

Culture and Gender Allocation of Tasks: Source Country Characteristics, Housework, and Childcare Division of Labor among US Immigrants*

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Abstract:

There is a well-known gender difference in time allocation within the household. We ask how malleable it is to culture. In particular, we ask if US immigrants allocate tasks differently depending upon the characteristics of the source countries from which they emigrated. Using data from the 2003-2015 waves of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), we find that first-generation immigrants, both women and men, from source countries with more gender equality (as measured by the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Index) allocate tasks more equally, while those from more traditional source countries allocate tasks more traditionally. These results are robust to controls for immigration cohort, years since migration, and spouse characteristics. There is some indication of an effect for second generation immigrants, particularly for second generation males with children. Our findings suggest that broader cultural factors do influence the gender division of labor.

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I Introduction

As women's labor force participation has increased, non-market labor or household labor has gained significant attention in the gender inequality literature (e.g., Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil, 2013; Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, and Robinson, 2000; Bruins, 2017; Yavorsky Kamp Dush, and Schoppe-Sullivan 2015; Coltrane, 2000; Ralsmark, 2017). Like the gender wage gap and male-female differences in labor force participation, the gender gap in housework has also decreased (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, and Robinson, 2000), much of this reflecting decreases in women's housework time. Men's housework time increased through the 1980s, with little subsequent change (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, and Robinson, 2000; Blau and Kahn, 2007; and Blau and Winkler 2018). Nonetheless, women continue to perform a disproportionate amount of housework and childcare. This leads to many employed women taking on a "second shift" in the household (Hochschild, 1989). For example, in 2014, employed married women spent somewhat less time on market work but considerably more time on work in the home than employed married men, resulting in 4.6 hours more of total work (home time plus market work) for women, on average (3.8 hours more if commuting time is included).¹ More broadly, the women's greater responsibility for housework and caregiving may be associated with a host of decisions that reduce women's labor market success compared to men, including, for example, the decision to work part-time, commute less, not seek promotions, etc., as well as women providing less effort for similar hours worked (e.g., Blau and Winkler 2018; pp. 246-250).²

The lack of equalization of housework time, even among employed couples, suggests that housework norms are more rigid than norms in the labor market (Ralsmark, 2017). In an effort to more fully understand the determinants of these norms and their responsiveness to

¹ Calculated from Blau and Ferber (2018), Table 4.1, p. 68.

² For evidence that housework reduces wages, see, for example, Hersch (2009).

environmental factors, we explore the impact of source-country cultural norms in affecting the behavior of first and second generation immigrants in the United States. This is also of interest because, as the proportion foreign-born continues to rise, the influence of source country culture will continue to play a large role in the future of gender equality in the United States (Blau, Kahn, and Papps, 2011).

This project studies the effect of source country characteristics on the gender division of household labor as well as which type of tasks (housework or childcare) are driving any differences. To examine this question, we use the 2003-2015 waves of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) for information on time use and the Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) from the World Economic Forum as a measure of culture and gender norms in the immigrant's source country. We also control for source country fertility and GDP per capita.

We find that women from more egalitarian countries, as measured by a higher Gender Gap Index, spend fewer hours per week both on housework tasks and on childcare, with a larger effect on housework. Among second generation women, parent source country characteristics have no significant impact on non-market work, though the signs are in the expected direction. An additional significant contribution of this paper is that we also examine how source country characteristics influence men's time allocation, whereas most of the previous work on source country gender roles and immigrant behavior focuses on women. We find that men from more egalitarian countries increase their non-market work, though not as much as women decrease theirs. Source country GGI raises immigrant men's housework and childcare time by roughly equal amounts. Further, second generation males with children whose parents came from a more egalitarian country spend more time on childcare than their counterparts whose parents came from more traditional countries.

II. Relationship to Previous Literature on the Gender Division of Labor in the Household

Coltrane (2000) summarizes the research on household division of labor from the 1990s as women reducing, men increasing, but women still doing twice as much housework. Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, and Robinson (2000) confirm this finding: though women have cut their housework hours in half and men have doubled their housework since 1965, women still do two-thirds of the household labor.³ About half of the decreases in women's housework can be accounted for through compositional changes, such as increased labor force participation, later marriages and fewer children; however, relatively little (15%) of the male increase in housework is accounted for by compositional factors (Bianchi, Sayer, Milkie, and Robinson, 2000). In addition, Blair and Lichter (1991) report that men and women concentrate their household labor on different tasks with women doing most of the work inside the home like cooking and cleaning while men do most of the work outside the home such as yard work and car repairs.

Along with the change in the amount of time spent on household labor, both men and women are changing how they spend their time, spending more time with their children since the 1960s, though mothers still devote more time than fathers (Gauthier, Smeeding and Furstenberg 2004). Additionally, more highly educated American parents spend more time with their children, despite also working more outside the home (Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008). However, in terms of gender norms, European data indicate that those with additional education, a common marker of less traditional attitudes toward gender,⁴ are less likely to agree with the statement that men should be the breadwinner, but not less likely to agree with the statement that

³ Blau and Winkler (2018), Table 4.1, present similar results for 2014—with women doing 63.2 percent of non-market work—suggesting that these patterns have not changed since this earlier literature. (These figures are based on averages for all married women and all married men regardless of employment status.)

⁴ For evidence on the relationship between education and gender role attitudes, see Campbell and Horowitz (2016), Cunningham (2008), Kostea (2013), Davis and Greenstein (2009) and Marks, Lam and McHale (2009).

women should be the homemaker (Ralsmark, 2017). We contribute to this literature by exploring the impact of an explicit measure of culture on the gender division of non-market time. Our results suggest an important and persistent effect of cultural factors on this division.

While the literature cited above on the household division of labor does not distinguish between the behavior of immigrants and that of natives, there exists a large literature concerning how immigrants and the second generation assimilate to gender norms in the US, primarily focused on fertility and labor supply. Blau (1992) found a positive effect of source country fertility rates on immigrant women's fertility and Antecol (2000) found that source country female labor force participation rates were positively correlated with US labor force participation of immigrant women. Blau, Kahn and Papps (2011) found a significant relationship between the assimilation of immigrant women's labor supply and gender roles in the source country. Women immigrating from countries with higher female labor force participation work more than those from lower participation countries and eventually fully assimilate to native levels. Women from low female labor supply countries do shrink the gap between their labor supply in the US and natives' labor supply over time, but never fully close it. Blau and Kahn (2015) confirm that the source country female labor supply affects labor supply in the host country even after controlling for the immigrants' own labor supply prior to immigration.⁵ Blau, Kahn, Brummund, Cook and Larson-Koester (2017) find that evidence consistent with son preference in fertility decisions for immigrants is stronger for those from less gender equal source countries (i.e., countries with a lower value of the GGI).

⁵ Research on other countries confirms the positive relationship between source country female labor supply and immigrant women's labor supply in the host country. Using labor force participation of the source country as a proxy for norms about women's roles, Bredtmann and Otten (2013) find that higher source country labor force participation increases the immigrant woman's labor supply in their host country using immigrants from 26 European countries in the European Social Survey.

With respect to the descendants of immigrants, Antecol (2000) found a positive correlation between US and source country participation for “second and higher generation” immigrants, defined by their answer to the 1990 Census question on ancestry, although the effect was weaker than it was for first generation immigrants. Similarly, the labor supply and fertility behavior of US-born daughters of immigrants (the second generation) has been found to be positively associated with female labor force participation and fertility rates in their parents’ country of origin (Fernández and Fogli 2009; and Blau, Kahn, Liu and Papps 2013), as well as with the female labor force participation and fertility rates in the US of immigrants from their parents’ source countries (Blau, Kahn, Liu and Papps 2013). Finally, Blau, Kahn, Brummund, Cook and Larson-Koester (2017) find stronger evidence of son preference in fertility decisions for second generation immigrants whose parents are from less gender equal source countries. We contribute to this literature on immigrants and the second generation by exploring the role of source country gender equity on the allocation of nonmarket time within the household.

III. Data

We use time diary data from the 2003-2015 waves of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) conducted by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. The ATUS elicits time diary data based on respondents’ recall of the previous day’s activities, recording each activity and time spent on each activity during a 24-hour period. Participants are selected from the outgoing rotation group of the Current Population Survey (CPS), with adjustments to make the sample representative of the population of the United States and over-sampling minority households. One participant from the CPS household over the age of 14 is randomly selected to complete the interview. Because participants may be linked to the CPS, we can observe not only a rich set of their own demographic information but also the same demographic information for their spouses and

children. This allows us to control for spouse source country characteristics and to look at parent migration status to observe second generation immigrants.

We restrict our sample to married individuals in heterosexual relationships where both the respondent and their spouse are between the ages of 18 and 64. Since time use data are only available for one respondent in each household, we are not able to observe the time allocation of the respondent and their spouse. However, by enforcing these sample restrictions, we can estimate for the population how married men and women divide household labor. All analyses were repeated including those in heterosexual partnerships but not married and results were similar. We also exclude observations recorded on holidays, natives born abroad, and immigrants whose year of immigration is missing.

Our dependent variables are housework, primary childcare, and total non-market work (defined as the sum of housework and primary childcare) measured in hours per week. Because, as noted above, the allocation of time to childcare has changed over time and differs across education groups, it is desirable to study housework and primary childcare separately in addition to total non-market work. Based on their finding that the tendency of more highly educated parents to spend more time with their children holds in 14 other countries, as well as the United States, Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008) suggest that child care should be modeled separately from other home production.

Our measure of housework includes all the activities coded as “Household Activities” by the ATUS. This includes household tasks such as laundry, food preparation, and cleaning as well as exterior household activities such as lawn care and vehicle repair. It also includes household management tasks such as financial management and household organization and planning. Primary childcare is all the time spent with the child either engaged in an activity with the child

or supervising the child. We use the ATUS codes under “Caring for and Helping Household Members” related to children in the subcategories “Caring for and Helping Household Children,” “Activities Related to Household Children’s Education,” and “Activities Related to Household Children’s Health.” This includes physical care of children, playing, homework, and obtaining or providing medical care for children. This does not include time when the child was present but the main activity during that period was not related to the child (i.e., secondary child care). Total non-market work time combines household and primary childcare tasks. Additional details about which codes are included in each dependent variable are provided in the data appendix.

The independent variable of interest is the Global Gender Gap Index (GGI) calculated by the World Economic Forum, our measure of source country gender norms. This Index is calculated using variables from four subindexes (economic participation and opportunity, educational attainment, health and survival, and political empowerment) that are averaged to produce an index with values between 0 (total inequality) and 1 (total equality). All indicators included are in ratios to measure the gap between men in women rather than the level of development in the measured country. Some of the female to male ratios included in the index are labor force participation incidence, wage equality between men and women for similar work, professional and technical employment, literacy rate, primary school enrollment, sex ratio at birth, healthy life expectancy, seats in parliament, and years as head of state. For more details on the inputs and calculation of the Index, refer to the World Economic Forum Report (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi, 2007). To be included in the Index, a country must have data available for at least 12 of the 14 indicators in the Index. Ideally, we would use a GGI from a period prior to our sample period so that it is independent of our outcome variables. Since the GGI began in 2006, this is not possible. We use an average of the 2006 and 2007 GGI values as our measure of

gender norms in the source country to create a more stable measure than using the values from just one year while also using values as early in our sample period to pre-date as many of our observations as possible. In 2006, 115 countries were included in the index, representing over 90 percent of the world's population. Immigrants from countries without a valid Index are excluded from our sample. We match 92 percent of the immigrants in our sample to a valid GGI value. The average GGI in our sample is 0.66 with a minimum of 0.529 and a maximum of 0.813. For 2006 and 2007, the three highest GGI scoring countries were Sweden (0.813), Norway (0.800), and Finland (0.797), respectively. The three lowest GGI scoring countries were Saudi Arabia (0.529), Pakistan (0.544), and Egypt/United Arab Emirates (0.579).

