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Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

Paper Session

Friday, Jan. 5, 2018 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

Pennsylvania Convention Center, 102-A
Hosted By: Econometric Society
  • Chair: Erica Field, Duke University

Dowry: Household Responses to Expected Marriage Payments

S. Anukriti
,
Boston College
Sungoh Kwon
,
University of Connecticut
Nishith Prakash
,
University of Connecticut

Abstract

Dowry is a ubiquitous feature of South Asian marriage markets. However, empirical research
on dowry has been limited by the lack of data. We utilize retrospective information on gifts
exchanged at the time of marriage for 39,544 marriages during 1960-2008 (a) to describe dowry
trends and (b) to examine the impact of dowry expectations on households’ financial and childbearing decisions in contemporary rural India. Average real net dowry has been remarkably
stable over time; although there is considerable heterogeneity across castes, religions, and states.
We also test if credit-constrained parents respond to the “lumpy” nature of dowry payments at
the time of marriage by saving in advance. We find that, relative to parents of firstborn-boys,
parents of firstborn-girls increase per capita household saving and fathers work more after the
child’s birth if expected future dowry payment is higher.

The Mating Game: (Potential) Intergenerational Conflict on Marital Arrangements

Gabriela Rubio
,
University of California-Merced

Abstract

Recent research has shown that across several countries there is an ongoing decline in marriages arranged by the parents of the spouses (AM). This transition has been associated with industrialization, higher human capital investment, incorporation of younger cohorts into paid jobs, urbanization and the dissolution of extended households - prominent features of the modernization process. This paper proposes a partial equilibrium model to explain these patterns, highlighting one mechanism within a household through which modernization might lead to self-choice marriages. The model is a non-cooperative two-period game between parents and one child, where AM are used as the means to enter into an informal risk-sharing contract with another household (i.e. allows parents to create alliances among them, or reinforce their standing within their social network): if the child accepts the AM, she (and her parents) will share risk with another household. However, the opportunity costs of the arranged marriage are limited geographic and social mobility - in order to enforce the informal contract, the new couple follows strict post-marital residence rules. In contrast, children having a self-choice marriage are not geographically nor socially constrained; they might look for a partner with higher labor market return, have access to better-remunerated occupations, and find a spouse of higher quality. The model suggests that arranged marriages might disappear when the net benefits of the insurance arrangement (within their social network) decrease relative to (unconstrained) returns (to human capital) outside of their social group. In this framework, love marriages, increasing investment in human capital and the dissolution of extended households are endogenously determined. Nonetheless, the transition period might be characterized by an inefficient investment in the human capital of children, as parents might try to lower their child's outside option.

Age of Marriage, Weather Shocks, and the Direction of Marriage Payments

Lucia Corno
,
Cattolica University
Alessandra Voena
,
University of Chicago
Nicole Hildebrandt
,
Boston Consulting Group-New York

Abstract

This paper studies how aggregate economic conditions affect marriage markets in developing countries where marriage is regulated by traditional customary norms. We examine how local economic shocks influence the timing of marriage, and particularly child marriage, in Sub-Saharan Africa and in India, where substantial monetary or in-kind transfers occur with marriage: bride price across Sub-Saharan Africa and dowry in India. In a simple equilibrium model of the marriage market in which parents choose when their children marry, income shocks affect the age of marriage because marriage payments are a source of consumption smoothing, particularly for a woman’s family. As predicted by our model, we show that droughts, which reduce annual crop yields by 10 to 15%, have opposite effects on the marriage behavior of a sample of 400,000 women in the two regions: in Sub-Saharan Africa, they increase the annual hazard into child marriage by 3%, while in India droughts reduce such a hazard by 4%. Changes in the age of marriage due to droughts are associated with changes in fertility, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, and with declines in observed marriage payments. Our results indicate that the age of marriage responds to short-term changes in aggregate economic conditions and that traditional norms determine this response. This suggests that, in order to design successful policies to combat child marriage and improve investments in daughters’ human capital, it is crucial to understand the economic role of traditional cultural norms.

Social Norms and the Household Commitment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Egypt

Siwan Anderson
,
University of British Columbia
Chris Bidner
,
Simon Fraser University

Abstract

An important role of marriage institutions, especially in developing countries, is to
counter a commitment problem in which a husband faces a socially excessive incentive to separate from their wife once she has made her early contributions to the household; most notably the raising of children. An analysis of the factors which influence the magnitude of this commitment problem is important, but has not been previously performed because this magnitude is not readily observed. We provide a simple model and use it to show that the magnitude of the commitment problem facing a household is revealed by an observable characteristic of Muslim marriages--the deferred dower (mo'akhar). Armed with this measure and household data from Egypt, we find considerable empirical support for a novel prediction of the model: the underlying commitment problem is less severe in places with social norms that give husbands greater authority over household decisions.
Discussant(s)
Seema Jayachandran
,
Northwestern University
Lucia Corno
,
Catolica University
Siwan Anderson
,
University of British Columbia
Erica Field
,
Duke University
JEL Classifications
  • A1 - General Economics