthly data).

FIGURE IX: MECHANISMS OF WITHHOLDING RATE IMPACT

Default Mechanism: Incomplete Reclaim




Salience of Enforcement Mechanism: Increased Reporting



Notes: The figure displays evidence on the mechanisms for the withholding rate impact. In all panels, the black solid line marks 08/2011, when the increase in withholding rates entered into effect. Panels A and B display, for all firms subject to withholding in a given month, the share of firms making a reclaim, and the average share of withheld tax reclaimed. The shares are winsorized by the 99.9th percentile. Panels C, D and E show results of the difference-in-difference estimation of Equation 2, with different outcome variables, as indicated by the figure titles. The treatment group includes firms experiencing an increase in the predicted withholding rate in 08/2011, the control group includes firms experiencing no increase in the predicted withholding rate and firms not subject to withholding. The data is winsorized by the 99th percentile, and scaled by the pre-09/2011 average. The text displays the coefficient β (marginal effect compared to pre-reform average) from estimating Equation 2. Panel F shows the evolution over time of the number of planned audits for all taxpayers and for taxpayers who are part of the large taxpayer unit, as per the annual work programs of the audit department.

FIGURE X: EVENT STUDY OF WITHHOLDING



Notes: This figure displays the results of an event study of a switch in the firm's withholding rate from zero to a positive rate. Firms in the event group were subject to third-party reporting by their card company but not subject to withholding prior to the event, and became subject to withholding at a non-zero rate in July. This happens due to the semesterly updating of withholding rates, based on firms' reported value-added/share of local sales two semesters prior, as per Table II. Firms in the control group experienced no change in the withholding regime nor in the third-party reporting regime between June and July. The graphs are constructed and labeled as in Figure VI. The estimation follows equation 1, except that the control group is not propensity-score-reweighted, and events in the year 2011 are excluded.

8 Appendix

8.1 Algorithm to Estimate Non-Filing: Income Tax

This section describes the procedure by which the pool of income tax-liable taxpayers is constructed for each year between 2010 and 2013. This pool forms the sample for Tables IV and VIII. The following algorithm is used to identify tax-liable firms:

- **Income tax filing:** Firms that declare income tax in current fiscal year t and are not found to have deregistered or switched to a simplified (non-tax-liable) regime by year t are included in the pool of income tax-liable taxpayers. Additionally, firms that filed in the previous year $t - 1$ and did not deregister or switch regimes in the interim are included to capture taxpayers who were previously identified as income tax-liable and then do not file in subsequent years. This condition is applied to generate the sample used in Table IV; for the sample used in Table VIII, the rule is extended to include firms that declared income tax in any year between $t - 1$ and $t - 3$ for years 2011 and later and between $t - 1$ and $t - 4$ for years prior to 2011, which are the historical rules officially applied by the tax authority for determining income tax liability, though in practice this condition may not have been systematically applied.
- **Registration:** Firms that are found to have registered with the tax authority in any of the previous three years prior to the current fiscal year t but did not file income tax returns in the current fiscal year are included. This step identifies firms that are officially registered as tax-liable but which did not file for the years during which these firms were registered, which step 1 does not capture as it relies only on the records of filings.
- **Subsequent deregistration:** In addition to identifying firms that are registered but do not file for income tax in prior years in step 2, firms that deregister in years following the current fiscal year t but are not found to have registered in year t or the previous three years are classified as having been income tax-liable despite not appearing on the official registration roster.
- **Declaring sales tax in current fiscal year:** Firms that declare sales tax in any of the months of the current fiscal year t - which spans from October of year $t - 1$ to September of year t - are included in the pool of income tax-liable taxpayers. This rule corresponds to the tax authority's official regulation that firms liable for sales tax are also deemed liable for paying income tax (though the reverse is not true).
- **Informative declarations:** Records of transactions between firms or between firm and the government provide information on the sales and costs of individual firms that can be used to identify income tax-liable taxpayers. Firms that report or are reported as having tax-liable sales in the current fiscal through the third-party reporting mechanisms described above are included in the pool of income tax-liable firms.

8.2 Algorithm to Estimate Non-Filing: Sales Tax

This section describes the procedure by which the pool of sales tax-liable taxpayers are constructed for each month of fiscal years 2011 to 2013. This pool forms the sample for Tables IV and VIII, which reports the average of the monthly values for each measure in corresponding fiscal year. The following algorithm, which is similar to the method used to identify income tax-liable firms, is used to identify sales tax-liable firms:

- **Income tax filing:** Firms that declare sales tax in month m of the current fiscal year t and are not found to have deregistered or switched to a simplified (non-tax-liable) regime by month m in year t are included in the pool of sales tax-liable taxpayers. Additionally, firms that filed in the previous four months - $m - 4$ to $m - 1$ - and did not deregister or switch regimes in the interim are included to capture taxpayers who were previously identified as sales tax-liable and then do not file in subsequent months. This could include firms that either declare sales tax in previous months within the same fiscal year or in months falling within the previous fiscal year $t - 1$, depending on the month. This condition is applied to generate the sample used in Table IV; for the sample used in Table VIII, the rule is extended to include firms that declared sales tax in months between $m - 12$ and $m - 1$.
- **Registration:** Firms that are found to have registered with the tax authority in any of the previous thirty six months (three years) prior to the current month m of fiscal year t but did not declare sales tax in month m are included. This step identifies firms that are officially registered as tax-liable but which did not file for the years during which these firms were registered, which step 1 does not capture as it relies only on the records of filings.
- **Subsequent deregistration:** In addition to identifying firms that are registered but do not file for income tax in prior years in step 2, firms that deregister in months following the current month m but are not found to have registered within the previous thirty six months are classified as having been income tax-liable despite not appearing on the official registration roster.
- **Informative declarations:** Firms that are reported as having been subject to withholding by credit/debit card companies are considered tax-liable for the sales tax.

TABLE VIII: NON-FILING, ROBUSTNESS


Panel A: Non-filing among all tax-liable firms					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	% Non-filers	Of which registered non-filers	Non-filers' TPI sales as % of declared TPI sales	Undeclared sales as % of declared sales	Unreported liability as % of declared liability
Income Tax 2010	0.420	0.335	0.154	0.225	0.081
Income Tax 2011	0.509	0.239	0.195	0.246	0.077
Income Tax 2012	0.547	0.218	0.114	0.189	0.076
Income Tax 2013	0.586	0.266	0.112	0.203	0.104
Sales Tax 2011	0.335	0.960	.	.	.
Sales Tax 2012	0.325	0.955	.	.	.
Sales Tax 2013	0.372	0.962	.	.	.

Panel B: Non-filing among registered firms					
	All	Self-Employed	Self-Employed with TPI	Corporations	Corporations with TPI
Income Tax 2010	0.195	0.158	0.131	0.155	0.073
Income Tax 2011	0.198	0.161	0.134	0.143	0.071
Income Tax 2012	0.209	0.153	0.126	0.128	0.051
Income Tax 2013	0.273	0.215	0.158	0.216	0.067
Sales Tax 2011	0.326	0.439	0.155	0.192	0.073
Sales Tax 2012	0.315	0.423	0.126	0.185	0.054
Sales Tax 2013	0.363	0.478	0.101	0.185	0.040

Panel C: Non-filing among firms covered by information reporting					
	All	Reported by firms	Reported by state	Reported by card companies	
Income Tax 2010	0.573	0.578	0.235	0.293	.
Income Tax 2011	0.652	0.658	0.202	0.297	.
Income Tax 2012	0.672	0.678	0.186	0.308	.
Income Tax 2013	0.676	0.681	0.177	0.320	.

Notes: The construction of this Table is identical to Table IV, except that it uses a less conservative algorithm to calculate the share of non-filers as explained in appendix section 8.1.

FIGURE XI: IMPACT OF INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING



Notes: This figure shows the impact of the introduction on withholding for the income tax in 2015 (corporation and self-employed) on reported gross tax liability, using a difference-in-difference estimation similar to equation 2, but on annual data. The treatment group contains firms that are subject to income tax withholding for the first time in fiscal year 2015.

FIGURE XII: CARD MACHINE STATEMENT

Pag. 1

Banco Nacional de Costa Rica
 Direccion de Medios Electronicos de Pago
 Resumen de Depositos para Comercios Afiliados
 De: 01/05/2016 Hasta: 31/05/2016

Fecha: 08/06/2016

Numero de Cuenta: [REDACTED]
 Nombre de Cuenta: [REDACTED]

Reporte Emitido por Cuenta		Valor Total	Ret. Venta	Ret. Renta	Comision	Neto a Pagar
COLONES						
01/05/2016	AUTOMATICO POR POS	1,356,380.00	0.00	23,872.29	53,945.20	1,278,562.51
02/05/2016	AUTOMATICO POR POS	483,100.00	0.00	8,502.56	19,135.55	455,461.89
03/05/2016	AUTOMATICO POR POS	1,465,575.00	0.00	25,794.12	58,448.16	1,381,332.72
04/05/2016	AUTOMATICO POR POS	1,026,590.00	0.00	18,067.98	40,844.40	967,677.62
05/05/2016	AUTOMATICO POR POS	687,650.00	0.00	12,102.64	27,452.58	648,094.78
05/05/2016	MANUAL/CARGO AUTOMATIC	944,500.00	0.00	16,623.20	37,543.50	890,333.30
06/05/2016	AUTOMATICO POR POS	818,500.00	0.00	14,405.60	32,657.50	771,436.90
07/05/2016	AUTOMATICO POR POS	676,900.00	0.00	11,913.44	26,774.45	638,212.11

Notes: This figure shows an example of the credit/debit card machine statement, that card processing companies provide to their affiliated businesses (clients) on a daily or monthly basis. The statement lists transaction amounts, withholding for the income tax and the sales tax remitted to the tax authority and commissions to the card processing company.