As mentioned above, we also include controls for source country fertility and GDP per capita since these measures may affect immigrant time use decisions apart from the factors the GGI is designed to capture. Both of these variables primarily come from the World Bank. See the online data appendix for information on the sources for the GDP per capita for the countries for which it is missing from the World Bank. For both total fertility and GDP per capita, we use the 2000-2007 country averages. As with GGI, we would ideally measure these variables prior to our sample period. Since these data are available, we go back as far as 2000. However, since GGI is an average of the 2006 and 2007 values, we include the fertility and GDP per capita information through 2007 so that we are observing all of our source country characteristics through the same end date. All other control variables come from the ATUS and the CPS obtained from IPUMS (see, <https://usa.ipums.org/usa/>).

IV. Methods

Before estimating the impact of source country characteristics, we first benchmark the immigrant data by examining the difference between immigrants and natives in regards to the

gender division of household labor. Are immigrants a more or less traditional group overall? To explore this question, we estimate separate regressions for men and women for the following OLS model for individual i , on day d , in month m , of year y , living in region r :

$$(1) Y_{idmyr} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Immigrant}_i + \beta_2 \text{Second Generation}_i + \beta_3 X_i + \delta_d + \eta_m + \tau_y + \theta_r + \epsilon_i$$

where Y is one of the three dependent variables described above: total non-market work, housework, and primary childcare. *Immigrant* is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the respondent was born in a country other than the US. *Second Generation* is a dichotomous variable equal to one if the respondent was born in the US and at least one of the respondent's parents was born in another country. The omitted category is *natives* - individuals born in the US, both of whose parents are also US born. Thus, natives correspond to the *third-plus generation*. X includes controls for respondent's age, age squared, education (4 discrete categories: less than High School, High School, Some College, and College+ with less than High School serving as the reference group), and race/ethnicity (measured in 5 mutually exclusive categories: Non-Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic, Non-Hispanic Asian, Non-Hispanic Other with Non-Hispanic White serving as the reference group) in the most parsimonious regression. Additional specifications add controls for children (number of children in age group 0-5, 6-12, and 13-17, respectively), spouse characteristics (spouse age, age squared, race/ethnicity, and education defined the same as above), and wife's usual hours of market work.⁶ The specification including wife's market work is intended to descriptively explore the question of whether results for housework and childcare simply reflect differences in time

⁶ The male regressions also include an indicator variable equal to 1 if the wife's hours of market work vary from week to week.

allocated to market work or persist even controlling for time spent in market work. All regressions control for day of week, month, year, and region (four categories: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West with Northeast serving as the reference group) fixed effects (δ_d , η_m , τ_y , and θ_r , respectively) and ϵ is the error term. For each sex and specification, we estimate the model on a sample of all individuals (including those without children) and a sample restricted to those with at least one child under 18.

We then focus on first and second generation immigrants to examine the relationship between source country characteristics and division of labor by gender. For first and second generation immigrants and males and females separately, we estimate the following OLS equation for individual i , on day d , in month m , of year y , living in region r :

$$(2) Y_{idmyr} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{GenderGapIndex} + \gamma_2 \text{SourceCountryCharacteristics} + \gamma_3 Z_i + c_d + d_m + e_y + f_r + u_i$$

where Y is one of the three dependent variables listed above: total non-market work, housework, and primary childcare. The coefficient of interest is γ_1 and measures the association between the *GenderGapIndex* (GGI) from the World Economic Forum and the outcome variables detailed above. *Source Country Characteristics* include the fertility rate and GDP per capita variables, also detailed above. Z includes all the variables in the X -vector in Equation (1) and, in addition, for immigrants, years since migration and its square, and immigration cohort (categorized based on year of migration: pre-1970, 1970-79, 1980-89, 1990-99, and 2000-2015 with pre-1970 as the omitted cohort) in the most parsimonious specification. As in Equation (1), controls for children, spouse characteristics, and wife's market work are added in additional specifications. Spouse characteristics include all the variables in X for the spouse and, in addition, dummies for spouse

immigrant and spouse second generation and interactions between the spouse immigrant dummy and the variables related to immigrant status: years since migration and its square and the immigrant cohort dummies. All regressions control for day of week, month, year, and region fixed effects (c_d , d_m , e_y , and f_r , respectively) and u is the error term. As above, for each gender and specification, we estimate the model on a sample of all individuals (including those without children) and a sample restricted to those with at least one child under 18.

Equation (2) is estimated separately for first and second generation immigrants. For first generation immigrants, the source country characteristics are those of the country from which they emigrated. For second generation immigrants, the source country characteristics are those of their parent. We are able to observe parents' birthplace for both respondents and respondents' spouse because of the linked data to the CPS. Second generation immigrant respondents are assigned the source country characteristics of their mother unless their mother's source country characteristics are missing or their mother is native. In that case, they are assigned their father's source country characteristics. This means that even if both parents are foreign born, they are assigned to their mother's source country unless she is from a country that does not have reported characteristics. Of second generation immigrants where both parents are foreign born, both parents are from the same source country for more than 85 percent (85.8 percent) of our sample.⁷ Standard errors are clustered at the immigrant or parental birthplace level.

V. Results

Differences in Time Allocation Across Generations

⁷ Blau, Kahn, Liu and Papps (2013) find that effect of the fertility and labor supply of immigrant women from the mother's source country on second generation women's fertility and labor supply is generally larger than that of women from the father's source country. Their findings are similar when they look directly at the impact of (mothers' vs. fathers') source country characteristics of the behavior of second generational women.

We first study the differences in time allocation across immigrant generations: natives, first generation immigrants, and second generation immigrants. (Recall that natives represent the third-plus generation.) Table 1 shows mean values for total non-market work, housework, and child care by generation and gender.⁸ Overall, the data show much larger gender gaps in total non-market work and in housework for first generation immigrants than for second generation immigrants, whose gender gaps are relatively close to those of third-plus generation natives. This supports our expectation that immigrants are a more traditional group with respect to gender roles, on average, compared to natives, at least for time spent in housework. In contrast, the gender gap in child care hours among those with children is similar across generations. In addition, there appears to be assimilation in total non-market work and housework from first to second generation immigrants for both women and men. Specifically, total non-market work for women falls between the first and the second generation, while total non-market work for men rises (these two patterns hold both for all men and women and for those with children).⁹ In contrast, child care hours among those with children rise slightly from first to second generation for both men and women, leading to a similar gender gap across the two generations.

While Table 1 shows differences in non-market work for men and women across generations, it is possible that compositional differences account for such differences. To explore the role of composition, we estimate regressions for the three non-market work dependent variables based on Equation (1), where we add a set of controls. The results from this analysis are presented in Table 2. The first four columns show the results for total non-market

⁸ Table 1 shows mean values for the samples included in the pooled regressions in Table 2, which do not control for source country characteristics. When we control for source country characteristics in the analyses restricted to first or second generation immigrants, the mean values are very similar to those shown in Table 1, with the sample size reduced only slightly due to missing data on these variables.

⁹ This conclusion about assimilation across generations of course may be due to true assimilation or to cohort effects across immigrant generations. As noted, when we study first generation immigrants, we control for arrival cohort as well as years since migration.

work with each panel showing the results for a different sample. Panel A is all females, Panel B is restricted to females with at least one child under the 18, Panel C is all males, and Panel D is restricted to males with at least one child under the age of 18. The first column of each outcome is the parsimonious regression of Equation (1), including controls for respondent's age, education, and race/ethnicity, as well as day of the week, month, year, and region fixed effects. The second column adds controls for children and the third adds spouse demographic controls, all detailed in the methods section above. In Columns 4, 8, and 12, we control for wife's market work. Though endogenous, it is useful for accounting. The results indicate that differences in wife's market work account for only a small portion of the immigrant-native differential in non-market time.

Immigrants are more traditional than natives, the reference group, across all samples with immigrant women doing significantly more non-market work and immigrant men doing significantly less. This finding is robust across all specifications, including controlling for wife's market work in Column 4, and always statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Among women, restricting the sample to only those with children increased the magnitude of the immigrant effect. For women, the immigrant effect on total non-market work (not controlling for market work) is an additional 3.9-5.9 weekly hours compared to natives, or about 16-19% of the respective female sample averages. For immigrant men, the impact ranges from -1.6 to -2.3, or about -10% to -17% of the respective male sample averages. Columns 5 through 12 repeat the analysis separately for housework and childcare, showing that the total non-market work difference is driven primarily by differences in time spent on housework, though there is a small but significant effect for childcare among women until wife's market work is included.

Second generation immigrants are much more similar to natives. While mostly not statistically significant, or only marginally significant, the coefficient for second generation women is almost always in the expected (traditional) direction across all outcomes. Among second generation men, the coefficient is small and not statistically significant in almost every case.

An additional set of findings from the regressions shown in Table 2 (results not shown) is that more highly educated women and men spend more time with children relative to less highly educated individuals, an effect consistent with previous research (Gauthier, Smeeding and Furstenberg 2004; Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney 2008). Specifically, focusing on those with children, the effect of a college degree or more education on time with children is positive and significant for women, and the effect for men is also positive and is 1.64 times its standard error. The effect for women is especially noteworthy because the impact of a BA+ on housework is significantly negative, as one might expect.

Having established that immigrants are generally more traditional in their allocation of time to non-market work, we now turn to the role of culture, measured through source country characteristics, on this relationship. While we continue to provide results for the same four specifications shown in Table 2, our preferred specification is that which includes children and spousal demographics controls (shown in columns (3), (7) and (11)). This specification includes the main determinants of time allocated to non-market activities but omits the control for wife's market work, which we included to ascertain whether the results for home time persist even taking into account time spent in the market.

The Effect of Source Country Characteristics on Immigrants

Table 3 shows the results of estimating Equation (2) for all female immigrants (Panel A) and all female immigrants with at least one child under 18 (Panel B). The estimates in Column 1 show that women from more gender equal countries do less total non-market work than women from less gender equal countries. This finding is robust to the addition of controls for children and spousal characteristics (Columns 2 and 3). When we further control for the respondent's market work hours (Column 4), the effect is still statistically significantly negative and is about 40% as large as Column 3's coefficient, which is based on the same model as Column 4's but excludes own market work hours. Thus, in an accounting sense, most (i.e. about 60%) of the impact of source country gender equality on total non-market work operates through its effect on market work hours. However, even controlling for market work, immigrant women migrating from more gender-equal countries do significantly less total non-market work. The models for housework and childcare also show significantly negative effects of the GGI, with the effect on housework about three times the effect on childcare (not controlling for market work). Moreover, the impacts of GGI on housework and on childcare are statistically significant in every case except for childcare when we control for market work.

To assess the magnitude of the effect of source country GGI, we compare Canada, whose GGI is at the 90th percentile of our sample's GGI distribution with a value of 0.72, to India, at the 10th percentile of our sample with a GGI of 0.60.¹⁰ Taking the sample of all married immigrant women and considering the models not controlling for market work time, when we change GGI from India's to Canada's level, the GGI coefficients in Table 3 imply decreases in total non-market work of 4.3-5.8 hours per week, or about 14-17% of the appropriate sample average. The effects on housework range from -4.4 to -4.6 hours per week (-18 to -19% of the sample

¹⁰ These percentiles are computed using individual immigrant women as data points, weighted by sampling weights. Thus, larger sending countries implicitly receive larger weight in the calculations.

average), while the impact on childcare ranges from -1.2 to -1.4 hours per week (-13 to -16% of the sample average). Thus, the magnitude of the effect of such a change in source country gender equality is noticeable.

The results are very similar when we restrict the sample to those with children (Panel B), but the magnitude of the coefficients is somewhat larger. As was the case for all married immigrant women (Table 3, Panel A), the effect of GGI on housework is much larger than its effect on childcare hours. The mean values for total non-market work, housework, and childcare are, not surprisingly, larger for those with children than for all women. Therefore the effect of a change from India's to Canada's GGI on total non-market work or on housework, not controlling for market work hours, relative to the mean is only slightly larger for immigrant women with children than for all immigrant women (17% vs 14-17% reduction for total non-market hours and 19-20% vs 14-17% reduction for housework). The impact on childcare is actually smaller or about the same as for all women (11-14% vs 13-16% reduction).

Overall, Table 3 shows statistically significant and moderately large negative effects of source country gender equality on immigrant women's total non-market hours, housework hours, and childcare hours. These findings suggest a further impact of source country culture on immigrant behavior beyond that observed in previous studies that examined outcomes such as fertility, female labor supply or son preference.

Table 4 presents analogous results for male immigrants. It shows statistically significantly positive effects of GGI on men's total non-market work, housework and childcare in most cases, although the coefficients for total non-market work and housework are smaller in absolute value than they are for women. That is, greater source country gender equality raises men's contributions to household production, but the increase is usually smaller than the

decrease in women's hours for total non-market work and housework. However, relative to men's smaller numbers of non-market work and housework hours, percentage effects tend to be larger in magnitude for men than women. Specifically, not controlling for wife's market work, a change from India's to Canada's GGI raises men's non-market work and housework by slightly larger percentages than the corresponding reductions for women. Moreover, the effect of source country gender equality is especially noteworthy for men's childcare: the effect of a change from India's to Canada's GGI values raises the childcare hours of men with children 1.3 to 1.4 hours per week, effects that are statistically significant and comparable in magnitude to the reductions for women of 1.3 to 1.7 hours per week. Of course, relative to the average childcare hours for men with children, this impact is a much larger percentage than it is for women (a 21-24% increase for men vs. an 11-14% decrease for women).

The results of Tables 3 and 4 indicate that greater source country gender equality lowers immigrant women's and raises immigrant men's total non-market work, housework and childcare. Combining these two effects of course implies that greater source country gender equality lowers the gender gap in non-market work as it also does for market labor supply (Blau, Kahn and Papps 2011). Table 5 shows the impact of combining the effects for men and women relative to the average gender gap in non-market work, housework and childcare. The results are based on models controlling for children and spouse characteristics. Panel II. A shows findings for all immigrants, while Panel II. B provides results for the sample of immigrants with children. In both cases the results are similar. Raising the GGI from India's to Canada's level lowers women's hours and raises men's hours and therefore lowers the gender gap in hours. The effects range from 35-40% among all immigrants and from 44-50% for immigrants with children, and each effect is highly statistically significant. In absolute terms, the effect of higher source

country GGI is larger for housework (highly statistically significant reductions in the gender gap of 4.8 to 6.0 hours per week) than for childcare (highly statistically significant reductions in the gender gap of 1.7 to 3.0 hours per week). However, relative to the average gender gap, the impacts are slightly larger for childcare than housework. Thus, a large increase in GGI for immigrants would have a large impact in reducing the gender gap in housework and childcare.

An additional set of results from Tables 3 and 4 concerns the changes in immigrant non-market time with additional time in the United States. Since the model includes own and spouse cohort dummy variables, we can interpret the YSM and partner YSM coefficients as measuring the impact of time in the United States relative to arrival, since we have independent cross-sections (Borjas 1985).¹¹ Table A1 shows the results of a simulation where we estimate the impact on non-market time for immigrant couples who migrated together 10, 20 or 30 years ago relative to what would be observed on arrival. For married immigrant women, there is negative assimilation for both total non-market work and housework—that is immigrant women’s time in these activities decreases with time in the US assimilating towards native levels. While the effects of time in the United States are significant only once (housework at 10 years in the United States among married women with children), they are consistently negative, as one might expect with assimilation toward US norms. The point estimates for women’s child care are small in magnitude and also not statistically significant. For immigrant men, there is some evidence of positive assimilation in total non-market work and child care, with several effects being statistically significant.

The specifications in Tables 3 and 4 do not include the GGI of an immigrant’s spouse (in the likely event that he/she is married to an immigrant). This means that the effects of own

¹¹ Of course, like other analyses using independent cross-sections, our interpretation of the YSM coefficients must be qualified by admitting the possibility of selective return migration (Lubotsky 2007).

GGI in these Tables can be seen as a reduced-form effect for the immigrant's GGI, taking the spouse's GGI as potentially endogenous. Nonetheless, it is potentially interesting to take account of the type of country the spouse comes from as well, beyond the controls for spouse immigrant and spouse second generation. In our samples, 78.5% of immigrant women and 81.7% of immigrant men had immigrant spouses, and of those immigrants with immigrant spouse, 85.3% of immigrant women and 86.5% of immigrant men were born in the same country as their spouse. Thus, it may be difficult to distinguish the effects of one's own GGI from that of spouse GGI for those married to immigrants.

In Table 6, we explore the impact of spouse's GGI in a way that is meaningful given the high correlation between own and spouse GGI. The table shows the results of models restricted to immigrants married to immigrants and where we include the children and spouse control variables (the specifications of columns 3, 7, and 11 of Tables 3 and 4). Because of the collinearity between own and spouse's GGI, we present the sum of the own and spouse GGI coefficients, as well as the individual GGI coefficients. The sum of one's own and one's spouse's GGI effects can be seen as the result of comparing an immigrant couple that migrates together from a high GGI country to an otherwise similar couple migrating from a low GGI country. Compared to the GGI coefficients in Tables 3 and 4 (where we did not control for spouse's GGI), the sums in Table 6 provide the effect of a stronger "treatment" of source country culture for a spouse from countries with the same GGI. Looking first at women, the sum of the own and spouse GGI effect is in each case slightly larger than the own GGI effect in Table 3, although in each case the sum in Table 6 is not significantly different from the individual GGI coefficient in Table 3.¹² For example, looking at all immigrant women, the sum of one's own

¹² The own GGI coefficients for women shown in Table 6 are much larger in magnitude than those for spouse's GGI for Total Non-Market Work and Housework, perhaps reflecting a stronger influence of one's own culture than one's

and one's spouse's GGI effects for total non-market work is -43.05 and is highly significant; the individual GGI effect in Table in Table 3 is -35.89 and is also highly significant. Thus, there is some suggestive evidence that being married to someone coming from the same country provides a stronger treatment of source country culture.

For immigrant men, there is some evidence of a stronger treatment effect for those married to immigrant women from the same country than for the average immigrant man, but the evidence is weaker than it is for women. On the one hand, the sums of own and spouse GGI effects for in Table 6 for all immigrant men married to immigrant women are very similar to the own GGI effects for all immigrant men in Table 4, suggesting no stronger treatment effect. On the other hand, the sums for immigrant men married to immigrant women with children in Table 6 are somewhat larger than the own GGI effects in Table 4, although not significantly so.¹³

Possible Selection Biases

The results presented so far suggest strong negative effects of source country gender equality on immigrant women's non-market time and positive effects on immigrant men's non-market time. We have interpreted such findings as indicating the role of culture as measured by the Gender Gap Index on immigrant behavior. However, it is possible that the GGI merely indicates what the immigrant men and women were doing before they migrated. For example, it is possible that the immigrant women coming from countries with a high GGI already were working more in the market and less in the home than otherwise, while men from such countries were already working more in the home than otherwise. After coming to the United States, such

spouse's culture; however, the effect of spouse's GGI is larger than the own GGI effect for childcare, perhaps reflecting the difficulty in distinguishing the two effects because of their collinearity.

¹³ For men, the relative effects of own and spouse GGI in Table 6 are unstable. For example among all immigrant men (married to immigrant women), the effect of spouse GGI on Total Non-Market Work is larger than the effect of own GGI; however, for married men with children, the reverse is true. The results for men give us further reason to be careful about making strong conclusions about the relative impacts of own and spouse GGI given the high level of collinearity.

immigrants might have just continued their established behavior patterns. Of course, one could still interpret such an outcome as reflecting culture to the extent that source country characteristics affected the migrants' attitudes and aspirations despite their US residence and exposure to the US environment and norms. However, Blau and Kahn (2015) found that immigrant women's labor supply in the United States was positively affected by source country female labor supply even after controlling for the immigrants' own labor force activity before migrating. This finding suggests a cultural influence beyond the immigrants' actual behavior before migrating.¹⁴

An issue related to the question of pre-migration time allocation is that of immigrant selectivity. It is possible that the migrant women coming from higher GGI countries are relatively more market and less home oriented than the average for their country, while immigrant men from high GGI countries may be more home-oriented than average men from their countries. If so, then the effects of GGI we have shown may be due to selection rather than a true effect of source country culture. We believe that these effects at least in part reflect the transmission of culture for several reasons. First, married women are relatively likely to be tied movers and thus less subject to direct selection biases. Second, in our earlier work (Blau and Kahn 2015), we found that even among immigrant women who did not work in the labor market before migrating, there was a large positive effect of source country female labor supply on labor supply in the United States. Women from high female labor supply countries (and therefore likely high GGI countries) who did not work before migrating are likely to be especially negatively selected for labor supply; yet source country female labor supply exerted a large positive impact on their labor supply in the US, implying a strong effect of culture.

¹⁴ Blau and Kahn (2015) used the New Immigrant Survey, which contains information on individual migrants' pre-migration labor force activity. The CPS does not include such information.

Second Generation Immigrants

While it is interesting to see the evidence that source country culture continues to influence immigrant behavior in the US, another question relates to the persistence of such effects, not only over the immigrant's time in the US but also across generations. We are able to address this question because the CPS provides information on parents' birthplace. We use mother's source country characteristics unless the mother is native or her source country characteristics are missing, in which case, we use the father's source country characteristics. Table 7 shows the results from estimating Equation (2) for female second generation immigrants. The effects of parent GGI on total non-market work and on housework are negative, as they were for immigrants' GGI in Table 3. However, the effects for second generation are much smaller than for immigrants and are not statistically significant for Total Non-Market Work, although they are significant in several instances for housework, particularly for women with children. Moreover, the effect of parent GGI on childcare for the second generation is sometimes positive and sometimes negative but is never statistically significant. Overall, for second generation women, the effects of parent's GGI are thus weaker than they are for immigrants, an outcome one might expect if women assimilate to US norms across generations.

The results for male second generation immigrants, shown in Table 8, also show some evidence of effects of parental GGI. For all second generation men, higher parent GGI has negative insignificant effects on total non-market time and housework. For those with children, however, the effects on non-market time are significantly positive and on housework they are insignificantly positive. Most noteworthy for second generation men are the positive effects of parent GGI on childcare, which are significant in several instances. These latter effects are even

larger than they are for immigrant men. These positive effects suggest cultural transmission across generations among men of source country gender roles.

VI. Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses

Alternative Children Controls Accounting for Sex of Child

As detailed above, our preferred specification includes controls for children. Children are measured using continuous variables counting the number of children in each of three age ranges: 0-5, 6-12, and 13-17. These controls do not account for the gender composition of the children. In a comprehensive review, Lundberg (2005) points to fairly robust findings that overall, fathers tend to spend more time with sons than daughters. In addition, recent research by Baker and Milligan (2016) finds that both mothers and fathers invest more time in teaching activities with girls, particularly young girls, while fathers spend more time in recreational and sports activities with boys as they age. This raises the question of whether our results for first and second generation immigrants would be affected were we to explicitly control for children's gender composition. To capture this age and gender differential, we use the same age ranges as our main specification but separate boys and girls (# girls 0-5, # boys 0-5, etc.). We test the sensitivity of our results to both alternative children controls that account for gender and the interaction of the Gender Gap Index with children's age and gender. The results, available on request, show that our estimates of the impact of GGI for immigrants and second generation women and men are very similar when we control for the gender of children. Moreover, we find that both first and second generation women spend similar amounts of time with girls to the time spent with boys, and the effects are also similar for men.

The Impact of Gender Norms About Relative Income

Another issue raised in recent research is the impact of the gender norm that women should not outearn their husbands. Specifically, Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) found evidence suggesting that US women who outearn their husbands pay a penalty for violating gender norms and, in the time allocation domain this results in their increasing the amount of housework that they do. The authors show that this finding is consistent both cross-sectionally and within couples. They also cite a large discontinuity in relative income at the point at which the wife would earn more than her husband, suggesting that women alter their labor market choices to avoid violating the norm of earning less than their husbands. We study the relevance of this phenomenon for first and second generation immigrants and in particular whether it is responsive to source country gender norms. While Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) studied the US population, their sample is dominated by third generation individuals. The logic of our study implies that the penalty first and second generation women face should be negatively affected by the extent of gender equality in their source country.

Their paper uses the same ATUS data that we do for the cross-sectional portion of their analysis. We were able to closely replicate their results using their sample restrictions. We then applied the same sample restrictions and variable definitions described in our data section, including using the same years of data as in our main analysis, to extend their analysis to answer our question. Otherwise, we adhere closely to their specification to maximize comparability. To test the influence of GGI on this norm, we used the following specification for individual i , in year y , and state s :

$$(3) Y_{iys} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{WifeEarnsMore} + \alpha_2 \text{RelativeIncome} + \alpha_3 \text{GGI} + \alpha_4 (\text{WifeEarnsMore} * \text{GGI}) + \alpha_5 X_i + g_y + h_s + v_i$$

where Y is total non-market work, defined as the sum of housework and primary childcare as above. For this analysis, we do not study housework and childcare separately, in order to match the specification in Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015). Our definition of total non-market work is the same as the one used by Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015). *RelativeIncome* equals the wife's earnings divided by the sum of husband and wife's earnings. *WifeEarnsMore* is a dummy variable equal to one if *RelativeIncome* is greater than 0.5. Our parameters of interest are the coefficients on *WifeEarnsMore* (α_1), *GGI* (α_2), and their interaction (α_4). All regressions include the log of wife's and husband's income, a cubic in the log of wife's and husband's income, log of the total household income, year and state fixed effects (g_y and h_s , respectively), the wife and the husband's race/ethnicity dummy variables (white omitted), a quadratic in wife and husband's age, indicator variables for the wife's and the husband's education groups (four categories), children controls, and indicator variables for whether only the husband is working, and whether only the wife is working.¹⁵ "Children controls" include indicator variables for whether the respondent has no children, whether the youngest child is 3 or younger, between 4 and 6, or older than 6.

In order to have the most parsimonious specification and to ease interpretation, in contrast to Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan (2015), we analyze males and females separately (rather than including a number of interactions with gender to allow for differences in male and female coefficients). The results for females are in Table 9 and the results for males are in Table 10. Column 1 of each table is equivalent to Column 4 of Table 6 in the Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) paper (their preferred specification), but is estimated separately for males and females. In

¹⁵ We follow Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) by assigning a value of zero to the log of income for those without positive incomes.

Column 2, we restrict the sample such that both spouses must have positive income. In Column 3, we add GGI as a control variable. Column 4 adds the interaction of GGI and WifeEarnsMore, and Column 5 reproduces Column 4 for the sample restricted to both spouses with positive income.

Panel A of Table 9 shows the results for all females regardless of immigrant status. Though smaller in magnitude than Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan (2015) (who found the women who earn more than their husband spend approximately 2.3-3 hours more per week on non-market work), we find that, *ceteris paribus*, wives who earn more than their husbands do 1.79-1.817 more hours per week of non-market work than wives who earn the same or less than their spouses. This finding, like Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan's (2015) is highly statistically significant at the 1 percent level. While the authors do not show the coefficient on RelativeIncome, we see there is a Beckerian response. The statistically significantly negative coefficient suggests that as the wife's income makes up a larger and larger portion of total household earnings, she spends fewer hours per week on non-market work. The significant positive coefficient on WifeEarnsMore suggests that when the wife crosses the threshold and earns more than her husband, she pays the "penalty" of violating the gender norm by spending more time on traditionally female, domestic tasks, counter to Becker's model. Panel B restricts the sample to native females, meaning 3rd or later generation American. The results here are similar to the all female sample, which is not surprising as natives make up the majority of that sample.

Panel C of Table 9 shows the results of Panel A's specifications for female immigrants as well as our extension accounting for the effect of GGI in the immigrants' source country. Columns 1 and 2 show significant coefficients on wifeEarnsMore of 5.0-5.3 additional hours of non-market per week. This suggests that immigrant wives who earn more than their husbands

compensate for violating the norm that their husband should be the primary breadwinner by doing even more additional non-market work than their native counterparts, and the immigrant-native differences in this response are highly statistically significant. The point estimates suggest that immigrants overall are more traditional than natives, as suggested by our results in Table 2, as well as other research (e.g., Blau, Kahn and Papps 2011). Alternatively, if there are relatively fewer immigrant wives earning more than their husbands, outliers may be driving this result. However, this alternative is not likely given that the proportion of immigrant wives who earn more than their husband is fairly similar to that of natives. Just over 28 percent of native wives earn more than their husbands, while about 19 percent of first generation wives and just over 27 percent of second generation wives earn more than their husbands (using sample weights).

Columns 3 through 5 show the results accounting for the impact of GGI on the phenomenon that wives who earn more than their husbands compensate by doing additional non-market work. Adding GGI as a control variable in Column 3 slightly lowers the coefficient on `wifeEarnsMore` but it remains highly significant. The coefficient on GGI is not statistically significant, but in the expected negative direction.¹⁶ In Columns 4 and 5, we show the key interaction effects between GGI and the indicator for whether the wife earns more. In both cases, the interaction effect has the “wrong” sign (i.e. it is positive, unlike the expectation that women coming from countries with more gender equality would pay a smaller penalty for earning more than their husbands) but is statistically insignificant. Thus, while columns 1 and 2

¹⁶ As may be seen in Table 9, Column 3, the impact of GGI on non-market work is insignificant, in contrast to the much larger, statistically significant effect of this variable in our main model shown in Table 3. This is likely due to the additional controls in Table 9; we have controlled for whether only husband is working, whether only the wife is working, relative income and whether the wife earns more than her husband, all of which are likely to be affected by GGI.

of Panels B and C suggest that immigrants are more traditional than natives, we do not find evidence that this behavior varies significantly with the degree of source country gender equality.

The second generation females in Panel D pay a small and insignificant penalty, 0.7 to 1.5 hours per week, for earning more than their husbands. Controlling for Parent GGI in Column 3 has little impact on the wifeEarnsMore coefficient, and Parent GGI is not significant itself, though it is in the expected direction. As was the case for immigrants, the interaction effects between (Parent) GGI and the indicator for whether the wife earns more are unexpectedly positive but again are not statistically significant.

Table 10 shows results for the impact of wife earning more for men's non-market work. The logic of the gender norms phenomenon suggests that husbands would do less non-market work when their wives earn more. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 show positive main effects of wife earning more on the non-market work of husbands for the population overall (Panel A), natives (Panel B), or immigrants (Panel C), contrary to expectations, although in most cases, these effects are not significant. For second generation men (Panel D), having a wife who earns more has the expected negative effect but it is also not statistically significant. The effect of wife's relative income is also statistically insignificant in each case and has an unstable sign.¹⁷

Columns 3-5 in Panel C of Table 10 show results for immigrants where we introduce the GGI. First, Column 3 shows a significant positive main effect for GGI, similar to its effect in Table 4. The main effect of the wife earning more remains insignificantly positive, similar to its effects when we do not control for GGI (Columns 1 and 2). This positive main effect is counter to the gender norms model in which men would be rewarded when their wives violate the gender

¹⁷ Since we have controlled for overall household income, one would expect the wife's relative income to raise husband's non-market work under a Becker-style model of the household. That is, in the regression, wife's relative income only has a substitution effect.

norm. However, Columns 4 and 5 suggest that the gender norm model may have relevance at low levels of source country gender equality. Specifically, they both show a significantly negative main effect of wives earning more and a significantly positive interaction effect between wives earning more and source country GGI. Evaluated at a low level of GGI (e.g. India's 0.60), the impact of the wife earning more is 2.77 to 3.01 fewer non-market work hours for husbands, although the effects are only marginally significant at the 10.2% (Column 5)-10.5% (Column 4) level on two tailed tests. In contrast, evaluated at Canada's high level of the GGI (0.72), wife earning more raises the husband's non-market time by 1.91 to 2.77 hours per week, with the latter effect significant at better than the 10% level.

Second generation males, shown in Panel D, consistently have a negative coefficient on wifeEarnsMore, and the effect is marginally significant in column 3 where we control for GGI but without the wifeEarnsMore*GGI interaction. Parent source country GGI has an unexpected negative sign but again is not significant. The interaction effects between the wife earning more and Parent GGI change sign and are not significant (Columns 4 and 5). Finally, the effect of wife's relative income is never significant and has an unstable sign.

Overall, we do not find evidence that the strength of the gender norm against wives earning more varies with source country gender equality when we study immigrant and second generation wives' non-market work. However, there is some suggestive evidence among immigrant men that men coming from a culture with a lower level of gender equality reap the benefit of their wives' violation of the gender norm by doing less housework.

VII. Conclusion

Despite increasing female labor force participation prior to the 1990s and decreases in the gender wage gap dating from the 1980s, the gender gap in non-market work remains large and

persistent. Despite women doing less and men doing more, women still spend twice as many hours on housework each week. This paper enters the literature at the intersection of the gender gap in housework and immigrant culture and assimilation. We use the American Time Use Survey to estimate the impact of source country culture on the gender division of household labor among US immigrants. One contribution of this paper is to study the impact of source country culture among men as well as women. Using the Gender Gap Index from the World Economic Forum, we find that gender norms in the source country do impact the division of household labor—affecting the time allocation decisions of men as well as women. Women from more egalitarian countries spend fewer hours per week on household labor than their counterparts from more traditional countries with three-quarters of this difference accounted for by differences in housework and only one quarter by differences in childcare. This resonates with previous literature that reduced non-market work is taken from household tasks rather than time with children. Men from more egalitarian countries spend more hours per week on non-market work, an effect that is relatively equally divided between housework and childcare.

For the immigrant generation, we also examine the extent to which the gender division of labor becomes closer to that of natives with additional time that immigrants spend in the US—that is, we examine immigrant assimilation to native patterns over time. For immigrant women, we find that their housework time does become more like that of natives over time (i.e., it decreases), although their time spent in child care appears to be relatively unresponsive to time in the United States. For immigrant men, the opposite pattern prevails. While there is some evidence of positive assimilation in total non-market work, the estimated effects are usually insignificant. However, we find evidence of positive assimilation in child care, effects which are large and usually statistically significant.

To further examine the impact of culture, as well as to gauge the extent of assimilation *across* immigrant generations (in contrast to assimilation of immigrants with time in the US), we look at second generation immigrants. While we find no significant difference by source country among second generation females suggesting complete assimilation to native norms for this group, second generation fathers from more egalitarian countries spend significantly more time, on non-market work with two-thirds of the difference coming from increased time on childcare. We also find that second generation men, especially fathers, are closer to natives than their first generation immigrant counterparts in regards to time devoted to household labor, suggesting greater assimilation.

Finally, we study the impact of source country culture on the strength of the traditional norm in which men are the primary breadwinners and should outearn women. Specifically, previous research has found that women who violate this norm pay a penalty by doing more housework (Bertrand, Kamenica and Pan 2015). While we find that norm holds on average in our data for both immigrants and native women, with a stronger effect for immigrants overall, its strength among immigrant women does not vary with source country gender equity. However, while we find no evidence of a significant effect of wife earns more on the non-market work of men overall or separately by immigrant status, immigrant men coming from a culture with a lower level of gender equality do appear to reap the benefit of their wives' violation of the gender norm by doing less housework.

Data Appendix

Appendix A. Dependent Variable Codes

Housework:

Code	Label	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
20000	Household Activities
20100	Housework
20101	Interior cleaning	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20102	Laundry	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20103	Sewing, repairing, and maintaining textiles	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20104	Storing interior household items, including food	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20199	Housework, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	.	X	X	X	X
20200	Food and Drink Preparation, Presentation, and Clean-up
20201	Food and drink preparation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20202	Food presentation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20203	Kitchen and food clean-up	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20299	Food and drink preparation, presentation, and clean-up, n.e.c.	X	.	.	X	X	X	.	X	X
20300	Interior Maintenance, Repair, and Decoration
20301	Interior arrangement, decoration, and repairs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20302	Building and repairing furniture	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20303	Heating and cooling	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20399	Interior maintenance, repair, and decoration, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20400	Exterior Maintenance, Repair, and Decoration
20401	Exterior cleaning	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20402	Exterior repair, improvements, and decoration	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

20499	Exterior maintenance, repair, and decoration, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20500	Lawn, Garden, and Houseplants
20501	Lawn, garden, and houseplant care	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20502	Ponds, pools, and hot tubs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20599	Lawn and garden, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	.	.	.	X	X	.	X	X	.	.
Code	Label	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
20600	Animals and Pets
20601	Care for animals and pets (not veterinary care) (2003-2007)	X	X	X	X	X
20602	Care for animals and pets (not veterinary care) (2008+)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20603	Walking, exercising, playing with animals (2008+)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20699	Pet and animal care, n.e.c.	X	X	X	.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20700	Vehicles
20701	Vehicle repair and maintenance (by self)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20799	Vehicles, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20800	Appliances, Tools, and Toys
20801	Appliance, tool, and toy set-up, repair, and maintenance (by self)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20899	Appliances and tools, n.e.c.	X	X	.	X	X	X	X	X	.	.	X	.	X	X
20900	Household Management
20901	Financial management	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20902	Household and personal organization and planning	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20903	Household and personal mail and messages (except e-mail)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

20904	Household and personal e-mail and messages	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20905	Home security	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
20999	Household management, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
29900	Household Activities, n.e.c.
29999	Household activities, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Primary Childcare:

Code	Label	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
30000	Caring for and Helping Household Members
30100	Caring for and Helping Household Children
30101	Physical care for household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30102	Reading to or with household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30103	Playing with household children, not sports	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30104	Arts and crafts with household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30105	Playing sports with household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30106	Talking with or listening to household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30107	Helping or teaching household children (not related to education) (2003)	X
30108	Organization and planning for household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

30109	Looking after household children (as a primary activity)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Code	Label	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
30110	Attending household children's events	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30111	Waiting for or with household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30112	Picking up or dropping off household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30199	Caring for and helping household children, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30200	Activities Related to Household Children's Education
30201	Homework (household children)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30202	Meetings and school conferences (household children)	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30203	Home schooling of household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30204	Waiting associated with household children's education	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	.	.	X	X
30299	Activities related to household child's education, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30300	Activities Related to Household Children's Health
30301	Providing medical care to household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

30302	Obtaining medical care for household children	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30303	Waiting associated with household children's health	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
30399	Activities related to household child's health, n.e.c.	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Variable Definitions

Variables from the ACS and CPS

Race and Ethnicity

- We control for race and ethnicity using a set of indicator variables for five mutually-exclusive categories: White non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, Hispanic, Asian non-Hispanic, and other non-Hispanic.
- Respondent is classified as Hispanic if the respondent reports being Hispanic or reports race as Spanish, Portuguese, Mexican, Puerto Rican, Latin American Indian, South American Indian, or Mexican American Indian.
- Respondent is classified as black non-Hispanic if the respondent reports being any detailed race that includes black and is not classified as Hispanic.
- Respondent is classified as Asian non-Hispanic if the respondent is not classified as Hispanic or black non-Hispanic and reports race as Asian or any mixed race including Asian.
- Respondent is classified as white non-Hispanic if the respondent is not classified as Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, or Asian non-Hispanic and reports race as white.
- Respondent is classified as other non-Hispanic if none of the above classifications apply.

First and Second Generation

- Respondents are classified as first generation if they report their birthplace as outside the fifty states or the District of Columbia.
- Respondents are classified as second generation if they were born in the fifty states or the District of Columbia and they report that either of their parents was born outside the United States.
 - Second generation immigrant respondents are assigned the source country characteristics of their mother unless their mother’s source country characteristics are missing or their mother is native. In that case, they are assigned their father’s source country characteristics. This means that even if both parents are foreign born, they are assigned to their mother’s source country unless she is from a country that does not have reported characteristics. Of second generation immigrants where both parents are foreign born, both parents are from the same source country for more than 85 percent (85.8 percent) of our sample.

- Natives are defined as those who were born in the US and with both parents born in the US. That is, natives may be considered third-plus generation immigrants.

Country Characteristics Variables

Total Fertility

- Total fertility data come from the World Bank, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN>. In the regressions with country characteristics, we include 2000-2007 country averages of total fertility.

GDP Per Capita

- Most GDP per capita data come from the World Bank, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD>. For Taiwan, data come from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook 2013, available at <http://ebook.dgbas.gov.tw/public/Data/3117141132EDNZ45LR.pdf>. GDP for Argentina, Burma and Syria is constructed from UN Stats data on GDP by Type of Expenditure at current prices and at constant 2005 prices in national currency units, available at <http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3A101%3BcurrID%3ANCU%3BpcFlag%3A0> and <http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=gdp&d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3a102%3bcurrID%3aNCU%3bpcFlag%3a0>, respectively. PPP conversion rates come from <http://icp.worldbank.org/icp/QueryResults.aspx?r=-1&ds=0&y=3&ws=1>. We use the World Bank methodology to convert to GDP per capita, PPP. In the regressions with country characteristics, we include the natural log of 2000-2007 country averages of GDP per capita.

Global Gender Gap Index

- The index of gender equality comes from the World Economic Forum's "The Global Gender Gap Report, 2012," available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2012.pdf. In the regressions with country characteristics, we include 2006-2007 country averages of the gender equity index.

Sample Selection

Unless otherwise noted, analyses with the American Community Survey (ACS) use data from the 2003-2015 waves. For the main analysis, we are looking specifically at first and second generation immigrants as defined above. When natives are included, they are defined as those who are born in the US with both parents born in the US. Regressions are weighted by household weights that are normalized to provide equal weighting for each sample year.

We restrict our sample to married individuals in heterosexual partnerships where both the respondent and their spouse are between the ages of 18 and 64. While we are not able to observe the time allocation of the respondent and their partner, by enforcing these restrictions, we can estimate for the population how married men and women divide household labor. All analyses were repeated including those in heterosexual partnerships but not married. Our results are

similar when partnered individuals are included (results shown in online appendix). We also exclude observations recorded on holidays, natives born abroad, and immigrants whose year of immigration is missing.

In analyses that include country characteristics, we exclude respondents who report being born in US territories or country aggregates. We also exclude respondents born in countries with low frequency and a high number of missing values in the data or countries with missing data on labor force participation. These countries include Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Bermuda, Micronesia, St. Kitts & Nevis, Marshall Islands, and Dominica.

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Table 1: Total Non-Market Work, Housework, and Childcare by Gender by Generation

I.. All Men and Women

A. Women	All	Natives with Native Parents	Immig	2nd Gen
Non-Market Work	24.77	23.38	30.62	25.74
Housework	18.24	17.34	22.38	17.89
Childcare	6.52	6.03	8.24	7.85
N	36,776	28,460	6,138	2,178
B. Men	All	Natives with Native Parents	Immig	2nd Gen
Non-Market Work	13.57	13.93	11.70	14.51
Housework	10.17	10.67	7.85	10.40
Childcare	3.40	3.25	3.85	4.12
N	31,728	24,781	5,157	1,790
C. Women-Men	All	Natives with Native Parents	Immig	2nd Gen
Non-Market Work	11.2	9.45	18.92	11.23
Housework	8.07	6.67	14.53	7.49
Childcare	3.12	2.78	4.39	3.73

II. Men and Women with Children Under Age 18

A. Women	All	Natives with Native Parents	Immig	2nd Gen
Non-Market Work	31.42	30.01	35.95	31.12
Housework	18.87	17.47	23.67	17.58
Childcare	12.55	12.55	12.27	13.53
N	23,745	17,781	4,467	1,497
B. Men	All	Natives with Native Parents	Immig	2nd Gen
Non-Market Work	15.59	16.35	12.94	16.47
Housework	9.29	9.86	7.47	9.40
Childcare	6.30	6.50	5.47	7.07
N	20,995	15,868	3,864	1,223
C. Women-Men	All	Natives with Native Parents	Immig	2nd Gen
Non-Market Work	15.83	13.66	23.01	14.65
Housework	9.58	7.61	16.2	8.18
Childcare	6.25	6.05	6.8	6.46

Source: ATUS waves 2003-2015. Variables are measured in hours per week. The sample includes those aged 18-64 with spouse present. Observations that fall on public holidays excluded. Data are weighted using CPS sampling weights adjusted so that each year receives the same weight.

Table 2. Determinants of Non-Market Work Time Across Generations

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Total Non-Market Work	Total Non-Market Work	Total Non-Market Work	Total Non-Market Work	Housework	Housework	Housework	Housework	Childcare	Childcare	Childcare	Childcare
<i>Panel A: All Females</i>												
Immigrant	4.890*** (0.424)	4.247*** (0.397)	3.917*** (0.405)	2.959*** (0.387)	4.073*** (0.341)	3.907*** (0.339)	3.506*** (0.346)	2.808*** (0.335)	0.817*** (0.225)	0.340* (0.192)	0.411** (0.195)	0.151 (0.193)
Second Gen Immigrant	1.114** (0.489)	0.775* (0.457)	0.579 (0.458)	0.646 (0.438)	0.634 (0.393)	0.583 (0.390)	0.442 (0.392)	0.491 (0.379)	0.480* (0.259)	0.192 (0.221)	0.137 (0.221)	0.155 (0.218)
Observations	37,043	37,043	36,776	36,776	37,043	37,043	36,776	36,776	37,043	37,043	36,776	36,776
R-squared	0.057	0.176	0.177	0.250	0.053	0.064	0.067	0.126	0.176	0.401	0.402	0.419
Mean	24.77	24.77	24.77	24.77	18.24	18.24	18.24	18.24	6.533	6.533	6.521	6.521
<i>Panel B: Females with at least one child under 18</i>												
Immigrant	5.938*** (0.525)	5.514*** (0.506)	5.156*** (0.518)	3.328*** (0.487)	4.710*** (0.389)	4.731*** (0.387)	4.195*** (0.397)	3.082*** (0.382)	1.228*** (0.324)	0.783*** (0.304)	0.961*** (0.310)	0.247 (0.303)
Second Gen Immigrant	1.059* (0.615)	0.725 (0.592)	0.410 (0.594)	0.505 (0.557)	0.228 (0.455)	0.204 (0.453)	-0.0297 (0.455)	0.0282 (0.437)	0.831** (0.379)	0.521 (0.355)	0.439 (0.356)	0.477 (0.347)
Observations	23,905	23,905	23,745	23,745	23,905	23,905	23,745	23,745	23,905	23,905	23,745	23,745
R-squared	0.051	0.123	0.126	0.231	0.066	0.077	0.080	0.150	0.134	0.239	0.243	0.282
Mean	31.43	31.43	31.42	31.42	18.86	18.86	18.87	18.87	12.57	12.57	12.55	12.55
<i>Panel C: All Males</i>												
Immigrant	-1.890*** (0.366)	-2.278*** (0.361)	-2.033*** (0.368)	-1.834*** (0.368)	-1.917*** (0.317)	-1.915*** (0.317)	-1.758*** (0.323)	-1.598*** (0.323)	0.0277 (0.175)	-0.363** (0.164)	-0.276* (0.167)	-0.236 (0.167)
Second Gen Immigrant	0.299 (0.441)	0.0641 (0.435)	-0.0240 (0.436)	-0.00321 (0.435)	-0.0970 (0.382)	-0.0961 (0.382)	-0.172 (0.383)	-0.156 (0.382)	0.396* (0.211)	0.160 (0.197)	0.148 (0.198)	0.153 (0.198)
Observations	31,880	31,880	31,728	31,728	31,880	31,880	31,728	31,728	31,880	31,880	31,728	31,728
R-squared	0.045	0.073	0.074	0.078	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.063	0.085	0.203	0.207	0.208
Mean	13.57	13.57	13.57	13.57	10.17	10.17	10.17	10.17	3.397	3.397	3.404	3.404
<i>Panel D: Males with at least one child under 18</i>												
Immigrant	-1.621*** (0.445)	-2.065*** (0.441)	-1.757*** (0.450)	-1.426*** (0.449)	-1.639*** (0.347)	-1.624*** (0.348)	-1.520*** (0.356)	-1.299*** (0.355)	0.0187 (0.263)	-0.441* (0.257)	-0.237 (0.261)	-0.127 (0.261)
Second Gen Immigrant	0.607 (0.548)	0.405 (0.543)	0.248 (0.544)	0.275 (0.542)	0.0268 (0.429)	0.0232 (0.429)	-0.0988 (0.430)	-0.0822 (0.428)	0.580* (0.325)	0.382 (0.316)	0.347 (0.316)	0.357 (0.315)
Observations	21,012	21,012	20,955	20,955	21,012	21,012	20,955	20,955	21,012	21,012	20,955	20,955
R-squared	0.062	0.079	0.082	0.090	0.070	0.071	0.071	0.076	0.060	0.111	0.118	0.120
Mean	15.58	15.58	15.59	15.59	9.290	9.290	9.293	9.293	6.288	6.288	6.295	6.295
Children		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Spouse Demographic Controls			X	X			X	X			X	X
Wife's Market Work				X				X				X

Notes: ATUS waves 2003-2015 have been used to produce this table. The unit of observation is an ATUS respondent, and standard errors are in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, (**) $p < 0.05$, (*) $p < 0.1$). The dependent variable is measured in hours per week. The sample include all female respondents aged 18-64 who are married with spouse present. Observations that fall on public holidays have been excluded. All regressions include own demographic controls and fixed effects for region, survey day, month, and year. Includes individuals who work zero hours. Along with "Wife Market Work" a dummy variable indicating if wife's hours vary is included for males. "Demographic Controls" are race, age, and education. Children are controlled using continuous variables for the number of children in each age range (0-5, 6-12, and 13-17). Regressions were weighted using CPS sampling weights adjusted so that each year receives the same total weight.

Table 3. Effect of Source Characteristics for Female Immigrants

VARIABLES	(1) Total Non- Market Work	(2) Total Non- Market Work	(3) Total Non- Market Work	(4) Total Non- Market Work	(5) Housework	(6) Housework	(7) Housework	(8) Housework	(9) Childcare	(10) Childcare	(11) Childcare	(12) Childcare
<i>Panel A: All Females</i>												
Gender Gap Index (GGI)	-44.83*** (10.92)	-41.24*** (10.14)	-35.89*** (9.670)	-14.16* (7.635)	-33.06*** (7.944)	-30.90*** (7.558)	-25.95*** (7.898)	-10.80 (6.724)	-11.77** (4.982)	-10.34** (4.800)	-9.945** (4.465)	-3.359 (3.944)
GDP per Capita	0.000264*** (7.52e-05)	0.000199*** (6.45e-05)	0.000207*** (6.37e-05)	0.000127*** (4.79e-05)	0.000188*** (5.11e-05)	0.000169*** (4.77e-05)	0.000184*** (4.87e-05)	0.000129*** (3.86e-05)	7.62e-05** (3.67e-05)	2.96e-05 (2.79e-05)	2.26e-05 (2.51e-05)	-1.60e-06 (2.17e-05)
Source Country Fertility	1.801*** (0.546)	1.264** (0.541)	1.390** (0.538)	0.862* (0.455)	1.754*** (0.454)	1.583*** (0.442)	1.686*** (0.441)	1.318*** (0.375)	0.0466 (0.289)	-0.319 (0.253)	-0.296 (0.246)	-0.456* (0.243)
Observations	5,689	5,689	5,629	5,629	5,689	5,689	5,629	5,629	5,689	5,689	5,629	5,629
R-squared	0.098	0.196	0.203	0.311	0.096	0.108	0.118	0.202	0.160	0.347	0.350	0.381
Mean	31.07	31.07	31.18	31.18	22.73	22.73	22.81	22.81	8.340	8.340	8.367	8.367
<i>Panel B: Females with Kids</i>												
GGI	-49.49*** (9.984)	-50.53*** (9.533)	-50.55*** (9.819)	-21.59** (8.239)	-38.72*** (10.72)	-37.48*** (10.21)	-36.40*** (9.840)	-18.89** (8.540)	-10.77 (7.656)	-13.06* (7.382)	-14.15* (7.501)	-2.701 (7.279)
GDP per Capita	0.000330*** (7.26e-05)	0.000272*** (6.91e-05)	0.000273*** (6.99e-05)	0.000110* (5.57e-05)	0.000224*** (4.46e-05)	0.000207*** (4.41e-05)	0.000222*** (4.52e-05)	0.000123*** (3.68e-05)	0.000106** (4.93e-05)	6.51e-05 (4.30e-05)	5.18e-05 (4.00e-05)	-1.29e-05 (3.69e-05)
Source Country Fertility	0.919 (0.818)	0.614 (0.814)	0.726 (0.796)	0.140 (0.723)	1.249* (0.672)	1.147* (0.671)	1.200* (0.642)	0.846 (0.593)	-0.330 (0.487)	-0.533 (0.413)	-0.474 (0.418)	-0.706* (0.411)
Observations	4,178	4,178	4,140	4,140	4,178	4,178	4,140	4,140	4,178	4,178	4,140	4,140
R-squared	0.094	0.144	0.148	0.276	0.106	0.110	0.119	0.197	0.160	0.256	0.259	0.312
Mean	36.24	36.24	36.31	36.31	23.99	23.99	24.03	24.03	12.25	12.25	12.28	12.28
Children		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Partner Characteristics			X	X			X	X			X	X
Market Work				X				X				X

Notes: ATUS waves 2003-2015 have been used to produce this table. The unit of observation is an ATUS respondent, and standard errors are in parentheses (***) $p < 0.01$, (**) $p < 0.05$, (*) $p < 0.1$). The dependent variable is measured in hours per week. The sample include all female, immigrant respondents aged 18-64 who are married with spouse present. Observations that fall on public holidays have been excluded. Regressions also control for respondent's age and age squared, years since migration and years since migration squared, education, race, region, survey day, month, year, and migration cohort. Includes individuals who work zero hours. Partner characteristics are partner age and age squared, years since migration and years since migration squared, migration cohort, education, race, and dummy variables for immigrant partner and second generation immigrant partner. Regressions were weighted using CPS sampling weights adjusted so that each year receives the same total weight. Robust standard errors clustered at the birthplace level.

Table 4. Effect of Source Characteristics for Male Immigrants

VARIABLES	(1) Total Non- Market Work	(2) Total Non- Market Work	(3) Total Non- Market Work	(4) Total Non- Market Work	(5) Housework	(6) Housework	(7) Housework	(8) Housework	(9) Childcare	(10) Childcare	(11) Childcare	(12) Childcare
<i>Panel A: All Males</i>												
Gender Gap Index (GGI)	18.78** (9.209)	20.27** (9.313)	18.43** (9.132)	13.45 (8.705)	15.90* (9.438)	15.93* (9.311)	14.14 (9.022)	10.16 (8.626)	2.881 (2.898)	4.332* (2.557)	4.288 (2.846)	3.290 (2.776)
GDP per Capita	5.14e-05 (4.51e-05)	2.77e-05 (4.59e-05)	9.51e-06 (4.63e-05)	2.13e-05 (4.55e-05)	3.10e-06 (4.08e-05)	3.71e-06 (3.99e-05)	-1.84e-05 (4.04e-05)	-8.92e-06 (3.98e-05)	4.83e-05 (3.15e-05)	2.40e-05 (2.78e-05)	2.79e-05 (2.79e-05)	3.02e-05 (2.77e-05)
Source Country Fertility	0.562 (0.532)	0.327 (0.564)	0.288 (0.534)	0.152 (0.514)	0.347 (0.526)	0.354 (0.533)	0.245 (0.518)	0.136 (0.499)	0.215 (0.191)	-0.0271 (0.196)	0.0433 (0.194)	0.0159 (0.197)
Observations	4,784	4,784	4,744	4,744	4,784	4,784	4,744	4,744	4,784	4,784	4,744	4,744
R-squared	0.057	0.076	0.081	0.090	0.066	0.066	0.071	0.080	0.067	0.142	0.149	0.150
Mean	11.82	11.82	11.84	11.84	7.989	7.989	7.986	7.986	3.826	3.826	3.852	3.852
<i>Panel B: Males with Kids</i>												
GGI	26.34*** (8.489)	25.33*** (8.663)	24.58*** (9.183)	20.49** (9.216)	14.28* (8.242)	14.38* (8.042)	13.90 (8.360)	10.83 (8.426)	12.06*** (4.059)	10.95*** (3.644)	10.69*** (3.951)	9.651** (3.973)
GDP per Capita	6.20e-05 (5.95e-05)	4.96e-05 (6.05e-05)	3.72e-05 (6.36e-05)	4.97e-05 (6.38e-05)	2.21e-06 (4.26e-05)	-2.26e-07 (4.20e-05)	-1.32e-05 (4.49e-05)	-3.84e-06 (4.61e-05)	5.98e-05 (4.14e-05)	4.98e-05 (3.89e-05)	5.04e-05 (3.87e-05)	5.36e-05 (3.84e-05)
Source Country Fertility	-0.141 (0.551)	-0.305 (0.560)	-0.247 (0.543)	-0.363 (0.529)	-0.384 (0.455)	-0.411 (0.460)	-0.431 (0.477)	-0.518 (0.468)	0.243 (0.277)	0.106 (0.271)	0.184 (0.266)	0.155 (0.268)
Observations	3,580	3,580	3,567	3,567	3,580	3,580	3,567	3,567	3,580	3,580	3,567	3,567
R-squared	0.070	0.080	0.086	0.095	0.069	0.070	0.074	0.083	0.079	0.109	0.123	0.124
Mean	12.99	12.99	13	13	7.578	7.578	7.574	7.574	5.416	5.416	5.430	5.430
Children		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Partner Characteristics			X	X			X	X			X	X
Wife's Market Work				X				X				X

Notes: ATUS waves 2003-2015 have been used to produce this table. The unit of observation is an ATUS respondent, and standard errors are in parentheses (** p<0.01, * p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent variable is measured in hours per week. The sample include all male, immigrant respondents aged 18-64 who are married with spouse present. Observations that fall on public holidays have been excluded. Regressions also control for respondent's age and age squared, years since migration and years since migration squared, education, race, region, survey day, month, year, and migration cohort. Includes individuals who work zero hours. Partner characteristics are partner age and age squared, years since migration and years since migration squared, migration cohort, education, race, and dummy variables for immigrant partner and second generation immigrant partner. "Wife's Market Work" includes spouse hours and a dummy variable equal to one if spouse's hours vary. Regressions were weighted using CPS sampling weights adjusted so that each year receives the same total weight. Robust standard errors clustered at the birthplace level.

Table 5: Effect of an Increase in Global Gender Gap Index from India's to Canada's Value on the Gender Gap in Non-Market Work, Immigrants

I. Mean Values

	A. All Immigrants, Spec with Children, Spouse Characteristics			B. Immigrants with Children, Spec with Children, Spouse Characteristics			
	Women	Men	W-M	Women	Men	W-M	
Total Nonmkt Work	31.65	13.69	17.96	Total Nonmkt Work	35.23	14.8	20.43
Housework	22.76	9.095	13.665	Housework	23.3	8.801	14.499
CC	8.885	4.599	4.286	CC	11.93	6.004	5.926

II. Effect of a 0.12 change in GGI (India to Canada), Spec with Children, Spouse Chars

	A. All Immigrants				B. Immigrants with Children				
	Women	Men	W-M	(W-M)/ Mean Gap	Women	Men	W-M	(W-M)/ Mean Gap	
Total Nonmkt Work	-4.307 (1.160)	2.212 (1.096)	-6.518 (1.596)	-0.363 (0.089)	Nonmkt Work	-6.066 (1.178)	2.950 (1.102)	-9.016 (1.613)	-0.441 (0.079)
Housework	-3.114 (0.948)	1.697 (1.083)	-4.811 (1.439)	-0.352 (0.105)	Housework	-4.368 (1.181)	1.668 (1.003)	-6.036 (1.549)	-0.416 (0.107)
CC	-1.193 (0.536)	0.515 (0.342)	-1.708 (0.635)	-0.398 (0.148)	CC	-1.698 (0.900)	1.283 (0.474)	-2.981 (1.017)	-0.503 (0.172)

Note: Effects are based on models in Tables 3 and 4, Columns 3,7 and 11. All effects on the female-male difference and the female-male difference relative to the mean gap are significant at better than the 1% level.

Table 6: Effect of Own and Partner GGI for Immigrants with Immigrant Partners

VARIABLES	All Females			Females with Children			All Males			Males with Children		
	(1) Total Non- Market Work	(2) Housework	(3) Childcare	(4) Total Non- Market Work	(5) Housework	(6) Childcare	(7) Total Non- Market Work	(8) Housework	(9) Childcare	(10) Total Non- Market Work	(11) Housework	(12) Childcare
Own GGI	-42.74** (18.89)	-43.46** (17.82)	0.724 (9.427)	-71.90** (30.54)	-67.96** (32.28)	-3.941 (16.56)	1.598 (15.77)	6.846 (10.97)	-5.248 (8.444)	24.44 (26.47)	26.18 (19.66)	-1.731 (15.77)
Partner GGI	-0.314 (17.81)	13.90 (14.62)	-14.22 (10.45)	14.28 (29.23)	29.09 (28.47)	-14.80 (16.96)	15.94 (14.22)	6.382 (10.64)	9.562 (8.669)	7.120 (25.13)	-6.475 (17.94)	13.60 (15.94)
Sum Own and Partner GGI	-43.05*** (9.74)	-29.56*** (7.79)	-13.49** (4.76)	-57.61*** (10.47)	-38.87*** (9.22)	-18.74** (6.83)	17.54* (9.77)	13.23 (9.65)	4.31 (3.47)	31.56*** (9.46)	19.70** (8.65)	11.86** (4.60)
Observations	4,307	4,307	4,307	3,231	3,231	3,231	3,778	3,778	3,778	2,905	2,905	2,905
R-squared	0.202	0.122	0.335	0.165	0.127	0.262	0.088	0.074	0.163	0.099	0.080	0.153
Mean	32.20	23.76	8.441	36.59	24.72	11.87	11.47	7.676	3.793	12.59	7.457	5.135

Notes: ATUS waves 2003-2015 have been used to produce this table. The unit of observation is an ATUS respondent, and standard errors are in parentheses (** p<0.01, * p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent variable is measured in hours per week. The sample include all immigrant respondents aged 18-64 who are married to an immigrant with spouse present. Observations that fall on public holidays have been excluded. Regressions also control for respondent's and partner's age and age squared, years since migration and years since migration squared, education, race, region, survey day, month, year, and migration cohort as well as dummy variables for immigrant partner and second generation immigrant partner. Partner GEI is own GEI if partner is an immigrant and partner's parents GEI is partner is second generation. Includes individuals who work zero hours. Regressions were weighted using CPS sampling weights adjusted so that each year receives the same total weight. Robust standard errors clustered at the birthplace level.

Table 7: GGI for Female Second Gen Immigrants

VARIABLES	(1) Total Non- Market Work	(2) Total Non- Market Work	(3) Total Non- Market Work	(4) Total Non- Market Work	(5) Housework	(6) Housework	(7) Housework	(8) Housework	(9) Childcare	(10) Childcare	(11) Childcare	(12) Childcare
<i>Panel A: All Females</i>												
Parent Gender Gap Index (GGI)	-8.608 (12.84)	-5.610 (11.35)	-11.58 (11.36)	-10.14 (10.32)	-10.28 (8.415)	-9.865 (9.437)	-14.65* (8.116)	-13.56* (7.566)	1.671 (7.604)	4.255 (5.947)	3.073 (6.433)	3.424 (6.232)
Parent GDP per Capita	6.28e-05 (5.68e-05)	7.36e-05 (5.22e-05)	9.48e-05* (5.67e-05)	7.24e-05 (5.00e-05)	0.000132*** (4.63e-05)	0.000131*** (4.35e-05)	0.000144*** (4.96e-05)	0.000127*** (4.36e-05)	-6.94e-05** (2.83e-05)	-5.70e-05** (2.74e-05)	-4.92e-05** (2.42e-05)	-5.46e-05** (2.43e-05)
Parent Source Country Fertility	-0.510 (1.085)	-0.840 (0.864)	-0.440 (1.142)	-0.587 (0.928)	0.0450 (0.892)	-0.0251 (0.718)	0.335 (0.927)	0.224 (0.770)	-0.555 (0.483)	-0.815* (0.453)	-0.775* (0.454)	-0.811* (0.428)
Observations	1,875	1,875	1,857	1,857	1,875	1,875	1,857	1,857	1,875	1,875	1,857	1,857
R-squared	0.062	0.178	0.190	0.286	0.093	0.098	0.119	0.206	0.166	0.396	0.401	0.416
Mean	26.09	26.09	25.91	25.91	18.14	18.14	18.06	18.06	7.948	7.948	7.846	7.846
<i>Panel B: Females with Kids</i>												
Parent GGI	-20.94 (14.25)	-12.49 (14.21)	-18.15 (11.69)	-15.85 (11.55)	-13.34** (6.409)	-12.62 (10.61)	-17.39** (7.145)	-15.88** (6.714)	-7.597 (12.20)	0.138 (9.036)	-0.760 (10.42)	0.0328 (10.52)
Parent GDP per Capita	-6.38e-06 (6.29e-05)	-3.88e-06 (6.75e-05)	4.08e-05 (5.68e-05)	2.44e-05 (5.44e-05)	7.60e-05* (4.46e-05)	6.67e-05 (5.04e-05)	9.54e-05* (4.87e-05)	8.47e-05* (4.65e-05)	-8.24e-05* (4.65e-05)	-7.06e-05 (4.29e-05)	-5.46e-05 (4.05e-05)	-6.02e-05 (4.07e-05)
Parent Source Country Fertility	-2.084 (1.427)	-1.759* (1.067)	-1.331 (1.292)	-1.383 (1.113)	-0.382 (0.921)	-0.441 (0.796)	-0.0259 (0.904)	-0.0596 (0.785)	-1.702* (0.877)	-1.317* (0.679)	-1.305* (0.773)	-1.323* (0.744)
Observations	1,311	1,311	1,296	1,296	1,311	1,311	1,296	1,296	1,311	1,311	1,296	1,296
R-squared	0.077	0.137	0.156	0.260	0.091	0.099	0.120	0.205	0.148	0.248	0.264	0.291
Mean	31.45	31.45	31.20	31.20	17.99	17.99	17.87	17.87	13.46	13.46	13.34	13.34
Children		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Partner Characteristics			X	X			X	X			X	X
Market Work				X				X				X

Notes: ATUS waves 2003-2015 have been used to produce this table. The unit of observation is an ATUS respondent, and standard errors are in parentheses (** p<0.01, * p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent variable is measured in hours per week. The sample include all male, second generation immigrant respondents aged 18-64 who are married with spouse present. Observations that fall on public holidays have been excluded. Regressions also control for respondent's age and age squared, education, race, region, survey day, month, and year. Sample includes individuals who work zero hours. Partner characteristics are partner age and age squared, years since migration and years since migration squared, migration cohort, education, race, and dummy variables for immigrant partner and second generation immigrant partner. "Wife's Market Work" includes spouse hours and a dummy variable equal to one if spouse's hours vary. Regressions were weighted using CPS sampling weights adjusted so that each year receives the same total weight. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent's birthplace level.

Table 8: GGI for Male Second Gen Immigrants

VARIABLES	(1) Total Non- Market Work	(2) Total Non- Market Work	(3) Total Non- Market Work	(4) Total Non- Market Work	(5) Housework	(6) Housework	(7) Housework	(8) Housework	(9) Childcare	(10) Childcare	(11) Childcare	(12) Childcare
<i>Panel A: All Males</i>												
Parent Gender Gap Index (GGI)	-4.317 (9.198)	-2.199 (9.298)	-5.272 (8.672)	-4.722 (9.100)	-13.56 (9.448)	-13.58 (9.550)	-14.39 (8.826)	-13.84 (8.998)	9.247 (5.958)	11.38** (5.097)	9.121* (5.157)	9.117* (5.187)
Parent GDP per Capita	0.000111** (4.52e-05)	0.000110*** (4.14e-05)	0.000107** (4.14e-05)	0.000106** (4.17e-05)	0.000126*** (3.60e-05)	0.000127*** (3.63e-05)	0.000123*** (3.49e-05)	0.000121*** (3.48e-05)	-1.50e-05 (2.28e-05)	-1.63e-05 (1.64e-05)	-1.54e-05 (1.74e-05)	-1.54e-05 (1.74e-05)
Parent Source Country Fertility	0.732 (0.716)	0.620 (0.658)	0.854 (0.663)	0.936 (0.658)	0.290 (0.666)	0.288 (0.659)	0.504 (0.606)	0.586 (0.592)	0.442 (0.457)	0.332 (0.367)	0.350 (0.370)	0.350 (0.376)
Observations	1,535	1,535	1,532	1,532	1,535	1,535	1,532	1,532	1,535	1,535	1,532	1,532
R-squared	0.074	0.115	0.136	0.138	0.091	0.092	0.117	0.120	0.142	0.286	0.305	0.305
Mean	14.43	14.43	14.38	14.38	10.45	10.45	10.40	10.40	3.981	3.981	3.986	3.986
<i>Panel B: Males with Kids</i>												
Parent GGI	25.38*** (9.558)	28.34*** (9.936)	23.84** (9.616)	23.79** (9.896)	7.364 (8.959)	7.302 (9.210)	6.682 (10.51)	6.842 (9.830)	18.02* (9.793)	21.04** (10.04)	17.16 (10.40)	16.95 (10.49)
Parent GDP per Capita	4.18e-05 (4.69e-05)	4.25e-05 (4.79e-05)	5.88e-05 (4.80e-05)	5.63e-05 (4.80e-05)	6.71e-05 (4.22e-05)	6.96e-05 (4.26e-05)	7.61e-05* (4.31e-05)	7.33e-05* (4.11e-05)	-2.53e-05 (3.20e-05)	-2.71e-05 (2.88e-05)	-1.73e-05 (2.99e-05)	-1.70e-05 (3.02e-05)
Parent Source Country Fertility	1.648** (0.803)	1.605** (0.716)	2.073*** (0.767)	2.150*** (0.780)	0.946 (0.808)	0.957 (0.791)	1.344* (0.798)	1.419* (0.765)	0.702 (0.725)	0.648 (0.663)	0.728 (0.681)	0.731 (0.693)
Observations	1,043	1,043	1,041	1,041	1,043	1,043	1,041	1,041	1,043	1,043	1,041	1,041
R-squared	0.107	0.139	0.176	0.187	0.108	0.110	0.155	0.170	0.126	0.201	0.231	0.232
Mean	16.37	16.37	16.31	16.31	9.508	9.508	9.434	9.434	6.863	6.863	6.875	6.875
Children		X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X
Partner Characteristics			X	X			X	X			X	X
Wife's Market Work				X				X				X

Notes: ATUS waves 2003-2015 have been used to produce this table. The unit of observation is an ATUS respondent, and standard errors are in parentheses (** p<0.01, * p<0.05, * p<0.1). The dependent variable is measured in hours per week. The sample include all male, second generation immigrant respondents aged 18-64 who are married with spouse present. Observations that fall on public holidays have been excluded. Regressions also control for respondent's age and age squared, education, race, region, survey day, month, and year. Sample includes individuals who work zero hours. Partner characteristics are partner age and age squared, years since migration and years since migration squared, migration cohort, education, race, and dummy variables for immigrant partner and second generation immigrant partner. "Wife's Market Work" includes spouse hours and a dummy variable equal to one if spouse's hours vary. Regressions were weighted using CPS sampling weights adjusted so that each year receives the same total weight. Robust standard errors clustered at the parent's birthplace level.

Table 9. Effect of Wife Earning More Than Husband on Total Nonmarket Time: Females

Panel A: All Females	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
wifeEarnsMore	1.790*** (0.496)	1.817*** (0.484)			
Relative income	-7.703*** (1.873)	-11.39** (5.415)			
Constant	2.446 (5.145)	15.57** (6.260)			
Observations	25,145	15,386			
R-squared	0.287	0.195			
Mean	27.22	23.58			
Panel B: Native Females					
wifeEarnsMore	1.398** (0.547)	1.445*** (0.541)			
Relative income	-5.370** (2.134)	-6.920 (6.057)			
Constant	2.503 (5.971)	9.664 (7.140)			
Observations	19,111	12,204			
R-squared	0.273	0.202			
Mean	26.30	23.34			
Panel C: Immigrant Females					
wifeEarnsMore	4.970*** (1.159)	5.269*** (1.527)	4.710*** (1.202)	0.0946 (11.43)	-5.794 (8.943)
Relative income	-18.12*** (6.024)	-52.14** (22.68)	-18.58*** (5.707)	-18.57*** (5.720)	-54.64** (22.90)
GEI			-6.526 (9.608)	-8.341 (11.45)	-16.11 (12.29)
wifeEarnsMore x GEI				6.893 (17.07)	16.16 (12.66)
Constant	-3.630 (11.44)	30.70* (16.78)	7.493 (11.27)	8.823 (11.11)	50.17*** (13.47)
Observations	4,515	2,217	4,171	4,171	2,026
R-squared	0.318	0.207	0.317	0.318	0.201
Mean	31.07	24.53	31.51	31.51	24.76
Panel D: Second Generation Females					
wifeEarnsMore	-0.678 (2.306)	-1.533 (2.364)	-0.454 (2.923)	-25.81* (15.04)	-28.89* (15.82)
Relative income	5.427 (8.702)	36.08 (43.19)	7.149 (10.38)	7.430 (10.50)	70.69 (43.01)
Parent Source Country GEI			-7.310 (11.07)	-19.51 (15.35)	-22.26 (18.81)
wifeEarnsMore x Parent GEI				37.30 (24.17)	39.60 (25.07)
Constant	-43.33** (20.87)	-242.4*** (87.90)	-37.74 (24.93)	-32.49 (26.73)	-207.8** (81.32)
Observations	1,519	965	1,295	1,295	821
R-squared	0.345	0.269	0.355	0.357	0.290
Mean	27.43	24.40	27.55	27.55	24.55
Sample Restriction	none	both spouses have positive income	none	none	both spouses have positive income

Notes. Data source are ATUS/CPS from 2003 to 2015. The sample is restricted to female, married individuals who are between 18 and 65 years old and whose spouse is also between 18 and 65 years old. The sample is further restricted to couples where both spouses are present at the time of the ATUS interview, and where at least one of the spouses is employed at the time of the ATUS interview (irrespective of that person being present at, or absent from, work at the time of the interview). Same sex couples are excluded. wifeIncome (husbandIncome) is the wife's (husband's) weekly earnings at main job. Earnings are drawn from the ATUS interview for the spouse that completes that interview and from the CPS interview for the other spouse; earnings from the CPS interview are changed to 0 if that spouse is not working at the time of the ATUS interview. Earnings are measured in logs. Top coded earnings values are inflated by 50%. Observations with negative income are set to missing. Observations with zero income are assigned zero log earnings as well. relativeIncome is the share of the household income earned by the wife. The key independent variable wifeEarnsMore is an indicator variable for whether relativeIncome > 0.5. All regressions include the log of the wife's income, \ln of the husband's income, cubic in the log of wife's and husband's income, log of the total household income, year, state, and day of the week fixed effects, the wife and the husband's race dummy variables (white omitted), a quadratic in wife and husband's age, indicator variables for the wife's and the husband's education groups (four categories), children controls, and indicator variables for whether only the husband is working, and whether only the wife is working. "Children controls" include indicator variables for whether the respondent has no children, whether the youngest child is 3 or younger, between 4 and 6, or is older than 6. Each observation is weighted using the ATUS/CPS weight. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***significant at 1% level, **at 5%, *at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the birthplace level for immigrants and parent's birthplace level for second generation immigrants

Table 10. Effect of Wife Earning More Than Husband on Total Nonmarket Time: Males

Panel A: All Males	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
wifeEarnsMore	0.441 (0.470)	0.869* (0.483)			
Relative income	0.813 (1.729)	-5.510 (5.539)			
Constant	3.862 (4.577)	2.580 (6.659)			
Observations	23,182	13,869			
R-squared	0.124	0.125			
Mean	16.57	16.56			
Panel B: Native Males					
wifeEarnsMore	0.455 (0.529)	0.902* (0.546)			
Relative income	-1.845 (2.027)	-6.740 (6.249)			
Constant	9.383* (5.414)	8.973 (7.528)			
Observations	17,878	11,292			
R-squared	0.124	0.129			
Mean	17.10	16.88			
Panel C: Immigrant Males					
wifeEarnsMore	1.291 (1.572)	1.017 (1.764)	0.527 (1.531)	-30.47*** (11.12)	-29.09*** (9.194)
Relative income	4.272 (4.509)	5.009 (15.35)	4.382 (4.755)	4.665 (4.752)	8.015 (15.43)
GEI			19.40*** (6.722)	8.662 (6.655)	8.032 (6.849)
wifeEarnsMore x GEI				46.16*** (16.44)	43.46*** (13.00)
Constant	-3.136 (12.17)	-41.21 (73.61)	-14.46 (13.43)	-7.863 (13.79)	-5.738 (74.51)
Observations	4,019	1,799	3,710	3,710	1,660
R-squared	0.156	0.181	0.163	0.165	0.192
Mean	13.95	14.36	14.02	14.02	14.34
Panel D: Second Generation Males					
wifeEarnsMore	-3.165 (2.118)	-1.469 (2.036)	-4.099* (2.225)	-4.592 (18.20)	-2.001 (18.19)
Relative income	10.02 (6.331)	-36.72 (27.35)	10.48 (6.665)	10.48 (6.679)	-33.33 (29.53)
Parent Source Country GEI			-1.163 (9.588)	-1.346 (11.94)	13.43 (15.83)
wifeEarnsMore x Parent GEI				0.723 (28.16)	-1.763 (27.88)
Constant	-39.14* (20.05)	-3.891 (36.76)	-33.06 (21.10)	-32.94 (20.06)	-13.44 (41.67)
Observations	1,285	778	1,088	1,088	665
R-squared	0.174	0.259	0.211	0.211	0.287
Mean	17.36	17.11	17.21	17.21	16.82
Sample Restriction	none	both spouses have positive income	none	none	both spouses have positive income

Notes. Data source are ATUS/CPS from 2003 to 2015. The sample is restricted to male, married individuals who are between 18 and 65 years old and whose spouse is also between 18 and 65 years old. The sample is further restricted to couples where both spouses are present at the time of the ATUS interview, and where at least one of the spouses is employed at the time of the ATUS interview (irrespective of that person being present at, or absent from, work at the time of the interview). Same sex couples are excluded. wifeIncome (husbandIncome) is the wife's (husband's) weekly earnings at main job. Earnings are drawn from the ATUS interview for the spouse that completes that interview and from the CPS interview for the other spouse; earnings from the CPS interview are changed to 0 if that spouse is not working at the time of the ATUS interview. Earnings are measured in logs. Top coded earnings values are inflated by 50%. Observations with negative income are set to missing. Observations with zero income are assigned zero log earnings as well. relativeIncome is the share of the household income earned by the wife. The key independent variable wifeEarnsMore is an indicator variable for whether relativeIncome > 0.5. All regressions include the log of the wife's income, log of the husband's income, cubic in the log of wife's and husband's income, log of the total household income, year, state, and day of the week fixed effects, the wife and the husband's race dummy variables (white omitted), a quadratic in wife and husband's age, indicator variables for the wife's and the husband's education groups (four categories), children controls, and indicator variables for whether only the husband is working, and whether only the wife is working. "Children controls" include indicator variables for whether the respondent has no children, whether the youngest child is 3 or younger, between 4 and 6, or is older than 6. Each observation is weighted using the ATUS/CPS weight. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***significant at 1% level, **at 5%, *at 10%. Robust standard errors clustered at the birthplace level for immigrants and parent's birthplace level for second generation immigrants.

Table A1: Effect on Total Non-Market Work, Housework, and Primary Child Care of Years Since Migration (YSM) for Couples Migrating Together

A. All Married Immigrant Women				B. Married Immigrant Women with Children			
YSM	Total Non-Market Work	Housework	Child Care	YSM	Total Non-Market Work	Housework	Child Care
10	-2.042 (2.5040)	-2.489 (2.3016)	0.4387 (0.7187)	10	-2.423 (2.1515)	-2.9449** (1.4878)	0.527 (1.1912)
20	-3.248 (4.1361)	-3.876 (4.0085)	0.6028 (1.2548)	20	-4.392 (3.7662)	-4.8096 (3.1030)	0.428 (2.0935)
30	-3.618 (5.0169)	-4.161 (5.1973)	0.4923 (1.7376)	30	-5.907 (5.1467)	-5.5941 (5.0860)	-0.297 (3.0367)
C. All Married Immigrant Men				D. Married Immigrant Men with Children			
YSM	Total Non-Market Work	Housework	Child Care	YSM	Total Non-Market Work	Housework	Child Care
10	2.072** (0.8481)	0.517 (0.6514)	1.5625*** (0.5772)	10	1.9668*** (0.7618)	0.658 (0.7595)	1.3093 (2.5040)
20	2.78* (1.6008)	0.032 (1.1034)	2.764*** (1.0558)	20	2.4952** (1.2240)	0.01 (1.5626)	2.4872 (4.1361)
30	2.124 (2.8873)	-1.455 (1.8065)	3.6045** (1.5892)	30	1.5852 (2.0803)	-1.944 (2.8023)	3.5337 (5.0169)

Based on regression models controlling for spouse and children's characteristics, which are shown in Tables 3 and 4, columns 3, 7 and 11.

***, ** and *: significant at the 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively, two tailed tests.